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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION  
The rates of return to schooling is one of the most important topics that economists have 
been investigating, especially by utilising the Mincerian model. However, there has been a 
long debate that the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates from the Mincer equation is 
possibly biased due to an endogeneity problem. Hundreds of studies with different methods of 
estimation attempt to deal with the endogeneity bias but they fail to establish a causal effect of 
schoolings on earnings in the absence of randomised experiment. Even though a randomised 
controlled trial (RCT) is the ideal estimation method, it is not feasible to conduct the RCT in 
most of the studies of returns to education. The second-best candidate is the estimation with 
quasi-experiment, e.g. regression discontinuity design (RDD), differences-in-differences, to 
name a few. However, the studies utilising those methods of estimation are rare, especially in 
developing countries where the issue of data scarcity is prevalent. The 1978 compulsory 
education law change in Thailand offers an unusual event which can be used as a 
quasi-experiment in estimating the returns to education. 
Section 1. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This study exploits the opportunity of quasi-experiment in Thailand that occurs from the 
change in compulsory education law to answer these following research questions:  
1. Is there a causal relationship between education and earnings? If yes, how large is the 
effect of education on earnings?  
2. What is the most dominant source of bias in the OLS estimation?  
3. What is an interplay between the rates of return to schooling and economic 
development? What is a role of different stages of economic development in explaining a 
magnitude and a direction of a bias of the estimated returns? And what is a role of the 
estimated returns in explaining the development process? 
4. How does heterogeneity in individuals’ demographic characteristics affect the returns to 
schooling and the magnitude and the direction of the endogeneity bias?  
Section 2. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 First, this study aims to establish the causal relationship between education and earnings 
by utilising the classic Mincer model. The second objective is to interpret the estimated rates 
of return to schooling and their bias, both in terms of the magnitude and direction, in the 
context of Thai social and economic development. Third, this study tries to examine the effect 




Section 3. RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS 
This study makes three main contributions in terms of methodology and also substantive 
aspect in the context of Thailand and, by implication, developing countries in general.  
First, the previous literature reveals that there is a quite different pattern of the relative 
magnitudes of the estimates from OLS and instrumental variables (IV) estimation using 
compulsory schooling as IV between developed and developing countries. Investigating this 
difference can contribute to a better understanding of (a) how and when the conventional 
“ability bias” matters in estimating returns to schooling and (b) the impact of compulsory 
schooling in different settings. 
The second contribution is in terms of substantive aspect in the context of Thailand. As 
Thailand experienced rapid economic development and structural transformation during 
1960-1990, obtaining the rates of return to education in this period helps us better understand 
the process of Thai economic development as well as the interplay between the rates of return 
to schooling and the economic development process during 1980 to 1990. The overall social 
and economic conditions of the development in Thailand are consistent with the general 
characteristics of other developing countries. Hence, estimating the rates of return to 
schooling in Thailand, by implication, also provides better understandings on the role of 
human capital in the process of development in other developing countries. Due to the fact 
that developing countries possess radically different degrees of market completeness and 
different quality of institution from those of developed countries, this warrants value for 
investigation of the returns to schooling in the context of developing countries. This further 
investigation possibly gives a different economic pattern and implications of the returns to 
schooling. 
Finally, the third contribution is on the construction of the database and discussion of the 
descriptive analysis for the discrepancies among different demographic characteristics, 
including gender, cohort, area of residence, region of residence, and economic sector. In 
addition to the overall estimates of returns to schooling, another important issue is an issue of 
heterogeneity in educational returns across individuals. Heterogeneity in individuals’ 
demographic characteristics tends to distort the returns to education; for example, the female 
rates of return to education is likely to be higher than those of male. Hence, it is worth 
examining heterogeneous returns to schooling from different demographic characteristics. 
Section 4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
To estimate the rates of return to schooling, this study exploits an opportunity of 
quasi-experiment in Thailand which occurs from a change in compulsory education law in 




Labour Force Survey (LFS) data from 1986 to 2012.   
Fundamentally, the estimation model is based on the Mincer wage equation. The 
presentation of the models is organised in terms of the analytic order of IV estimation.  
First stage least squares regression: 
 
(1-1)    𝑺𝒊 = 𝝅𝟎 + 𝝅𝟏𝑭𝒊 + 𝝅𝟐𝑨𝒊 + 𝝅𝟑𝑨𝒊




(1-2)   𝐥𝐨𝐠 𝒚𝒊 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝑭𝒊 + 𝜶𝟐𝑨𝒊 + 𝜶𝟑𝑨𝒊




(1-3)   𝐥𝐨𝐠 𝒚𝒊 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑺𝒊 + 𝜷𝟐𝑨𝒊 + 𝜷𝟑𝑨𝒊
𝟐 + 𝜷𝟒𝑪𝒊 + 𝜷𝟓𝑹𝒊 + 𝒆𝒊 
 
Second stage least squares regression: 
 
(1-4)   𝐥𝐨𝐠 𝒚𝒊 = 𝜸𝟎 + 𝜸𝟏𝑺?̂? + 𝜸𝟐𝑨𝒊 + 𝜸𝟑𝑨𝒊
𝟐 + 𝜸𝟒𝑪𝒊 + 𝜸𝟓𝑹𝒊 + 𝝑𝒊 
 
Where: Log yi is log of monthly wages of individual i. Si refers to years of education an 
individual i attended, while 𝑆?̂? refers to the fitted value estimated from the first stage least 
squares regression. Fi represents a dummy variable indicating whether an individual 
complying with the 1978 compulsory education law. Control variables include age of an 
individual i as a proxy of working experience (Ai), birth cohort dummies (Ci), and regional 
dummies (Ri). εi, θi, ei, and ϑi represent disturbance terms. 
Section 5. RESEARCH FINDINGS 
First, the IV estimation indicates that the coefficients of years of schooling are statistically 
significant and robust across different specifications. This confirms a causal relationship 
between education attainment and earnings. One additional year of schooling leads to 
approximately 8 per cent increase in monthly wages.  
Second, the result shows that the OLS estimates are greater than those of IV around 3 per 
cent. This indicates that the net effect of different sources of endogeneity bias leads to the 
overestimated rates of return to schooling in the OLS regression. In the context of Thailand, 
the ability bias outweighs other sources of bias, including the discount rate bias and the 
measurement error bias.  




educational opportunity during the early period of social and economic development. There 
are two sources of ability bias, including the ability bias from a selection of more-able child 
within poor households and the ability bias due to higher financial endowment in rich families. 
This finding may possibly be generalised to the case of other developing countries, which 
share similar social and economic context with Thailand. 
Fourth, with the disaggregated analyses by different demographic characteristics, it is 
generally observed higher returns to schooling for women, older cohort, urban area, the North 
and Northeast regions, and service sector. These results can be explained in the context of 
Thai development process. In addition, higher bias gap is prevalent in subsamples of women, 
older cohort, rural area, the North and Northeast regions, and agricultural sector. Again, 
income and educational opportunity inequality during the early period of social and economic 
development help explain the higher bias gap in those socially disadvantaged groups. With 
less educational opportunity and high poverty, socially disadvantaged households tend to 
choose only most-able children to send to school since they cannot bear costs of education for 
all children in a household. This is consistent with the general ability bias hypothesis that 
argues more-able individuals tend to have higher schooling. 
Section 6. ORGANISATION OF THE DISSERTATION 
This dissertation consists of eight chapters. Chapter 2 provides readers with a 
comprehensive overview of Thai economic and educational development during 1960-1990. 
Chapter 3 revisits the Mincer model to show its validity and provides a comprehensive 
literature review in terms of potential biases from various methods of estimation in the study 
of returns to education. Chapter 4 presents a general theoretical framework of the analysis of 
returns to education. Chapter 5 discusses the data, methodology, and identification strategy 
employed in this study. The empirical results with the discussions from IV estimation and 
disaggregated analysis of returns to schooling are provided in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, 
respectively. Finally, the last Chapter concludes this dissertation, suggests policy implications, 





CHAPTER 2. THAI ECONOMIC AND EDUCATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
This chapter intends to provide readers with a comprehensive overview of Thai 
development in terms of economics and education during 1960-1990. The overall background 
helps understanding the interpretation and discussion of empirical results in the later chapters. 
The organisation of this chapter is as followings: Section 1 describes the overall economic 
and educational development in Thailand and shows that the situation of the development in 
Thailand is consistent with the general characteristics of developing countries suggested by 
Behrman and Srinivasan (1995). Section 2 provides a background of the demand side and 
supply side of Thai education. Section 3 portrays a detailed situation of migration in Thailand. 
Finally, Section 4 concludes this chapter. 
Section 1. THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPMENT IN THAILAND 
This section provides a background of the process of development in Thailand, both in 
terms of economics and education, and illustrates that the situation of the development in 
Thailand is consistent with the characteristics of developing countries proposed by Behrman 
and Srinivasan (1995). They suggest that developing countries possess different degrees of 
market completeness and different quality of institutions from developed countries. While 
market with a highly competitive level and advanced institutions are observed in developed 
countries, malfunctioned market and institutions are prevalent in developing countries. The 
followings are the proposed characteristics of developing economies in comparison with 
developed ones. First, a majority of population still depends heavily on agricultural sector and 
rural labour activities. Second, in agricultural sector, it is common for family members to help 
working without formal pay; therefore, non-wage labour accounts for a large proportion of the 
total labour force in developing economies. Third, there has been a rapid growth of labour 
force in developing countries. Fourth, high labour participation rates among 15-64 year olds 
can be observed due to low human capital investments among young cohorts. Fifth, there are 
low school enrolment rates and the education gap is in favour of males. Sixth, lower 
non-labour production inputs per worker are observed in developing countries. 
2.1.1. Overall Economic Development and Structural Transformation 
Thailand has been one of the fastest growing countries in the world. According to Figure 
2-1, from 1960 - 2014, the average annual growth rate of real GDP is 6.16 per cent. GDP per 
capita has been growing substantially during the past decades. Thailand reached its peak in 




export-oriented policy, and hit its bottom in 1998 with a negative growth at -7.6 per cent due 
to the 1997 Asian financial crisis originated from Thailand, so-called Tom Yum Kung crisis. A 
standard of living has been improving significantly as per capita GDP has been increasing 
substantially during the past fifty years. However, Thailand was caught in a middle-income 
trap for a long period of time. With a prolonged political unarrest, the future of Thai economy 
is still in gloom. From 2006 to present, severe fluctuations in Thai economy can be observed. 
Figure 2-1 Real GDP Growth and Per Capita GDP in Thailand, 1960-2014 
 
Source:  Author’s compilation based on data from World Development Indicators, 2016. 
Table 2-1 Period of Economic Growth 
Thailand Rates of Growth of GDP and GDP per capita, 1951-2003 
Period Real GDP growth 
Real GDP growth  
per capita 
1951-1986 Pre-boom 6.5 3.9 
1987-1996 Boom 9.2 8 
1997-1998 Crisis -6.1 -7.1 
1999-2003 Post-Crisis 4.0 3.3 
Whole period 1951 to 2003 6.2 4.2 
Source: Siriprachai, 2009. 
According to Warr (2005), Thai economy can be divided into four main periods, namely 
pre-boom (1951-1986), boom (1987-1996), crisis (1997-1998), and post-crisis (1999 
onwards). Table 2-1 shows different periods of economic growth in Thailand from 1951-2003. 
During 1951-1986, this period is characterised as a pre-boom period which the real GDP 






















































































































































basic physical infrastructure, e.g. road, electricity, to name a few, to help facilitating trading 
and the growth of the economy. The real GDP growth rate jumped to 9.2 per cent during the 
boom period, 1987-1996. This is considered as an economic miracle growth in Thailand. 
However, Thailand experienced a financial crisis in 1997 and faced a negative GDP growth at 
6.1 per cent, which is the lowest in the Thai economic history. In the post-crisis period, 
Thailand managed to bounce back and achieved a real GDP growth rate of 4 per cent. The 
overall average real GDP growth and real GDP growth per capita are around 6.2 per cent and 
4.2 per cent, respectively, during 1951-2003. 
 Figure 2-2 demonstrates Thai income growth for the last five decades in a comparative 
East Asian perspective. Data on GDP per capita is presented for eight East Asian countries, 
including Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, China, India (South Asia)
1
, Korea, Japan, and 
Singapore. Comparing with other countries, Thai economy is doing fairly well even after the 
financial crisis. Figure 2-3 compares real GDP of East Asian countries by indexing level of 
real GDP to 100. This figure emphasises the fact that Thailand is one of the fastest growing 
economies during 1986-1996. Thailand shows the highest level of real GDP among other East 
Asian countries.  
The high GDP growth is claimed to be the result of the structural transformation during 
the pre-boom period, 1951-1986. Thailand went through the structural transformation from a 
primitive agriculture-based economy to newly industrialised economy. According to Figure 
2-4, the share in GDP of the agricultural sector sharply declined, from nearly 40 per cent in 
1960 to 25.9 per cent in 1970. Owing to industrial development, a crossing point between the 
share of agriculture and manufacture could be observed. In 1971, it was the first time that the 
share of manufacture outweighed that of agriculture. The share of agricultural sector gradually 
dropped to 23.2, 12.8, and 8.5 in 1980, 1990, and 2000, respectively. On the other hand, the 
share of manufacturing sector raised from 20 per cent in 1960 to 25 per cent in 1970. It kept 
rising to 28.7, and 37.2 in 1980 and 1990, respectively. The share remained constant after 
1990.  
Table 2-2 summarises the sectoral composition of Thailand’s shares of GDP and annual 
GDP growth performance into different decades of development. The agricultural sector 
played an important role in Thai economy and act as an engine of economic development in 
the 1960s and 1970s (Suphannachart and Thirawat). As previously discussed, the 
manufacturing sector surpassed the agricultural sector in 1971 and the role of manufacturing 
sector became even more important in 1980s and afterwards. In terms of GDP growth, the 
role of agricultural sector has declined substantially over time.  
Table 2-3 indicates the sectoral composition of Southeast Asian countries’ shares of GDP 
in 1981, 1990, and 2003. Although different countries experience different levels of economic 
                                                        
1 Even though India is located in South Asia, it is included in the analysis as it is considered as a fast growing 




development, every country seems to go through a similar structural transformation. Except 
for Myanmar and Singapore, the share of GDP by manufacturing sector in every country 
increases over time, while a drop in the share of GDP by agricultural sector can be observed. 
Hence, Southeast Asian countries go through structural transformation from agriculture-based 
economies to industrialised economies in a similar period of time with different paces of 
development. The middle income and developing countries such as Thailand, Malaysia, 
Indonesia, and Vietnam have relatively greater structural change, compared to the developed 
and the least developed countries. For example, in Thailand, the agricultural share of GDP 
dropped from 21.4 per cent in 1981 to 12.5 per cent in 1990 and declined further to 9.7 per 
cent in 2003. As Singapore underwent the structural transformation long before other 
Southeast Asian countries, Singapore is already considered as a developed country moving 
forward to service-based economy. Table 2-3 indicates that Singapore’s GDP is mainly driven 
by the service sector, which is roughly 60 per cent of its GDP. On the other hand, Myanmar is 
considered as a least developed economy heavily based on primitive agricultural sector. 
Hence, even in a recent year, the share of agricultural sector is still high which constitutes half 
of its GDP. Overall, Table 2-3 shows that the decline of agricultural share and the rise of 
industrial share can be observed simultaneously in most of the Southeast Asian countries. 
Similar to most of industrialisation process in other countries, this implies that the industrial 
sector is developed at the expense of the agricultural sector. 
Figure 2-2 Income Growth in East Asian Countries during 1960-2014 
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Figure 2-3 Real GDP in East Asia, 1986-1996 
 
Source: Warr (2011) based on data from Asian Development Bank. 
 
 
Figure 2-4 Structural Transformation: Net Output as % of GDP (%), 1960 - 2014   
 





































































































































Table 2-2 Shares of GDP and Annual GDP Growth Rates by Economic Sector  
 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Shares of GDP (%) 
Agriculture 29.04 24.52 18.40 11.75 9.52 
Manufacturing 16.62 20.81 23.98 30.89 38.30 
Services 11.49 11.99 13.39 10.81 11.50 
Annual GDP Growth Rates (%) 
Agriculture 6.67 4.49 4.27 1.72 1.68 
Manufacturing 10.78 9.49 8.77 8.14 5.35 
Services 7.96 7.87 7.04 4.40 4.39 
All sectors 8.36 6.92 7.24 5.28 4.06 
Source: Suphannachart and Thirawat based on data from National Economic and Social Development Board. 
 
Table 2-3 Sectoral Shares in GDP (percentage)* 
 Agriculture Industry Manufacturing** Services 
1981 1990 2003 1981 1990 2003 1981 1990 2003 1981 1990 2003 
Brunei na na na na na na na na na na na na 
Cambodia na 55.6 37.2 na 11.2 26.8 na 5.2 19.3 na 33.2 36 
Indonesia 23.9 19.4 16.6 41.2 39.1 43.6 12.1 20.7 24.6 34.9 41.5 39.8 
Lao PDR 81.2 61.2 48.6 9.9 14.5 25.9 na 9.9 19.2 8.9 24.3 25.5 
Malaysia 23.0 15.0 9.1 35.6 41.5 47.0 19.7 23.8 30.2 41.4 43.5 43.9 
Myanmar 47.4 57.3 57.1 12.4 10.5 10.5 9.3 7.8 7.8 40.2 32.2 32.4 
Philippines 24.9 21.9 14.4 39.2 34.5 32.4 25.5 24.8 22.9 35.9 43.6 53.2 
Singapore 1.2 0.3*** 0.1*** 37.9 32.7 33.0 28.5 25.5 26.3 60.9 67.0 66.9 
Thailand 21.4 12.5 9.7 30.1 37.2 44.0 22.6 27.2 35.2 48.5 50.3 46.3 
Vietnam 55.0 38.7 21.8 25.0 22.7 40.0 na 12.3 20.8 20.0 38.6 38.2 
Note: * The sectoral classification has been revised to be in accordance with the International Standard 
Industrial Classification of all Economic Activities (ISIC): Agriculture also contains the Forestry and Fishing 
sub-sectors; Industry includes the Mining and quarrying, Manufacturing, Electricity, gas, and water supply and 
Construction sub-sectors. All other sub-sectors are classified under Services. Also, apart from figures of Lao 
PDR in 1981 that are calculated from data at a constant 1986 factor cost, all figures are calculated from data at 
current market prices. 
** Manufacturing is a component of Industry. 
*** Comprises the Mining sub-sector, which is normally a component of Industry.; na: not available. 
Source: Numnak (2006) based on data from Asian Development Bank (1999) for 1981 and Asian Development 















Total GDP 6.7 9.5 -2.5 5.0 6.4 
Agriculture 4.5 2.6 0.1 2.7 3.3 
Industry 8.5 12.8 -1.7 6.2 8.4 
Services 6.8 9 -3.6 4.3 6.1 
Source: Warr (2011) based on data from Bank of Thailand (1951-1986) and National Economic and Social 
Development Board (1987-2006). 
Table 2-5 Total Factor Productivity Growth by Sectors, 1980 to 2002 
Average Growth Rates  
(Per Cent Per Annum) 
Aggregate Agriculture Manufacture Services 
Output 6.01 2.64 8.09 5.53 
Raw Labour 2.19 1.50 5.25 3.47 
Human Capital 2.49 9.43 11.35 6.90 
Physical Capital 9.05 8.50 13.84 18.47 
Agricultural Land 1.12 1.12 0 0 
Source: Author’s compilation adjusted from Warr (2011) based on data from National Economic and Social 
Development Board. 
Table 2-4 provides similar information as that of Table 2-2. It depicts the sectoral 
composition of Thailand’s annual GDP growth performance into different period of economic 
development. However, in Table 2-4, it is possible to observe resilience of each economic 
sector after the 1997 financial crisis. Agriculture seems to have the highest resilience as it 
manages to bounce back to the same growth level achieved before the crisis. However, the 
manufacturing and the service sectors take a longer time to get back to the growth level 
achieved before the crisis. Hence, the agricultural sector is the first sector to help stabilising 
the economic growth after the crisis. Even though the agricultural sector contributes to the 
GDP less than the manufacturing sector does and indicates the lowest annual GDP growth 
rate among all sectors, it seems that the agricultural sector has been playing an important role 
in Thai economic development even after the structural change.    
The agricultural sector contributes not only to the economic stability but also to the 
development of other economic sectors. As previously argued, the manufacturing sector is 
developed at the expense of the agricultural sector. Resources from the agricultural sector 
such as labour force, land, and capital have been drawn to other sectors, especially the 
manufacturing sector, while the agricultural sector manages to maintain its output (Warr, 
2011). Since resources from the agricultural sector are allocated to other sectors, there has 
been insufficient Government investment in research and development regarding domestic 




slow growth can be observed in agricultural sector. Thai agricultural sector is still backward 
and traditional. During the period of social and economic development, the agricultural 
growth is solely driven by expanding cultivated areas (Siriprachai, 2009) rather than utilising 
agricultural technology advancement. Land productivity remains very low and stable, while 
labour productivity increases substantially (James, et al., 1987; Timmer, 1991; Watanabe, 
1992). An increase in labour productivity leads to a contraction of agriculture as a share of 
total output. According to Table 2-5, it can be observed that the output growth from the 
agricultural sector (2.64 per cent) is lower than those from the manufacturing (8.09 per cent) 
and the service sector (5.53 per cent).  
Thai agricultural sector plays another crucial role in economic development since it 
serves as an important source of income for a majority of Thai population. Behrman and 
Srinivasan (1995) suggest that a majority of population still depends heavily on agricultural 
sector and rural labour activities in developing countries. This also holds true in the case of 
Thailand. Figure 2-5 indicates sectoral employment during 1977-2003. Even though the 
employment share in the agricultural sector has been declining over time, it still remains 
substantially larger than the other economic sectors, especially during the period of social and 
economic development, 1970-1997. This emphasises the fact that agriculture has a far larger 
role in the economy in terms of the employment. The declining share of agricultural labour is 
due to the effect of the structural transformation, which labour from the agricultural sector is 
allocated to the manufacturing sector, especially over the last ten years. The employment 
share in the agricultural sector fell from roughly 70 per cent in 1977 to 40 per cent in 2003. As 
a consequence, the shares of the employment in the manufacturing and the service sectors in 
2003 have approximately doubled since 1977. Although both sectors’ share of employment 
has increased gradually, they are still less dominant than the agricultural sector. These 30 
percentage points of the declining share in the agricultural sector go to the manufacturing 
sector 20 points and the service sector 10 points. Table 2-6 provides more detailed 
information on sectoral employment for modern economic period. It emphasises the 
importance of the agricultural sector in supporting Thai labour even in the modern economy. 
Even though its employment share dropped to 42 per cent in 2002, the agricultural sector is 
still the most dominant sector.   
In addition, Thailand also goes through another structural transformation in terms of 
export and import pattern. Thailand changes from agriculture produce exporter, e.g. rice, to 
manufactured goods exporter, especially garments and parts and components. Siriprachai 
(2009) divides Thai industrial development into four phases based on the characteristics of 
import and export activities. The first period is the period of import substitution (1961-1971). 
From this period, the Government started to allocate a larger portion of the Government 
budget towards manufacturing sector, e.g. food processing. The expansion of manufacturing 




it is often argued that the expansion of the manufacturing sector is at the expense of the 
agricultural sector. To promote import substitution, the Government protected domestic 
industries targeting the domestic market. However, the domestic market soon became 
saturated. Hence, in the second phase the Government shifted its emphasis to export-oriented 
industries, e.g. textiles. This phase refers to the period of export promotion (1972-1976). Due 
to the world recession, this industrial development strategy was not successful. The next 
phase is called the Big Push (1977-1982). The main Government strategy was to focus on 
development of necessary infrastructure and enhancement of domestic industry. The Eastern 
Seaboard Development Programme (ESDP) was initiated to build an industrial complex in the 
East area of Thailand. Moreover, the discovery of natural gas in the Gulf of Thailand helped 
contributing to the success of the large scale industrial development plan. Since 1983, the 
Government moved forward to the next phase of industrial development, manufacturing 
export led growth. In this phase, the Government implemented the development strategy in 
favour of foreign investors to attract foreign direct investment. Industries such as parts and 
components, automobiles, and electrical appliances demonstrated a high growth. This 
contributed mainly to the fast growth of Thai economy at that time. This phase of industrial 
development corresponded to the boom period of the overall economy. Thailand successfully 
underwent the second structural transformation from agriculture produce exporter to 
manufactured goods exporter. 
 
Figure 2-5 Sector Employment Share, 1977-2003 
 









Table 2-6 Labour Force Status: Thailand (Unit: thousands) 
 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1995 1997 1998 2002 
Labour Force 27,525 28,732 29,614 30,283 30,809 32,175 32,780 32,596 34,292 
Employed Persons 
Total 25,220 26,174 27,727 28,061 28,812 30,815 31,714 30,775 33,133 
Agriculture 16,070 15,659 17,379 17,020 17,129 14,389 14,315 14,056 13,792 
Manufacturing 2,300 2,739 2,611 3,104 3,322 4,609 4,644 4,556 5,257 
Construction 678 817 809 947 2,649 2,248 2,502 1,661 1,701 
Commerce 2,707 3,086 3,031 3,063 2,935 3,909 4,207 4,257 4,989 
Employed Persons (%) 
Agriculture 63.72 59.83 62.67 60.65 59.45 46.69 45.14 45.67 41.63 
Manufacturing 9.12 10.46 9.42 11.06 11.53 14.96 14.64 14.80 15.87 
Construction 2.69 3.12 2.92 3.37 9.19 7.30 7.89 5.40 5.13 
Commerce 10.73 11.79 10.93 10.92 10.19 12.69 13.26 13.83 15.06 
Unemployed 
Persons 
1,445 1,795 1,277 1,178 1,061 550 495 1,423 766 
Unemployment 
Rate (%) 
5.25 6.25 4.31 3.89 3.44 1.72 1.53 4.37 2.24 
Source: Krongkaew, Chamnivickorn, and Nitithanprapas (2006) based on data from Labour Force Survey 
1986-2002, National Statistical Office and Thailand Development Indicators, 1990-1999, National Economic 
and Social Development Board. 
2.1.2. Non-Wage Labour and Informal Sector2 
Table 2-7 Thai Labour Market: Formal and Informal Employment (Per Cent) 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Employment rate 93.7 94.2 94.8 96.4 
Share of Employment 
Formal Sector 26.7 28.1 27.5 27.9 
Informal Sector 73.3 71.9 72.5 72.1 
Source: Krongkaew, Chamnivickorn, and Nitithanprapas (2006) based on data from Labour Force Survey. 
 Table 2-7 depicts the fact that the informal sector plays an important role in Thai labour 
market as it dominates more than 70 per cent of the total employment. The share of informal 
sector is expected to be even higher during the early stage of social and economic 
development. The informal sector includes both own account workers and informal employers 
                                                        
2 According to ILO (1993), informal sector is defined as, “The informal sector is broadly characterised as 
consisting of units engaged in the production of goods or services with the primary objective of generating 
employment and incomes to the persons concerned. These units typically operate at a low level of organisation, 
with little or no division between labour and capital as factors of production and on a small scale. Labour 
relations - where they exist - are based mostly on casual employment, kinship or personal and social relations 




such as unpaid family workers, which are usually characterised as non-wage labour. Table 
2-8 indicates employment by work status during 1985-2002. In 1985, the share of unpaid 
family workers amounts to 42.9 per cent but decreases to 25.6 per cent in 2002. Although the 
decline of the share of unpaid family workers can be observed, it still covers a large 
proportion of employment even in the modern economy. During the same period, the share of 
own account workers remains stable at roughly 30 per cent. Hence, Table 2-8 points out the 
quantitative importance of non-wage labour since the share of both unpaid family worker and 
own account worker involves a majority of Thai employment.     
Table 2-8 Employment by Work Status, 1985-2002 (Per Cent) 
 1985 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Employer 1.0 1.2 2.9 2.5 2.3 2.5 2.9 3.4 2.9 3.2 
Government Employee 6.2 6.0 7.5 7.1 7.3 8.4 8.6 8.2 8.5 7.8 
Private Employee 19.2 22.5 28.2 30.6 30.3 28.1 29.7 31.4 31.9 32.2 
Own Account Worker 30.7 29.8 30.2 30.9 29.8 31.2 31.7 30.1 32.0 31.2 
Unpaid Family Worker 42.9 40.5 31.2 28.9 30.3 29.8 27.1 26.9 24.7 25.6 
Note: 1) Data are extracted from tables titled ‘Employed Persons by Work Status, Industry and Sex’ or ‘Number 
of Employed Persons by Work Status, Industry and Sex (Quarter 3)’ from the source. 
 2) From 2001, Own Account Workers also included those in Member of Producers’ Cooperatives. 
Source: Author’s compilation adjusted from Numnak (2006) based on data from National Statistical Office 
(1987-2002). 
 It is generally observed that non-wage labour has lower income. Table 2-9 indicates that 
almost half of the agricultural labour lived below the poverty line in 1988. Even though 
headcount ratio of agricultural sector has been declining over time due to the industrial 
growth, the poverty is still dominant in the agricultural sector. On the other hand, headcount 
ratios from the other economic sectors are relatively low and demonstrate a declining trend 
over time. In 2002, less than 10 per cent of labour in the other sectors lived below the poverty 
line. Although the agricultural sector has the highest resilience among all economic sectors, 
agricultural labour seems to be substantively vulnerable to the economic shock. After the 
1997 financial crisis, headcount ratio in the agricultural sector increased from 19.2 per cent in 
1996 to 26.2 per cent in 2002. In contrast, headcount ratios of the other sectors went up 
around 1-2 per cent and dropped back to the same level in 2000, except for the construction 
sector which suffers severely from the crisis. As the majority of agricultural labour are either 
classified as own account worker or unpaid family worker, it can be concluded from Table 
2-9 that, on average, non-wage labour is poorer than wage labour and more vulnerable to 
economic shock. Table 2-10 reinforces the previous discussion. It shows that headcount ratios 
of unpaid family worker and own account worker are the highest among all working status. 
Nevertheless, in more recent years, the poverty of own account worker becomes less 




 In conclusion, Thailand faces the same situation as other developing countries where 
informal sector and non-wage labour, especially unpaid family workers in agriculture at lower 
incomes, is much more important (Behrman and Srinivasan, 1995), at least quantitatively as 
the share of both unpaid family worker and own account worker accounts for a majority of 
Thai employment. Moreover, non-wage labour tends to have lower income and tend to be 
more vulnerable to exogenous shocks.  
Table 2-9 Headcount Ratios by Types of Enterprises 
Types of 
Enterprises 
1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 
Agricultural 45.7 38.6 35.1 25.9 19.2 22.5 26.2 17.6 
Manufacturing 16.5 17.6 17.0 7.9 6.8 8.2 6.8 6.3 
Construction 15.4 10.8 1.4 4.5 1.4 0.4 6.8 0.6 
Trades 11.1 8.2 6.3 3.6 1.6 3.1 3.3 2.2 
Services 14.9 11.6 7.3 5.5 3.5 4.3 2.9 2.4 
Source: Krongkaew, Chamnivickorn, and Nitithanprapas (2006) based on data from Socio-Economic Surveys 
Table 2-10 Headcount Ratios by Employment Status 
Working Status 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 
Employer 15.8 12.2 15.4 18.3 9.3 
Own account worker 16.4 10.8 10.4 11.4 9.8 
Private employee 8.1 4.6 6.0 5.4 4.8 
Government employee 0.9 0.6 0.5 0.9 0.7 
Unpaid family worker 25.3 17.5 20.7 25.0 16.3 
Unemployed 20.7 8.4 9.5 na 6.7 
Economically inactive 13.5 8.6 10.7 10.5 8.0 
No occupation 11.6 9.1 14.4 8.4 7.1 
Child under 15 and no income from working 21.9 15.2 16.8 19.1 13.2 
Total 16.3 11.4 13.0 14.2 9.8 
Note: na: not available. 
Source: Krongkaew, Chamnivickorn, and Nitithanprapas (2006) based on data from Socio-Economic Surveys 
2.1.3. Labour Force and Labour Participation Rate 
The other characteristics of developing countries are rapid growth of labour force and 
high labour force participation. This is due to the fact that young cohort starts working at early 
ages. Thailand seems to follow these two patterns as well.  
Table 2-11 shows that, compared to developed countries such as the US and Japan, the 




(1950-60) and Japan (1960-70), labour force growed around 1 per cent in both countries. On 
the other hand, Thai labour force growth reached 3.4 per cent during the pre-boom and 2.85 
per cent during the boom period. In terms of employment, there has been a high growth 
during the boom period, which is around 4.7 per cent. Table 2-12 summarises labour force 
growth by industry and shows that labour force growth is highest in the manufacturing sector 
during the pre-boom and boom periods. In contrast, the growth of labour force in the 
agricultural sector is fairly slower. After 1990, negative growth can be observed in the 
agricultural sector. This is due to labour force reallocation from the agricultural sector to the 
manufacturing sector during the rapid economic expansion.       
 Table 2-12 supports the fact that there is a high labour force participation rate in Thailand. 
The overall labour participation rate and the rate of 15-24 years old move along each other 
and remain constant for a decade. However, the rate for 15-24 years old starts to decline 
thereafter. This is possibly a result of educational opportunity expansion. As the decline of 
participation rate of labour aged 15-24 years begins, the overall labour participation rate also 
decreases simultaneously. Although the declining portion of the rate for 15-24 years old does 
not exactly match with that of the overall rate, it is possible to conclude that the high 
participation rate is partly due to the high participation of the young cohorts. During 
1980-1990, high participation rate among labour aged 15-24 years can be observed in 
Thailand, which means that there is low enrolment in secondary school and higher education. 
This statement is supported by Figure 2-7 which illustrates that students tend to enrol in 
school only until the final grade of primary school (grade 6) and that significantly low 
numbers of students enrol in secondary school.  
Table 2-11 Growth of Thailand’s Economy in Different Areas, 1970-2003 





Thailand the US Japan 
1950-60 na na na na na 1.10 1.3* 
1960-70 na na na na 1.92 1.60 1.4** 
1970-80 6.7 6.4 5.2 2.1 3.41 2.00 na 
1980-90 7.8 10.9 8.2 4.7 2.85 1.20 na 
1990-2000 4.5 -2.4 7.9 2.8*** na 1.00 na 
1970-1996 7.5 8.9 7.8 2.8 na na na 
1996-2003 1.5 -8.3 2.0 1.3 na na na 
Note: Employment data begin in 1971 and are based on the annual average of a varying number of survey 
rounds. The capital stock is available only through 2002.  
* 1959-62; ** 1962-1967;***1990-1997; na: not available. 
Source: Bosworth (2005) based on data from National Accounts of Thailand, National Economic and Social 
Development Board. Labour force data are from Sarntisart (2000) for Thailand, Toosi (2002) for the US, and 













Table 2-12 Growth of Labour Force by Industry 
 1970 1980 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Total 1.92 3.41 2.85 -5.26 5.39 -0.37 -1.68 2.16 
Agriculture 1.54 2.45 1.61 -16.94 5.62 -5.98 -6.69 -5.21 
Manufacturing 3.78 6.72 9.12 16.77 7.51 6.26 0.28 9.96 
Other 3.47 6.41 4.48 14.94 4.12 7.06 5.49 9.50 
Source: Author’s compilation adjusted from Sarntisart (2000) based on data from Labour Force Surveys of 
multiple years. 
Figure 2-6 Labour Force Participation Rate (%) 
 
Source: Author’s compilation based on data from World Development Indicators, 2016. 
Figure 2-7 Number of Students Enrolment by Education Level (Grade), 1964-1984 
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2.1.4. Human Capital Investment and Gender Inequality  
In Thailand, human capital investments are fairly low. According to Table 2-13, a 
majority of labour force, 79 per cent, completes only primary education during the boom 
period. Roughly 6 per cent still has no education. Even though there is an increase in the share 
of labour force attaining secondary education and higher education over time, the level is still 
unsatisfactory even in a more modern economic era. In 2002, 23.6 per cent of labour force 
possesses secondary education degree, while 11.7 per cent obtain higher education. This 
leaves the majority of labour force with at most a primary education.  
Table 2-13 Percentage of Labour Force by Level of Education Attainment since 1986 
 1986 1990 1995 2000 2002 
No Education 5.8 5.4 4.1 3.4 3.3 
Primary and less 79.0 78.1 74.7 64.6 61.3 
Secondary 9.9 11.0 14.3 21.5 23.6 
Higher education 4.8 5.4 6.8 10.5 11.7 
Other 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.03 0.1 
Note: 1) Data are computed from figures in tables titled ‘Population 11 Years and Over by Level of Education 
and Sex’, ‘Population 13 Years and Over by Level of Education and Sex’, or ‘Population 15 Years and Over by 
Level of Education and Sex’ of the source. 2) Person in labour force, 11 years of age and over in 1986, 13 years 
of age between 1990 and 2000, and 15 years of age in 2002. 
Source: Numnak (2006) based on data from National Statistical Office (1989; 1993; 1996; 2000b; 2002). 
 Table 2-14 shows adult literacy rate and net enrolment ratio by region and selected Asian 
countries in 1997. By international standards, the net secondary enrolment rate in Thailand is 
in a severe situation. The rate is 47.6 per cent which is the second to the bottom in the region 
and is lower than the regional average and the world average by roughly 10 per cent and 17.8 
per cent, respectively. In contrast, the secondary enrolment rates in developed countries such 
as Japan and Korea are 99.9 per cent and that of Singapore is 75.6 per cent which is one of the 
highest rates in the region. It seems that Thai economic growth miracle is driven by a small 
portion of highly educated human resource. However, high literacy rate owing to universal 
primary education helps prepare a majority of labour force to function properly in the 
industrialised process. With low enrolment rate in secondary education and higher education, 
it seems that Thai social and economic development may not be sustainable. As commonly 
observed in other Asian and developing countries, there also has been a gender gap in 
educational opportunity and labour market in Thailand. It is always the case that human 
capital investments are in favour of males.  
 Figure 2-8 indicates that percentage of males who complete a certain educational level is 
higher than that of females in every level of education, including four years of primary 
education, lower secondary education, upper secondary education, and higher education. 
Hence, there is discrimination against women in education at all levels. Gandhi-Kingdon 
(2002) explains this situation as “unexplained parental discrimination”. Given the same level 




early stage of social and economic development, market distortions such as gender 
discrimination prevent women to attend schools. The gender gap in education persists over 
time and is widest for older cohorts. However, the situation in Thailand has been improving 
and the gap seems to be closed at all level of education since 1990. 
Table 2-14 Adult Literacy Rate and Net Enrolment Ratio by Region and Selected Asian 
Countries, 1997 
 Adult Literacy 
Rate (%) 
Net Primary Enrolment 
Ratio (%) 
Net Secondary Enrolment 
Ratio (%) 
World na 87.6 65.4 
Southeast Asia and the 
Pacific 
na 97.8 58.3 
Japan na 99.9 99.9 
South Korea 97.2 99.9 99.9 
Singapore 91.4 91.4 75.6 
China 82.9 99.9 70.0 
India 53.5 77.2 59.7 
The Philippines 94.6 99.9 77.8 
Malaysia 85.7 99.9 64.0 
Thailand 94.7 88.0 47.6 
Indonesia 85.0 99.2 56.1 
Lao PDR 58.6 73.0 63.4 
Cambodia na 99.9 38.8 
Vietnam 91.9 99.9 55.1 
Myanmar 83.6 99.3 54.2 
Source: Numnak (2006) based on data from UNDP (1999). 
Figure 2-8 The Closing of the Gender Gap in Schooling 
 
Note: Trends in percentage by sex, of persons in Thailand, 1990 (a) completing at least 4 years of schooling, (b) 
completing at least some lower secondary schooling, (c) with at least some upper secondary schooling and (d) 
with at least some tertiary level education. 




Figure 2-9 Factor Intensity in Agriculture 
 
Source: Nidhiprabha (2005) based on data from FAOSTAT. 
2.1.5. Non-labour Production Inputs per Worker 
 Thailand has a significantly low non-labour production inputs per worker, especially in 
the agricultural sector. Figure 2-9 shows that the ratio between imported machine per worker 
is almost close to zero for past 40 years (1961-2001). First, this implies that Thai agricultural 
sector is still backward and traditional. As discussed above, there is slow growth in the 
agricultural sector as its growth is solely driven by expanding cultivated areas (Siriprachai, 
2009) rather than utilising agricultural technology advancement during the period of social 
and economic development. Second, the ratio also implies that there is abundant of labour in 
Thailand, especially in the agricultural sector. These two factors contribute to a low 
non-labour production inputs per worker in Thailand and, in general, in developing countries 
(Behrman and Srinivasan, 1995).      
2.1.6. Poverty Reduction 
Figure 2-10 shows that Thailand has made enormous progress in reducing poverty. 
Headcount ratio has declined steadily from 88.3 per cent in 1962 to 1.2 per cent in 2012. 
However, during 1970-1980, the headcount ratio was roughly 40-50 per cent, which is 
considered to be relatively high. This implies that 40-50 per cent of the population still lived 
below the poverty line even in the midst of high economic growth. Figure 2-11 provides an 
overview of the poverty incidence of Thailand and other Asian countries for past 30 years. In 
general, there is a declining trend of poverty in all countries. Compared with other Asian 
countries, Thailand and Malaysia manage to deal with the poverty incidence very effectively 




Figure 2-10 Poverty Incidence, 1962-2012 (Headcount Measure, % of total Population) 
 
Source: Author`s compilation based on 1962-2002 data from Siriprachai (2009) and 2004-2012 data from World 
Development Indicators (2016). 
Figure 2-11 Poverty Headcount Ratio at $1.90 a day (2011 PPP) 
 
























































































































































Section 2. OVERVIEW OF THAI EDUCATION 
2.2.1. Enrolment Situation   
There has been an increasing trend of enrolment in every education level. Figure 2-12 
illustrates number of student enrolment by education level during 1951-1986. While the 
enrolment rate of lower primary is the highest among all education levels, the number of 
student enrolment in other education levels remains substantially low. This implies that most 
of students drop out after completing the lower primary education which is the compulsory 
education level (before 1978). According to Figure 2-7, between 1977 and 1978, a sharp 
increase in the number of student enrolment of grade 5 and grade 6 could be observed. This is 
due to the change of compulsory education law in 1978, which is utilised as an instrument for 
the estimation.  
Table 2-15 indicates the gross enrolment ratio (GER) during 1960-1983. Thailand 
achieved steady but uneven progress in school enrolment in different education levels. The 
primary education showed the most impressive demand for education as the enrolment rate 
reaches 83 per cent in 1960 and almost 100 per cent in 1983. On the contrary, demand for 
secondary and tertiary education stagnated during 1960-1970. The enrolment rate for tertiary 
education remained at 2 per cent for a decade. However, from 1980, the increasing demand 
for secondary and tertiary education could be observed. There was a 12 percentage point 
increase for both levels of education. This shows a favourable trend in Thai education during 
the early stage of the development. However, there is plenty of room for improvement in the 
enrolment situation, in both secondary and tertiary education. 
According to Table 2-15, gender disparities are less pronounced in the primary education. 
The share of female students is almost half of the total number of enrolment in primary 
education. However, the share of female students is still lower than that of male students in 
every level of education. Moreover, the gender inequality becomes wider and wider in the 
higher levels of education. Large disparities remain, especially in secondary education 
(vocational) and higher education. The observed improvement of the gender equality is fairly 
slow during 1956-1968. The gender disparities in primary education remain constant for a 
decade. In contrast, the situation has been improving gradually in the secondary and tertiary 
education which the share of female is approximately 40 per cent of total number of enrolled 
students. Despite the improvement of gender disparities, it is always the case that human 
capital investments are in favour of males.  
Table 2-8 indicates percentage of male and female enrolment by age and education level 
from which the situation of enrolment rate after 1968 can be inferred. In terms of primary 






 grade students in 1980 and 1970, respectively (Figure 2-14
3
 panel a). The same 
inference can also be applied to other education levels. The enrolment rates of cohorts aged 
15, 25, and 35 in 1990 represents the enrolment rate of the last grade of lower secondary 
education (approximately 15 years old) in 1990, 1980, and 1970, respectively (Figure 2-14 
panel b). Moreover, the enrolment rates of cohorts aged 20, 30, and 40 in 1990 represents the 
enrolment rate of the last grade of upper secondary education (approximately 20 years old) in 
1990, 1980, and 1970, respectively (Figure 2-14 panel c). Lastly, the enrolment rates of 
cohorts aged 25, 35, and 45 in 1990 represents the enrolment rate of the last year of the 
university (roughly 25 years old) in 1990, 1980, and 1970, respectively (Figure 2-14 panel d). 
The ages used in the deduction are approximated; therefore, Figure 2-14only provides a rough 
idea of the male and female enrolment rates in different education levels in 1970, 1980 and 
1990. Figure 2-14 indicates that the gender disparities exist in every education level even 
during the economic development period and that there is a gradual growing demand for each 
education level during 1970-1990. The enrolment rates in secondary and tertiary education are 
still unfavourable. 
In terms of repetition rate (Figure 2-15), the repetition rates were lower than 10 per cent 
for all education levels, except for grade 1. The repetition rates were even lower than 5 per 
cent for the higher grades. It seems that during 1970s it was not common for students to 
repeat the same grade. One of the reasons was that the Government aimed to quantitatively 
increase the number of labour force that graduates at least primary education. Moreover, to 
keep students repeating the same was costly and created a burden on the Government budget.     
In conclusion, there has been a rather gradual growing demand in Thai education market 
for past 40 years (1950-1990). The highest demand for education can be observed in the 
primary education, while the enrolment rate is substantively low in the other education levels. 
The lower demand for education in women is another concerned issue. Even though, gender 
disparities are less pronounced in the primary education, male enrolment rates in other 
education level are always greater than those of women. The situation becomes better after 
1990. Thus, the deep-rooted problem Thailand faces is a persistent low demand for secondary 








                                                        







Figure 2-12 Number of Student Enrolment by Education Level, 1951-1986 
 
Source: Author’s compilation based on UNESCO and Ministry of Education (1965-1988). 




Note: na not available. 






































Pre-primary Lower primary Upper primary
Lower secondary Upper secondary University
 (Units) 1960 1970 1980 1983 
Primary Level      
Number of Students (million) 3.936 5.635 7.392 7.272 
Number of Teachers (million) 0.109 0.163 0.299 0.356 
Gross Enrolment Ratio (%) 83 83 96 97 
Secondary Level      
Number of Students (million) 0.311 0.695 1.92 2.192 
Number of Teachers (million) 0.016 0.045 na na 
Gross Enrolment Ratio (%) 12 17 29 30 
Tertiary Level      
Number of Students (million) 0.046 0.055 0.361 1.12 
Number of Teachers (million) 0.003 0.008 0.03 0.029 





Figure 2-13 Percentage of Female Students by Education Level, 1956-1968 
 
Source: Author’s compilation based on UNESCO (1955-1970). 
Figure 2-14 Percentage of Male and Female Enrolment by Age and Education Level 
 
 
Note: Trends in percentage by sex, of persons in Thailand, 1990 (a) completing at least 4 years of schooling, (b) 
completing at least some lower secondary schooling, (c) with at least some upper secondary schooling and (d) 
with at least some tertiary level education. 
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Figure 2-15 Repetition Rate in Primary Education by Year    
 
 
Source: UIS (2016) 
 
2.2.2. Supply Side of Thai Education 
 
Figure 2-16 Numbers of Primary Schools 
 

































Figure 2-17 Numbers of Teachers in Primary Education 
 






































Important indicators of educational supply provided by the Government include numbers 
of schools and teachers.  
Figure 2-16 illustrates the numbers of primary schools during 1952-1977, whereas  
Figure 2-17 shows numbers of teaching staffs in primary education during 1951-1983. The 
trends of these two indicators correspond to each other since more schools mean more 
teaching staffs needed to fill in teaching positions in those schools. The numbers of schools 
increased roughly 12.5 per cent and 20 per cent during 1955-1965 and 1965-1975, 
respectively. Similarly, the numbers of teachers rose approximately 25 per cent between 1955 
and 1965. However, during 1965-1975, a sharp increase around 60 per cent in the numbers of 
teachers could be observed. The numbers of teachers grew roughly 2 times faster than those 
of schools. The higher growth rate of primary schools and teachers could be observed during 
the early stage of structural transformation, 1965-1975. The Government raised both supplies 
of primary schools and teaching staffs to respond to the increasing demand for primary 
education during the same period. The boost in both demand and supply of education was a 
part of a national development plan to be ready for the next stage of social and economic 
development. 
A financial resource from the Government played a crucial role behind those increases in 
physical supplies of education such as school buildings and teaching staffs since public 
education is financed almost entirely by the central Government. During 1966-1971, there 
was a small increase in public expenditure on education (Figure 2-18). However, after 1971, 
the sharp increases of the public expenditure on education and its percentage of total budget 
could be observed. Thailand’s education budget amounted to 5,000 million Baht in 1971, 
while it rose substantially to 13,500 million Baht in 1976. Similarly, the educational 
expenditure as a share of total Government budget increased about 4 per cent over the same 
period (17.9 per cent to 21.3 per cent). In addition, public education expenditure as a 
proportion of GDP increased from 2.4 per cent in 1966 to 4 per cent in 1976. This was due to 
the fact that the Government had to prepare teaching staffs and all educational facilities to 
deal with an influx of students after enforcing the new compulsory education law in 1978. 
This explanation can be supported by the above discussion on the increase in numbers of 
primary schools and teaching staffs during the same period. In 1981 and thereafter, a high 
level of public expenditure on education still could be observed. Teachers’ wages and 
maintenance constituted a large portion of the education expenditure, while the Government 
still had to expand the free compulsory education. In 1981, the education budget was 
approximately 28,000 million Baht and within three years it jumped to 39,406 million Baht in 
1984. According to World Bank (1989), it is reported that 57 per cent of the 1984 budget was 
spent on primary education, while 16 per cent on secondary and 12 per cent on universities. 
This corresponds to the different degrees of demand for different education levels discussed in 








Figure 2-18 Public Expenditure on Education, 1966-1984 
 
Source: Author’s compilation based on World Bank (1989) 
Figure 2-19 Enrolment Trends, Number of Teachers, and Student-Teacher Ratio, 
1960-1980  
 





























































































































Figure 2-19 summarises the situation of the demand side and supply side of Thai 
education during the period of structural transformation. There has been a rapid expansion of 
the education system in the primary education for past 20 years (1960-1980), both in terms of 
student enrolment and number of teachers. In contrast, the demand and supply for secondary 
and tertiary education grew at a much slower pace. The Government raised both supplies of 
primary schools and teaching staffs to respond to the increasing demand for primary 
education while tries to increase the quality of the education. Hence, an improvement of 
overall education quality could also be observed as the student-teacher ratios kept declining 
over time across different levels of education. The boost in both demand and supply of 
education was a part of a national development plan to prepare Thai labour force to be ready 
for the next stage of social and economic development.  
Section 3. MIGRATION 
In addition to characteristics of developing countries discussed above, migration is also 
another important perspective in developing countries. In developed countries, motivation and 
factors of migration seem to be more sophisticated than those of developing countries, in 
which the migration is mainly driven by basic needs such as better job opportunities and 
better quality of education. Nevertheless, migration in developing countries plays a crucial 
role in economic development as it reallocates labour between the agricultural and the other 
sectors and promotes urban growth. Thus, the issue of migration warrants further 
investigation.     
The phenomenon of “human capital drain from rural to urban areas” seems to occur in 
Thailand. Migration streams of migrants can be broken down into six categories, including 
urban-urban, rural-urban, unknown-urban, rural-rural, urban-rural, and unknown-rural. 
According to Table 2-16, rural migrants (rural areas as migration destination) accounted for 
77, 65.2, and 64 per cent of the total migration streams in the period of 1965-70, 1975-80, and 
1985-90, respectively. Even though the decline in the number of rural migrants could be seen, 
the majority of the migration streams concentrated in rural migrants. In contrast, the 
rural-urban migration stream kept increasing during the period of 1965 – 1990. The 
rural-urban migration flow made up for 10.5-18.4 per cent. This indicates a growing trend of 
human capital drain from rural to urban areas.  
In terms of education distribution of migrants, Table 2-17 indicates that rural-urban 
migrants consist of more educated individuals than those of rural non-migrant. The majority 
of rural-urban migrants attain at most primary education, which amounts to 59.6 per cent of 
the rural-urban migration flow, while 76 per cent of the rural non-migrant population 
complete only primary education. The percentage of persons completes secondary and 




than those of rural non-migrants (11.7 and 2.5 per cent, respectively). The flow of rural-urban 
migrants is dominated by the group of more educated individuals. In other words, more 
educated individuals have higher mobility. This pattern can also be observed from each of 
migration flows, even within rural-rural migration stream. 
Table 2-16 Migration Streams of Migrants 
Migration Stream 
1965-70 1975-80 1985-90 
Number Per cent Number Per cent Number Per cent 
Total migrants 3,331,100 100 2,947,700 100 4,026,100 100 
Urban migrants 763,400 23.0 1,024,900 34.8 1,448,700 36.0 
Urban-urban 297,000 8.9 506,000 17.2 545,100 13.5 
Rural-urban 348,000 10.5 420,600 14.3 738,400 18.4 
Unknown-urban 118,400 3.6 98,300 3.3 165,200 4.1 
Rural migrants 2,567,700 77.0 1,922,800 65.2 2,677,400 64.0 
Rural-rural 2,086,700 62.6 1,532,900 52 1,645,100 40.9 
Urban-rural 180,400 5.4 278,300 9.4 508,900 12.6 
Unknown-rural 300,600 9.0 111,600 3.8 423,400 10.5 
Source: Pejaranonda et al, 1995 and Vutthisomboon (1998). 
Table 2-17 Percentage Distribution of Educational Attainment of Populations Aged Six 
Years and Above 
 Migrant Non-migrant Migrant Non-migrant 
Education Urban-Rural Rural-Rural Rural Urban-Urban Rural-Urban Urban 
Males 
      
No Education 3.5 5.6 9.6 3.2 2.5 6.3 
Primary 48.4 71.2 76.0 39.4 59.6 44.4 
Secondary 34.6 18.1 11.7 34.0 27.4 32.6 
University 13.2 4.5 2.5 23.0 10.2 16.3 
Other 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.3 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Females 
      
No Education 7.0 8.9 14.2 4.6 4.1 9.4 
Primary 54.7 73.9 75.8 42.2 63.6 44.4 
Secondary 24.2 12.0 7.8 30.5 21.4 25.4 
University 14.1 5.2 2.2 22.7 10.8 16.0 
Other na na na na 0.1 0.1 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Note: na: not available. 
Source: Author’s compilation adapted from Vutthisomboon (1998) based on data from the National Statistical 




In terms of regional mobility, both lifetime and temporary migrants tend to move to 
Bangkok and the Central region (Table 2-18). During the development period, 1970-1990, net 
migration losses were highest in the Northeast and the North regions. On the other hand, the 
Central area, and Bangkok and metropolitan areas had the highest net migration gains among 
all regions.   
Table 2-18 Regional Net Gains and Losses from Five-year Migration 1955-1990 
Current residence Total 
Region of Previous Residence 
Bangkok Central North Northeast South 
1955-60 
      
Bangkok 67,045 
 
41,208 5,047 17,855 2,935 
Central -46,643 -41,208 
 
-14,710 15,102 -5,827 
North 30,134 -5,047 14,710 
 
21,106 -635 
Northeast -59,809 -17,855 -15,102 -21,106 
 
-5,746 
South 9,273 -2,935 5,827 635 5,746 
 
1965-70 
      
Bangkok 168,863 
 
83,358 21,909 43,221 20,375 
Central -80,370 -83,358 
 
-10,804 17,290 -3,498 
North 6,340 -21,909 10,804 
 
17,790 -345 
Northeast -85,006 -43,221 -17,290 -17,790 
 
-6,705 
South -9,827 -20,375 3,498 345 6,705 
 
1975-80 
      
Bangkok 170,400 
 
29,042 22,233 99,602 19,523 
Central 49,454 -29,042 
 
14,981 63,748 -233 
North -17,713 -22,233 -14,981 
 
23,120 -3,619 
Northeast -194,815 -99,602 -63,748 -23,120 
 
-8,345 
South -7,326 -19,523 233 3,619 8,345 
 
1985-90 
      
Bangkok 365,900 
 
500 65,800 261,100 38,500 
Central 293,400 -500 
 
42,500 246,900 4,500 
North -89,300 -65,800 -42,500 
 
26,800 -7,800 
Northeast -553,700 -261,100 -246,900 -26,800 
 
-18,900 
South -16,300 -38,500 -4,500 7,800 18,900 
 
Source: Vutthisomboon (1998) based on 1955-60, 1965-70 and 1975-80 data from Goldstein and Goldstein 




Section 4. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THAI ECONOMY AND EDUCATION IN THE CONTEXT 
OF THE RATES OF RETURN TO SCHOOLING ANALYSIS 
It is possible that the stage of social and economic development may explain a 
direction of bias in the OLS estimation of returns to schooling. In this study, the dominance of 
ability bias is mainly explained by the inequality of income and educational opportunity 
during the early period of social and economic development. At that time, Thailand was 
characterised as a developing and agriculture-based economy with relatively high poverty rate 
and income gap. A majority of population still depended heavily on agricultural sector and 
rural labour activities, which earn relatively lower than other sectors. It was common for 
family members to help working without formal pay in those sectors. Moreover, there was 
low school enrolment rate observed during the same period. Overall, it was common to 
observe the inequality, both in terms of income and access to basic public services such as 
basic education, between different socio-economic groups. Individuals from agricultural 
families are socially discriminated, poorer, and having greater immediate need to work. Their 
opportunity cost of schooling is also higher. It is likely that individuals from agricultural 
families may quit school at younger ages. Due to high costs of schooling and demand for 
household labour, agricultural households cannot afford to send all children to school. Thus, 
they may select only one or few children with the highest ability among all children to receive 
proper education, while the rest of the children are expected to help household agricultural 
activities. As a result, children with higher ability tend to have more schooling in agricultural 
households. This is consistent with the general ability bias hypothesis which argues that 
more-able individuals are more likely to have higher years of schooling. On the other hand, 
individuals from a higher socio-economic class are likely to have higher investments in 
education qualitatively (better school quality) and quantitatively (more years of schooling) 
(Behrman, 1999). This reflects the ability bias usually discussed in both studies of developed 
and developing countries. In sum, there are two sources of ability bias in case of Thailand 
which includes the ability bias from a selection of more-able child within poor households 
and the ability bias due to higher financial endowment of rich families.  
The argument of the ability bias due to a selection of more-able child within poor 
households is more relevant and specific to the case of Thailand and, perhaps, other 
developing countries. In other words, this type of ability bias is less relevant in developed 
countries where poverty and inequality of educational opportunity, especially for the basic 
education, are less pronounced. Due to high economic development and standard of living, 
individuals in developed countries have more economic power to afford education for their 
children regardless of their level of ability. In addition, a universal access to free education is 




opportunity is more prevalent in developed countries. Even though there is a tendency that 
individuals with higher ability are more likely to attain more years of schooling, the ability 
bias seems to be less dominant in developed countries, at least for the basic level of education. 
This is possibly the main reason that the upward ability bias is observed in Thailand and other 
developing countries, but not in developed countries. Instead, OLS estimation from developed 
countries suffers from downward bias (IV estimates > OLS estimates). Hence, other sources 
of bias seem to dominate the effect of the upward ability bias in case of developed countries. 
Explaining the upward ability bias in terms of inequality of income and educational 
opportunity during the early period of Thai social and economic development may possibly be 
generalised to other developing countries, which share similar social and economic context 
with Thailand. The main result shows that the magnitude of OLS estimates in Thailand is 
comparable with those of other developing countries. However, the IV estimates are fairly 
different. As different instruments from different studies define different parameter (Heckman 
et al., 2006), a similarity of magnitude of IV estimates should not be expected to observe from 
different estimations. In other words, it is usually the case that IV varies across different 
studies. Nonetheless, similar instruments and identification strategies correct the same 
endogeneity bias, given that those studies share similar sample characteristics. Thus, the 
difference between estimates from OLS and IV estimations should indicate a similar direction 
of bias whether OLS estimates are higher than those of IV. 
Section 5. CONCLUSION 
 This chapter provides readers with a comprehensive overview of Thai economic and 
educational development during 1960-1990. Thai economy can be divided into four main 
periods, namely pre-boom (1951-1986), boom (1987-1996), crisis (1997-1998), and 
post-crisis (1999 onwards). During 1951-1986, the Government put efforts in building basic 
physical infrastructure, e.g. road, electricity, to name a few, to help facilitating trading and the 
growth of the economy. The real GDP growth rate jumped to 9.2 per cent during the boom 
period, 1987-1996. This is considered as an economic miracle growth in Thailand. However, 
Thailand experienced a financial crisis in 1997 and faced a negative GDP growth at 6.1 per 
cent, which is the lowest in the Thai economic history. In the post-crisis period, Thailand 
managed to bounce back and achieved the real GDP growth rate of 4 per cent. The overall 
average real GDP growth and real GDP growth per capita were around 6.2 per cent and 4.2 
per cent, respectively, during 1951-2003. 
The high GDP growth is claimed to be the result of structural transformation during the 
pre-boom period, 1951-1986. Thailand went through a structural transformation from a 
primitive agriculture-based economy to newly industrialised economy, which the agricultural 




most of industrialisation process in other countries, the industrial sector was developed at the 
expense of the agricultural sector. In addition, Thailand also went through another structural 
transformation in terms of export and import pattern. Thailand changed from agriculture 
produce exporter, e.g. rice, to manufactured goods exporter, especially garments and parts and 
components. 
Overall, the situation of the development in Thailand is consistent with the characteristics 
of developing countries proposed by Behrman and Srinivasan (1995). They suggest that 
developing countries possess different degrees of market completeness and institutions from 
developed countries. The followings are the proposed characteristics of developing economies 
in comparison with developed economies. First, a majority of population still depends heavily 
on agricultural sector and rural labour activities. Second, in agricultural sector, it is common 
for family members to help working without formal pay; therefore, non-wage labour accounts 
for a large proportion of the total labour force in developing economies. Third, there has been 
a rapid growth of labour force in developing countries. Fourth, high labour participation rates 
among 15-64 year olds can be observed due to low human capital investments among young 
cohorts. Fifth, there are low school enrolment rates and the education gap is in favour of 
males. Sixth, lower non-labour production inputs per worker are observed in developing 
countries. Lastly, a majority of Thai population still lives below the poverty line even in the 
midst of high economic growth during 1970-1980. 
In terms of educational development, there had been a rapid expansion of the education 
system in the primary education for past 20 years (1960-1980), both in terms of student 
enrolment and number of teachers. In contrast, the demand and supply for secondary and 
tertiary education grew at a much slower pace. The Government raised both supplies of 
primary schools and teaching staffs to respond to the increasing demand for primary 
education while tried to increase the quality of the education. Hence, an improvement of 
overall education quality could also be observed as the student-teacher ratios kept declining 
over time across different levels of education. The boost in both demand and supply of 
education was a part of a national development plan to prepare Thai labour force to be ready 
for the next stage of social and economic development.  
In terms of migration, the rural-urban and interregional migration help facilitating the 
development process of Thai economy by reallocating human resources between regions and 
economic sectors. The phenomenon of “human capital drain from rural to urban areas” seems 
to occur in Thailand. Even though the majority of the migration streams concentrated in rural 
migrants, there was a growing trend of human capital drain from rural to urban areas during 
the period of 1965 – 1990. The flow of rural-urban migrants is dominated by the group of 
more educated individuals. In other words, more educated individuals have higher mobility. 
This pattern can also be observed from every type of migration stream. Regarding regional 




1970-1990, while the Central area, and Bangkok and metropolitan areas had the highest net 
migration gains among all regions.  
In conclusion, Thailand experiences rapid economic development and structural 
transformation during 1960-1990. Obtaining the rates of return to education in this period 
helps us better understand the process of Thai economic development as well as the interplay 
between the rates of return to schooling and economic development in Thailand during 1980s 
to 1990s. In addition, the overall social and economic conditions of the development in 
Thailand are consistent with the general characteristics of other developing countries. Hence, 
by implication, estimating the rates of return to schooling in Thailand also provides better 
understandings on the role of human capital in the process of development in other 
developing countries. As developing countries possess different degrees of market 
completeness and institutions which are radically different from those of developed countries, 
this warrants value for investigation of the rate of returns to schooling in the context of 
developing countries. This further investigation possibly gives a different economic pattern 




CHAPTER 3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 The rates of return to schooling is one of the most important topics that economists have 
been investigating, especially by utilising the Mincerian model. However, there has been long 
debate that the OLS estimates from the Mincer equation is possibly biased due to the 
endogeneity problem. Schultz (1988) suggests that the most concerned issue in the study of 
returns to education is the issue of possible biases in estimation owing to the endogeneity 
problem. Later, the attention should be given to the issue of sample selection. Strauss and 
Thomas (1995) also emphasise the importance of these two issues and posit that they are 
more relevant in the studies from developing countries.  
First, this chapter revisits the Mincer model to show that the Mincer function is alive and 
well in fitting actual age-wages profiles. Second, the chapter reviews previous literature 
regarding methodological issues in estimating the rates of return to schooling. The third 
section surveys previous studies of the rates of return to schooling with a particular focus on 
studies utilising compulsory education law change as an instrumental variable. Fourth, 
previous studies on the sample selection are briefly discussed. Finally, the chapter is closed by 
emphasising the contributions of this research.  
Section 1. REVISITING MINCER MODEL 
Despite the fact that the Mincer model has been intensively used to find the rates of return 
to schooling, there is a doubt whether the Mincer model can capture new elements and 
changes in the current social and economic situation. As the world economy has been growing 
rapidly, social and economic conditions also have changed tremendously during the past 
decades. However, the Mincer equation has never changed and is still as simple as it is.  
The following is the simple Mincerian earnings equation (Mincer 1958, 1974):  
(3-1)                     𝐥𝐨𝐠 𝒚𝒊 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑺𝒊 + 𝜷𝟐𝑿𝒊 + 𝜷𝟑𝑿𝒊
𝟐 + 𝒆𝒊  
 
where the log of individual earnings (yi) is a function of years of education an individual i 
attended (Si) and number of years an individual i has worked after completing his/her 
education (Xi). ei represents a disturbance term. Economists are interested in estimating the 𝛽1 
since it represents an educational premium for wages and/or an internal rate of return to 
schooling
4
.   
Card (1999) shows the evidence of the shape of the Mincer function and its specification, 
that supports the fact that Mincer equation is still alive and well in fitting the actual age-wages 
                                                        




profiles. By utilising the United States (US) pooled samples from 1994-1996 March Current 
Population Surveys, Figure 3-1 illustrates the age profiles of hourly wages for men (a) and 
women (b) by education level (10, 12 and 16 years of education). Each data point on the lines 
represents the average log hourly wages by age. The lines with the marks indicate the actual 
age-wages profiles, while the smooth lines show the fitted profiles estimated by the Mincer 
equation. Card (1999) modifies the model specification by adding a cubic term of potential 
experience (Xi) and a dummy variable indicating whether individuals are black. According to 
Figure 3-1, the age-wages profiles for US men and women are well-approximated since the 
fitted lines move along closely with the actual age-wages profiles. However, Mincer’s 
equation understates some portions of the actual profiles of different education groups in the 
US data. 
In the case of Thailand, a similar conclusion can be drawn from the age-wages profiles 
that also indicate that the estimates from Mincer model reasonably well approximate the 
actual age-wages profiles. Figure 3-2 shows the age profiles of hourly wages by education 
levels for Thai workers using pooled samples from the 1986-2012 Labour Force Surveys. The 
data represents mean log monthly wages by age for individuals with four, six, nine, twelve, 
sixteen, and twenty-one years of education. Four years of education refer to the minimum 
years of education required by the 1962 Compulsory Education Act, whereas six years of 
education represent the minimum compulsory education level enforced by the new 1978 
compulsory education law. Other education years refer to the final year of each academic 
level, including lower secondary level, upper secondary level, undergraduate level (normally 
four years after graduating from upper secondary school), and graduate level. Plotted lines 
along with the actual means are the fitted values obtained from Mincer model that includes 
only a quadratic term of age. Comparisons of the fitted and actual data suggest that the 
age-earnings profiles for Thai workers are fairly smooth, and reasonably well-approximated. 
In contrast to the age-wages profiles from the US, the problem in fitting the precise curvature 
is less pronounced in the case of Thailand.  
In conclusion, the age-wages profiles from the US and Thailand confirm that the Mincer 
model is still alive and well in fitting the actual age-wages profiles. Even though the model 
specification requires functional adjustment and has some troubles fitting the precise 
curvature in the case of the US, Mincer model with the OLS estimation can fit the actual data 
fairly well, especially in the case of Thailand. Instead of using the cubic terms of age, the 
model used in fitting the Thai age-wage profiles maintains the quadratic terms. Regardless of 
its simplicity and accuracy in estimation, there has been a long debate that the OLS estimation 
of Mincer model may yield biased estimates because of the problem of endogeneity and the 




Figure 3-1 Age Profiles of Hourly Wages for Men (a) and Women (b), the US 
 
Note: The samples include 102,718 men and 95,360 women aged 16-66 with positive potential experience and average 
hourly earnings between $2.00 and $150.00 in 1995 dollars. 53 per cent of the sample have 10, 12, or 16 years of schooling 
and are used in graphs. The regression models are fit by gender to all education groups and include a linear education term, a 
cubic in experience, and a dummy variable for individuals of black race. 
Source: Card (1999). 
Figure 3-2 Age Profiles of Hourly Wages, Thailand 
 
Note: The regression models include a linear education term and a quadratic in age. 




Section 2. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES: POTENTIAL BIASES FROM VARIOUS METHODS OF 
ESTIMATION 
As indicated in the Section 1, Mincerian function fits the data very well and OLS 
regression has been used exhaustively to estimate rates of return to education. Nevertheless, 
there has been a long debate that OLS estimates have a possibility to be biased due to the 
endogeneity problem. This section provides a comprehensive review on potential endogeneity 
biases from various methods of estimation and their related previous literature.   
3.2.1. Standard OLS Estimation and Endogeneity Bias 
 In general, the standard OLS estimation is possibly biased due to the problem of 
endogeneity. Endogeneity biases occur when explanatory variables are correlated with the 
error term in models of estimation. There are three main sources of endogeneity, including 
simultaneity, measurement errors, and omitted variables. In the context of returns to schooling, 
the omitted variable is the most debatable source of endogeneity bias (Willis, 1986, Schultz, 
1988, Card, 1999, Deere and Vesovic, 2006). The issue of omitted variable bias has been 
discussed in the literature beginning with Beck’s (1964) work. The main concern is that there 
may be a positive correlation between innate ability and schooling as it is likely that more 
able individuals tend to invest in more schooling. Without controlling for the ability, estimated 
returns to schooling include both the effects of education and ability. Hence, this leads to 
overestimations of the “true” rates of return to schooling. This upward bias commonly refers 
to “ability bias”. 
 However, the source of upward bias is not only limited to individuals’ ability, but also 
includes family background and quality of schooling (Schultz, 1988, Behrman, 1990, Strauss 
and Thomas, 1995). As both family background and school quality can be linked to the 
individuals’ ability, the arguments for both factors are similar to that of the ability bias. It is 
argued that individuals  from wealthier families are more likely to invest in more (and better 
quality) schooling (Behrman and Birdsall, 1983, Strauss and Thomas, 1995). As wages are a 
function of individuals’ ability, it is arguably that parents with high ability earn more, on 
average, and inherit financial endowments to their children. Hence, it is possible that family 
background is related to both years of schooling and earnings. Furthermore, it is posited that 
there is a positive association between quality of school and years of schooling as individuals 
with higher ability tend to be educated in schools with a higher quality (Behrman and Birdsall, 
1983, Strauss and Thomas, 1995). Hence, if these variables are omitted from the estimation 
equation, the estimates of the rates of return to schooling are possibly upwardly biased. As 
Behrman (1999) put it, “individuals with higher investments in schooling are likely to be 




backgrounds that provide more reinforcement for such investments and who have lower 
marginal private costs for such investments and lower discount rates for the returns from 
those investments and who are likely to have access to higher quality schools”. Family 
background and school quality factors are all linked back to the ability variable, and probably 
are easier to be controlled or included in the wage equation. Therefore, more emphasis is on 
the issue of unobserved ability which is mainly discussed in the literature of the rates of return 
to education. No agreement has been reached in the recent literature on both the degree and 
the direction of the ability bias of the estimated rates of return to schooling. 
 First, the debate regarding the degree of the ability bias can be divided into two schools 
of thought. On one hand, it is usually argued that there is a substantial large ability bias, 
especially in the case of developing countries (Behrman, 1999). On the other hand, the ability 
bias is rather small (Griliches, 1977, Card, 1999) and overstated (Becker, 1964) in the 
literature of returns to schooling. Many studies have been attempting to correct for the 
omitted variable bias by utilising different methods of estimation. For example, with fixed 
effects estimation, samples of twins and siblings have been utilised to deal with the problem 
of unobserved ability. In general, it is found that OLS estimates are marginally larger than 
those of the estimation utilising sample of identical twins. Thus, Card (1999) used the 
findings from the sample of twins to make an argument that as the results from the OLS 
estimation and studies of identical twins are quantitatively similar, there is a small upward 
ability bias in the OLS estimation. Moreover, the estimated rates of return from IV estimation 
based on institutional or policy changes, e.g. changes in compulsory education law, is usually 
higher than those of OLS estimations by approximately 20–40 per cent (Card, 1999). The 
findings show that the OLS estimates are downwardly biased, given that the IV estimation 
deals with the endogeneity properly. This contradicts to the ability bias hypothesis, which 
states that there is an upward bias in OLS estimates. Nevertheless, Behrman (1999) raises 
interesting observations from recent studies of returns to schooling mainly from the US to 
defend his stand. First, there are many studies that try to control for unobserved ability, family 
background, and school quality in the estimations to obtain the “true” rates of return.
5
 The 
results suggest that the OLS estimates suffer from the ability bias and the impact of education 
attainment is overestimated 40–100 per cent (Behrman, 1990, 1999). Second, even though the 
evidence of a strong ability bias is weaker in the studies from the US (Card, 1999), there is 
still a debate on the rates of return to schooling and also increasing numbers of studies 
supporting the fact that there is a correlation between school quality and returns to schooling 
                                                        
5 See: “Revisionist” literatures suggested by Behrman (1999): school quality (Behrman and Birdsall, 1983), 
unobserved shared family background of adult siblings and of members of the same household (Behrman and 
Wolfe, 1984; Behrman and Deolalikar, 1993), usually unobserved abilities through new tests (Boissiere et al., 
1985; Knight and Sabot, 1990; Glewwe, 1996), selectivity (Schultz, 1988), dropout and repetition rates 
(Behrman and Deolalikar, 1991), measurement error, school quality and behavioral choices regarding school 




from the US literature. Hence, Behrman (1999) perceives that the estimation from developing 
countries would further overstate the “true” rates of return to education. Finally, regarding the 
recent estimates from the IV estimation, Lang (1993) and Card (1999, 2001) posit that the 
higher estimate from IV is because a policy change may affect only certain subgroups, 
especially relatively disadvantaged groups, rather than the whole population. Therefore, it is 
not possible to conclude the effect of ability bias in this case since the estimates do not 
represent the “real” rates of return from the representative sample.  
 The direction of ability bias can go either upward or downward. It depends on the 
direction of correlation between ability and schooling. An upward ability bias means that 
there is a positive correlation between ability and schooling. This bias generally refers to the 
“ability bias”. The (upward) ability bias argues that more-able individuals are more likely to 
attain more years of schooling. In contrast, in the case that a correlation between ability and 
schooling is negative, OLS estimates are downwardly biased. This downward ability bias 
refers to a “discount rate bias” (Lang, 1993, Card, 1994). It is argued that individuals make a 
decision to go to school by comparing returns to schooling with foregone returns from labour 
market (an opportunity cost of attending school). Thus, individuals with higher ability may 
choose not to go to school, if they can earn high returns from the labour market (high 
opportunity cost of attending school). In addition, the discount rate bias can also be explained 
by a preference towards schooling and also financial constraint in attending school. For 
example, individuals with a financial constraint find the opportunity cost of attending school 
expensive, and they may opt to earn their living instead of going to school. The argument of 
discount rate bias is often used to explain the estimated results in recent literature that find 
that IV estimates are greater than those of OLS estimations. However, as discussed above, a 
lack of the element of randomization in a quasi-experiment may possibly explain the higher 
IV estimates.  
 The issues of measurement errors, especially systematic one, are less emphasised in the 
literature of returns to schooling, while the problem of simultaneity is not relevant in this 
study. Regarding measurement errors, it generally assumes that any observation consists of 
the true value and some random or systematic error value. The estimated returns to schooling 
with random measurement error tends to become smaller in absolute term (Griliches, 1977, 
Blackburn and Neumark, 1995). The bias drives the estimates towards zero, which commonly 
refers to an attenuation bias. However, there is a consensus in the previous literature that the 
measurement error bias is of modest magnitudes (Schultz, 1988; Card, 1999; Krueger and 
Lindahl, 2001; Orazem and King, 2008) as years of schooling and other wage determinants 
are measured relatively well compared with other micro-level variables, e.g. landholding, 
consumption expenditure, to name a few. In contrast, the systematic error can lead to a more 
serious problem since it is difficult to be detected and is unable to be analysed statistically. 




of returns to schooling. Therefore, the issue seems not to be specific to the study in this field. 
Regarding the problem of simultaneity, it is possible that explanatory variables may correlate 
with the error in a model in which explanatory variables are determined simultaneously with 
the dependent variable. Thus, the model gives biased and inconsistent OLS estimates and the 
bias is generally upward. However, the problem of simultaneity is not relevant in the study of 
returns to education as individuals’ current wages receiving from working in the labour 
market cannot determine individuals’ past levels of schooling. It may be possible that 
individuals may enter the labour market after finishing compulsory education and then come 
back to study later. Nevertheless, the practice is not common at least during the period of 
analysis (1970–1990) in which graduates from primary education are still significantly small. 
3.2.2. Proposed Remedies to Deal with the Endogeneity Bias 
3.2.2.1 OLS with an Explicit Proxy for Ability 
In the previous section, it is clear that OLS estimates possibly suffer from the ability bias. 
There may be a positive correlation between ability and schooling since more able individuals 
tend to invest in more schooling. Without controlling for the unobserved ability, estimated 
returns to schooling include both the effects of education and the ability. Hence, this leads to 
overestimations of the “true” rates of return to schooling.  
There have been several studies
6
 utilise different test scores as a proxy for ability, e.g. test 
scores on cognitive skills, test scores on literacy, to name a few. Table 3-1 summarises the 
previous studies regarding OLS estimation with a proxy of unobserved ability. The overall 
results indicate that the OLS estimates of returns to schooling tend to be smaller after 
introducing ability proxy variables. The magnitude of the returns to schooling is quite low and 
moderate in developed countries (1.6–6 per cent). Since it is difficult to find a data set with 
the information on test score, the samples of most studies tend to be very small (under 300 
observations). Moreover, after introducing the ability variable, most studies focus on the 
returns to ability rather than those of years of schooling. Hence, there is no systematic way of 
analysing the effect of years of schooling on earnings. Although the returns to schooling are 
observed to be smaller after controlling for the unobserved ability, it is still inconclusive 
whether the estimated results are unbiased due to aforementioned arguments. 
There are several studies criticising against the validity of test score as a proxy of innate 
ability. Becker's (1964) argues that ability is not one dimensional characteristic since ability 
may include a wide range of domains, e.g. physical strength, intelligence, creativity, to name a 
few. Thus, there is no guarantee that those tests can perfectly measure the true ability or they 
even can capture the true ability at all (Lillard, 1977). Using test scores as a proxy for ability 
may still result in biased estimates due to the problem of endogeneity. The fact that test scores 
                                                        
6 See Hanushek and Woessmann (2008) for a comprehensive review on impacts of cognitive skills on individual 




are imperfect proxy of the true ability means that some parts of ability still remain in the error 
term. In other words, there is a problem of measurement error when the imperfect proxy of 
ability is used in the regression. Previous studies, e.g. Hanushek and Woessmann (2008), 
Korwatanasakul (2013), argue that ability that influences earnings is mainly from the effect of 
cognitive skills; therefore, they limit the definition of ability to cognitive skills. Cognitive 
skills consist of three components, including mathematics, science, and language. In contrast, 
Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006) argue that both cognitive and noncognitive skills affect 
wages. Noncognitive skills, e.g. personality traits, persistence, communication skills, 
motivation, and teamwork skills, to name a few, are found to substantially influence schooling 
and wages (Bowles and Gintis, 1976; Edwards, 1976; Jencks, 1979; Wolfe and Johnson 1995; 
Duckworth and Seligman 2005; Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua, 2006).
7
 Given that a test score 
is a perfect proxy of ability or cognitive skills, the regression model accounting for only the 
cognitive skills still possibly gives biased estimated results of returns to schooling. As the 
disturbance term contains the non-cognitive skills highly correlated with schooling and wages 
variables, the regression model suffers from the omitted variable bias.   
 In sum, dealing with the problem of unobserved ability bias, the previous studies try to 
explicitly add the ability component in the Mincer model by using the test score variable as a 
proxy for ability. However, test score seems to be an imperfect proxy. This results in a 
problem of measurement error and, in turn, an endogeneity bias in the regression estimation. 
                                                        




Table 3-1  OLS Estimation with a Proxy of Unobserved Ability 
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R: 0.006 (1.32) 
H: 0.020 (6.18) 
R: 0.001 (0.15) 




Pakistan Cognitive skills (C) and 





C: 0.007 (1.41) 
A: 0.006 (0.67) 




3.2.2.2 Fixed Effects Regression Using Twins or Siblings Sample
8
 
With fixed effects estimation, samples of twins and siblings have been utilised to deal 
with the problem of unobserved ability. It argues that these samples, especially a sample of 
identical (monozygotic) twins, possibly offer a high degree of internal validity, an estimation 
design that successfully uncovers a causal effect of a variable of interest that is schooling in 
this case (Bingley, Christensen, and Walker, 2007). The justification of using identical 
samples is that they are inherited the same genetic traits implying same innate ability and, 
most likely, the same degree of other endowments, e.g. investment in schooling, peer 
influences, geographic and sociological influences, to name a few. Hence, after taking a first 
difference within identical twin pairs, the unobserved ability and other endowments are 
removed from the estimation model. In other words, within-twin differences in education are 
uncorrelated with unobservable within-twin differences as the unobserved ability and other 
endowments are removed from the error term. In terms of external validity (an issue whether 
the estimated causal relationship can be generalised to other populations or settings), Bingley 
et al. (2007) argue that there is an external validity in the monozygotic twins estimation as 
Christensen et al. (2006) find that the distribution of educational outcomes among non-twins 
and twins samples are similar in nature, in spite of their substantial difference in the 
distributions of weights at birth. 
 Table 3-2 shows the estimated results from the studies of monozygotic (MZ) and 
dizygotic (DZ) twins (identical and fraternal twins). In general, the OLS estimates of general 
sample are greater than those of within twin pair (WT) sample as estimation from WT sample 
arguably removes the ability bias, both in studies of MZ and DZ twins. Moreover, IV 
estimates are likely to be greater than those of OLS with WT sample, but smaller than those of 
OLS with general sample. This is explained by the hypothesis that OLS estimates from first 
difference suffer from the classical measurement error bias which downwardly biases 
estimated results towards zero. However, some studies show contradicting results.  
 Nevertheless, the literature of fixed effects regression using twins samples is subject to 
two main criticisms. The first and the most important criticism is that there may be a problem 
in the internal validity of the twins studies. Neumark (1999) and Bound and Solon (1999) 
argue that the within differences in schooling may be correlated with the error term since 
presumption that the omitted ability is entirely made up of a genetic effect and a family effect 
does not necessarily hold true. If some parts of the omitted ability still remain in the error 
term after first differencing, the within-twin estimator may still suffer from an omitted 
variable bias and, in fact, may even be more biased than OLS estimates (Neumark, 1999 and 
Bound and Solon, 1999). Hence, the problem of endogeneity may still exist in the fixed 
effects estimation with the samples of twins. The second criticism is in terms of external 
                                                        
8 See Harmon, Oosterbeek, and Walker (2003) and Bingley, Christensen, and Walker, 2007 for detailed and 




validity. As the estimation is based on a small and non-random twins sample, it may be 
difficult to generalise the estimated causal relationship to the non-twins population. 
Blachflower and Elias (1993) show strong evidence that, in comparison to non-twins of a 
similar age and environment, a sample of twins can be quite different. Even though estimation 
using twins samples indicates the differences between OLS and IV estimates and is expected 
to deal with the endogeneity bias, due to aforementioned arguments, estimated results still 
have problems both in terms of internal and external validity. Thus, it is difficult to draw any 




Table 3-2 Studies of Monozygotic (MZ) and Dizygotic (DZ) Twins 
Study Country Sample Number of 
Twin Pairs 
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Berhman et al. 
(1994) 
US NAS-NRC and 
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Note: a – GLS estimate. b – not instrumented but evaluated at a reliability ratio of 0.88. c – evaluated at upper secondary level of 
schooling. d – pooled DZ and MZ. 




3.2.2.3 Instrumental Variable (IV) Estimation Using Natural or Quasi-Experiment 
Traditional Instrumental Variable 
 A traditional IV estimation is introduced into the research of returns to schooling to 
provide estimates of the causal effect of schooling on wages that are arguably free from 
ability bias. The IV estimation utilises the fact that the instrument variable is correlated with 
the endogenous explanatory variable (years of schooling), but has no correlation with the 
error term in the main regression model. In other words, the instrument variable must satisfy 
two conditions, including strong first stage and exclusion restriction, to be able to draw a 
causal relationship between years of schooling and wages. Several studies attempt to use 
various kinds of instruments; however, estimates from the traditional IV estimation possibly 
suffer from the endogeneity bias. Since the identification strategy cannot be tested by any 
statistical methods, it tends to be easily refuted by any arguments convincing that there is a 
correlation between the instrument variable and the error term. Moreover, there is the problem 
of weak instrument which occurs when the instruments are only weakly correlated with the 
endogenous variables in the first-stage equation. Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1993, 1995) put it, 
“cure can be worse than the disease” since a weak instrument results in biased and 
inconsistent estimates. The biased estimates tend to be in the same direction as OLS (Bound, 
Jaeger, and Baker, 1993, 1995; Chao and Swanson, 2005). Furthermore, with weak 
instruments, statistical hypothesis testing has incorrect size, and confidence intervals are 
wrong. 
 IV Estimation with Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD)  
 An IV estimation with RDD gains its popularity due to its advantages over a traditional 
IV estimation, especially in terms of its internal validity. As discussed in the previous section, 
the traditional IV estimation still possibly produces biased estimates since it is difficult to 
justify the internal validity, both in terms of relevance and exogeneity conditions. Regarding 
the assumption of relevance, the IV with a quasi-experiment ensures that there is a causal 
relationship between the event (law change) and the endogenous variable (years of 
schooling); and between the event (law change) and the outcome (wage) through the effect of 
the endogenous variable (years of schooling). In terms of exogeneity condition, IV with a 
quasi-experiment is exogenous to an individual as RDD exploits a particular event, 
compulsory education law change in this study, being random to individuals. Hence IV with 
RDD is not correlated with individuals’ unobserved variables, e.g., ability and preferences, 
and has less possibility to have the endogeneity bias. In contrast, the traditional IV estimation 
is often based on arbitrary identification strategy and there is no statistical way to check the 
exogeneity. Thus, in terms of internal validity, the IV utilising a quasi-experiment based on 
interventions in the school system is more convincing than a traditional IV estimation.   
 However, the IV utilising a quasi-experiment is not without a caveat. Even though the IV 




validity, the causal relationship may not be generalised to other populations and settings. The 
issue of generalisation refers to the external validity. In fact, the IV estimation with RDD 
lacks the element of randomization since it mainly relies on the arbitrary cut-off. Hence, only 
within a narrow bandwidth around the cut-off, treatment assignment approximates 
randomization or treatment effect. This method is equivalent to random assignment in a 
neighbourhood, which explains the reason that the regression discontinuity design is closer to 
randomised experiment than other quasi-experimental methods. Imbens and Angrist (1994) 
argue that the RDD estimates the average treatment effect from those who comply with the 
treatment. This estimated average treatment effect is commonly referred to Local Average 
Treatment Effect (LATE). Even though it is difficult to estimate Average Treatment Effect 
(ATE) as a full compliance from the whole population may not happen, the LATE converges 
to the ATE as the number of compliers becomes an increasingly large proportion of the 
sample (Oreopoulos, 2006). 
 Even though a randomised controlled trial (RCT) is the ideal estimation method, it is not 
possible to conduct RCT in most of the studies of returns to education. To the best of my 
knowledge, there is only one study from Schultz (2004) in estimating the rates of return to 
schooling by utilising RCT. Schultz estimates the internal rates of return to schooling from 
Progresa programme. The Progresa programme was implemented in 495 localities in rural 
communities with an initial sample size of 40,959 children. The main propose of the 
programme is to evaluate the effects of conditional cash transfer (CCT) given to rural poor 
families, both in terms of the school attainment and the returns to schooling. Schultz reports 
that the rates of return to schooling from the Progresa programme is approximately eight per 
cent per year. Nevertheless, this estimate is based on a strict set of assumptions regarding the 
behaviour of the sample. For example, Schultz assumes that “the rural youth migrate to the 
urban area at age 18, and then work until their retirement at age 65.” Unfortunately, the 
magnitude and the direction of bias from OLS estimation are still inconclusive since there is 
no information on OLS estimates provided.  
 From previous arguments, other estimation methods may still suffer from endogeneity 
bias and RDD is closer to randomized experiment than other quasi-experimental methods e.g. 
differences-in-differences (Raju and Trias, 2010)
9
. Therefore, the second best candidate 
among various methods of estimation of returns to schooling is the IV estimation with RDD. 
The estimated results of RDD is discussed in Section 3, “Why Thailand?: Issues from the 
Previous Literatures of Natural Experiment with Compulsory Education IV.”  
                                                        
9 This material is meant to be a supporting material for the book called, "Impact Evaluation in Practice" (Gertler, 




Previous Studies of Returns to Schooling Using IV Estimation (Excluding Studies 
with Compulsory Education IV) 
In general, it is found that the IV estimates are greater than those of OLS. Table 3-3 
outlines a list of the selected previous studies of returns to schooling using IV estimation, 
excluding studies with compulsory education IV. Several instrument variables have been 
introduced into the literature, ranging from quarter of birth (Angrist and Krueger, 1991), draft 
lottery number (Angrist and Krueger, 1992), school building project (Duflo, 1999), to name a 
few. Some of these instruments are purely traditional IVs which are difficult to justify their 
internal validity, namely college proximity (Card, 1995), family composition (Butcher and 
Case, 1994; Dearden, 1998), parental income and education (Dearden, 1998; Uusitalo, 1999), 
location of residence (Uusitalo, 1999), while the rest are based on quasi-experiments utilising 
a random nature of a particular event to estimate the rates of return to education.  
Why Are IV Estimates Greater than Those of OLS? 
 Heckman, et al. (2006) illustrate that theoretically IV estimates should be smaller than 
those OLS under the estimation from traditional Mincer model. For simplicity, the age 
component in the Mincer model is omitted from the analysis. 
 
(3-2)      𝐥𝐧 𝒀 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝑺 + 𝑼 
 
Under the OLS estimation with the endogeneity problem, the OLS estimates suffer from an 
upward ability bias. Therefore, the estimated rate of returns ?̂?𝑂𝐿𝑆  is greater than the “real” 
rate of returns 𝛽.  
 
(3-3)   𝐩𝐥𝐢𝐦 ?̂?𝑶𝑳𝑺 =  𝜷 +
𝑪𝑶𝑽(𝑺,𝑼𝟎)
𝑽(𝑺)
>  𝜷 
 
Given that IV estimation corrects for the endogeneity problem, the estimated rate of returns 
?̂?𝐼𝑉 should be equal to the “real” rate of returns 𝛽.  
 
(3-4)   𝐩𝐥𝐢𝐦 ?̂?𝑰𝑽 =  𝜷 +
𝑪𝑶𝑽(𝒁,𝑼𝟎)
𝑪𝑶𝑽(𝒁,𝑺)
=  𝜷 
 
Hence, the IV estimates are theoretically less than the OLS estimates 
 
(3-5)    ?̂?𝑰𝑽 < ?̂?𝑶𝑳𝑺  
 
 IV estimates are often higher than those of OLS. Harmon et al. (2003) compare estimated 




including OLS estimation, traditional IV estimation, IV estimation based on interventions in 
the school system, and IV estimation with family background. Figure 3-3 shows that the 
average OLS estimate is approximately 6.5 per cent which is the lowest among all estimation. 
In contrast, the average IV estimate based on education reforms is around 14 per cent 
indicating the highest rate of return to schooling. The average estimates from the traditional 
IV and the IV using family background as instruments are also greater than that of OLS 
estimation. Card (1999) points out that the estimates based on education reform are likely to 
be at least 20 per cent above the OLS estimates. 
 Although, as shown above, estimates from IV should theoretically be lower than those of 
OLS, there are few plausible hypotheses that potentially explain the reasons that IV estimates 
are greater than those of OLS. First, Bound and Jaeger (1996) suggest that the IV estimation 
may produce further upward biased results due to the unobserved heterogeneous 
characteristics between the control and the treatment groups, e.g. family backgrounds, and 
schooling quality. However, Card (1999) argues that even with the family background 
controls, the IV estimation still yields a higher estimated result. Figure 3-3 also supports 
Card’s (1999) argument. Second, the effect of the ability bias in the OLS estimates is 
substantially smaller than that of the measurement error bias; therefore, the downward bias 
can be observed from the OLS estimates (Griliches, 1977; Angrist and Krueger, 1991). 
Nonetheless, the bias gap
10
 between OLS and IV is significantly large. According to Card 
(1999), only ten per cent of the bias gap is explained by the measurement error, and it is 
unreasonable to conclude that a large positive gap only comes from the effect of the 
measurement error. A third explanation by Ashenfelter and Harmon (1998) suggests that 
higher estimates of IV are possibly due to a pure publication bias caused by a tendency to 
report a large point estimate of the returns to schooling. Finally, Card (1999, 2001) and Lang 
(1993) posit that the IV estimation yields LATE rather than ATE as the education reform, 
especially compulsory schooling, tend to only change the behaviour of individuals who would 
otherwise have low schooling. These individuals are more likely to come from socially and 
economically disadvantaged groups and have higher returns to schooling than those of the 
whole population (LATE is greater than ATE). Thus, the IV estimation based on interventions 
in the school system is expected to give higher rates of return to schooling than those of the 
OLS estimated from the whole population. In fact, if heterogeneous characteristics, e.g. 
unobserved ability and cost terms are not observed among individuals in the treatment group, 
the same level of school attainment and returns to education would be expected among the 
treatment group members through the effect of the intervention.  
                                                        




Figure 3-3 Meta-Analysis of Models with Endogenous Schooling 
 
Note: Total number of estimates is 942 (OLS: 863 studies, IV: 79 studies, IV-Experiment: 17 studies, and 
IV-Family: n.a. 
Source: Harmon et al. (2001) and Harmon et al. (2003). 
 
Table 3-3 Previous Studies of Returns to Schooling Using IV Estimation (Excluding 
Studies with Compulsory Education IV) 
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Section 3. WHY THAILAND?: ISSUES FROM THE PREVIOUS LITERATURE OF 
QUASI-EXPERIMENT WITH COMPULSORY EDUCATION IV 
 There have been studies from both developed and developing countries estimating the 
rates of return to schooling by utilising quasi-experiment with compulsory education IV. This 
section raises debates, issues, and critiques of the previous studies and justifies that Thai data 
is appropriate in estimating returns to education. 
3.3.1. Rates of Return to Schooling Using Compulsory Education as IV from Developed 
Countries 
 Table 3-4 summarises the previous literature regarding the rates of return to schooling 
using compulsory education as IV from developed countries. Harmon and Walker (1995) are 
the pioneers of the research in this area. They exploit the change in the minimum school 
leaving age in the UK in 1947 and 1973 as instrumental variables and find that the estimated 
returns to schooling are approximately 15 per cent, while those of OLS estimation are around 
6 per cent. The result shows that the IV estimates are greater than those of OLS. In favour of 
Harmon and Walker (1995), Oreopoulos (2006) argues that IVs of previous studies affect 
fewer than 10 per cent of the population exposed to the instrument, whereas the minimum 
school leaving age in the study of Harmon and Walker (1995) covers almost half of the 
population. In other words, the estimated local average treatment effect from Harmon and 
Walker’s study (1995) is close to the real average treatment effect. Oreopoulos (2006) 
improves Harmon and Walker’s estimation model (1995) by adding birth cohort control to 
allow for systematic inter-cohort changes in school attainment. His findings for the UK are 
consistent with those of Harmon and Walker (1995) in which the IV estimates are higher than 
those of OLS. Nevertheless, the rates of return to schooling are approximately 10 per cent, 
which is lower than that of previous study. In terms of the results from the US and Canada 
where the change of minimum school leaving age seems not to affect most of the population, 
the IV estimates are substantively greater than those of OLS. This is arguably due to the fact 
that the LATE in the US and Canada represents the estimated returns to schooling of a 
socially disadvantaged group which usually has higher returns to schooling. Even though 
Oreopoulos’s (2006) study is more convincing than others in terms of model specification and 
the estimated results, his estimates may still suffer from the endogeneity bias. In the context 
of the study based on compulsory education reform, Card (1999) argues that the samples used 
in developed countries have a high tendency to be affected by the World War II, that makes 
the treatment and control groups are fundamentally different and biases the results of returns 
to schooling. Ichino and Winter-Ebmer (2004) find that the average year of schooling of 




cohorts that do not experience the war.  
    From late 2000s, many studies argue that compulsory education has a positive but 
smaller effect than previous studies, or zero effect on earnings. The second wave of the 
studies finds statistically significant result with much smaller returns of about 3-6 per cent, 
compared with those of previous studies, 10-14 per cent. These studies likely use the 
school-based interventions even if they do not affect most of the population in the analysis, 
while they try to argue that the compulsory education does not have an impact on returns to 
schooling. Hence it is common to observe that the returns to schooling from these studies are 
not statistically significant or even have a negative sign.  
 In the most recent study of Stephen Jr. and Yang (2014), an interesting methodological 
issue regarding the model specification has been raised. They find that adding region and 
school quality control leads the effect of compulsory education on earnings towards zero or 
even wrong-signed. They argue that without the interaction between region control and year 
of birth, changes across regions over time of school quality cannot be captured in the 
estimation. The effects of differences in school quality (and perhaps family background) may 
cause estimates to be biased since the source of upward bias is not limited to only an 
individual’s ability, but also includes family background and quality of schooling (Schultz, 
1988, Behrman, 1990, Strauss and Thomas, 1995).    
 In conclusion, there are two main debates in the literature from developed countries. The 
first debate is that the LATE is far from the ATE as the interventions do not affect the majority 
of the population. Moreover, the IV estimates tend to be higher than those of OLS since the 
estimated results indicate the estimated returns to schooling of a socially disadvantaged group 
that usually has higher returns to schooling. The second debate raised by Stephen Jr. and Yang 
(2014) seems reasonable and is worth further examination as it is consistent with the 
theoretical discussion regarding the ability bias. Nevertheless, Card (1999) and Ichino and 
Winter-Ebmer (2004) argue that, due to the effect of the World War, the samples from 
developed countries may suffer from the endogeneity bias which possibly results in a 
fundamental difference between treatment and control groups. Thus, it is also worth 
examining the previous studies from developing countries where the effect of the war is less 
pronounced. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 2, developing countries have their own 
characteristics which are radically different from developed countries. Therefore, this 




Table 3-4 Literature Review of Rates of Return to Schooling Using Compulsory Education as IV from Developed 
Countries 
Author Country Identification 
  Schooling 
Coefficients 
OLS IV/DD 
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Note: a no report on statistical significance; b the confidence intervals based on Moreira’s CLR test, which are reported in 









3.3.2. Rates of Return to Schooling Using Compulsory Education as IV from Developing 
Countries 
 Table 3-5 is the summary of the previous literature from developing countries. There are 
few studies using compulsory education as IV in estimating returns to schooling since the 
issue of data scarcity is common in most of developing countries. Although the studies from 
China utilise the same data set, their findings contradict each other. This problem also applies 
to the case of Turkey. In case of China, the IV estimates from the study of Fang et al. (2012) is 
around 2 per cent and statistically significant at one per cent, while that of La Vincent and 
College (2014) is about 6 per cent but not statistically significant. However, both studies share 
similar magnitude of OLS estimates and show that the IV estimates are lower than those of 
OLS. Aydemir and Murat (2013) report that the rates of return to schooling in Turkey are 
approximately 16-30 per cent for the IV estimation. With gender disaggregation, the returns to 
schooling for men are around 0.5 per cent and not statistically significant, whereas those of 
women are approximately four per cent and statistically significant at five per cent (Aydemir 
and Murat, 2015). The estimated results from the latter study are far from those of the original 
study in 2013. However, both studies still illustrate a similar magnitude of OLS estimates but 
different bias direction. Interestingly, the studies from China and Turkey indicate the similar 
trend that the OLS estimates are higher than those of IV. In other words, the upward ability 
bias can be expected in the OLS estimation from both countries. In Indonesia, the rates of 
return to schooling estimated from IV estimation are statistically significant and around 13 per 
cent (Parinduri, 2014). This is consistent with the first wave of the studies from developed 
countries. However, the method of estimation used in this study is a fuzzy regression 
discontinuity design (FRDD)
11
. With FRDD, the identification strategy depends on a cut-off, 
around which there is a discontinuity in the probability of assignment from 0 to 1. 
Nonetheless, this assumption is not likely to hold; therefore, FRDD possibly produces biased 
estimates of returns to schooling. Moreover, the result from Parinduri (2014) is not directly 
comparable to other studies using a sharp regression discontinuity design in the estimation.  
 In sum, the estimated results of developing countries are different from those of 
developed countries. The results from developing countries show that the OLS estimates are 
higher than those of IV estimation, though some of the results are not statistically significant. 
In other words, the ability bias is dominant in the OLS estimation of developing countries. On 
the other hand, the estimates from developed countries e.g. US and UK, tend to produce OLS 
estimates that are lower than those of IV. As Chapter 2 illustrates that the economic and social 
conditions of developing countries are fundamentally different from those of developed 
countries, this may explain the different patterns of endogeneity bias from countries with 
different stages of development. This finding is worth further investigation. 
                                                        




Table 3-5 Literature Review of the Rates of Return to Schooling Using Compulsory 
Education as IV from Developing Countries 
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Section 4. RATES OF RETURN TO SCHOOLING FROM THAILAND 
3.4.1. Overall Estimated Results 
 The studies of returns to schooling from Thailand are very similar. They share common 
characteristics, in terms of data, research methodology, and estimated results. Regarding data 
and research methodology, most of the studies utilise the Labour Force Survey data collected 
by the National Statistics Office as it is the most comprehensive data containing large 
representative samples and all variables required by the Mincer equation. However, using the 
Labour Force Survey data is not without caveats. Both advantages and disadvantages of the 
Labour Force Survey data are discussed in Chapter 5 Data and Methodology. Either a single 
year or multiple years of the Labour Force Survey data are used in the literature. The main 
statistical estimation methods are cross-sectional or pooled cross-sectional OLS regressions 
without fixing for the endogeneity bias, even in the most recent studies, e.g. Wannakrairoj 
(2013) and Tangtipongkul (2015). With a similar data set of the same or different years, a 
comparable magnitude of OLS estimates can be observed among previous studies. The OLS 
estimates are approximately 10-11 per cent. As mentioned earlier, these estimated returns to 
schooling highly possibly suffer from the endogeneity bias, especially the ability bias. Table 
3-6 briefly outlines the literature review of the rates of return to schooling from Thailand. 
3.4.2. The Returns to Education in Thailand: A Pseudo-Panel Approach 
 This section thoroughly reviews the study by Warunsiri and McNown (2010). The study 
offers the most unique and interesting estimation method and estimated results among 
literature regarding returns to schooling in Thailand. In attempt to solve the endogeneity bias, 
Warunsiri and McNown (2010) use two types of estimation, including IV estimation with 
college proximity as an instrument, and estimation pseudo-panel approach, to estimate returns 
to education in Thailand. They use the Labour Force Survey data from 1986 to 2005.  
 Following Card (1995) and Uusitalo (1999), they adopt college proximity as an IV by 
arguing that the existence of college in each area would reduce the costs of schooling and, in 
turn, increase the number of years of schooling. Furthermore, following Deaton (1985), 
Warunsiri and McNown (2010) construct synthetic cohorts (pseudo panels) by using a pooled 
cross sectional LFS data. They treat those cohorts as repeated observations over time and 
utilise the fixed effects estimation with the (pseudo) panel data to eliminate unobserved ability 
from the error term. The following sector briefly explains the method of estimation using 









(3-6)                 𝐥𝐨𝐠 𝒚𝒊 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑺𝒊 + 𝜷𝟐𝑿𝒊 + 𝜷𝟑𝑿𝒊
𝟐 + 𝒆𝒊  
 
where the log of individual earnings (yi) is a function of years of education an individual 
attended (Si) and number of years an individual has worked after completing his/her education 
(Xi). ei represents a disturbance term. Equation (3-7) is the time and individual specific 
representation of (3-6) where i indexed individuals and t indexes time periods: 
 
(3-7)   𝐥𝐨𝐠 𝒚𝒊𝒕 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑿𝒊𝒕
𝟐 + 𝜶𝒊𝒕 + 𝒆𝒊𝒕   
 
where the log of earnings (yit) of individual i at time t is a function of years of education an 
individual i attended at time t (Sit) and number of years an individual i has worked after 
completing his/her education (Xit) at time t. eit represents a disturbance term of individual i at 
time t. The term 𝛼𝑖𝑡 captures unobserved individual heterogeneity that includes ability and 
motivation. If 𝛼𝑖𝑡 is observable, it can be included directly into the equation. However, in the 
absence of such information, unobservable variables represented by  𝛼𝑖𝑡   will cause a 
regression estimation to produce biased results due to the unobserved variable bias.  
Deaton (1985) Pseudo Panel: 
 
(3-8)   𝐥𝐨𝐠 𝒚𝒄𝒕̅̅ ̅̅ = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑺𝒄𝒕̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝜷𝟐𝑿𝒄𝒕̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝜷𝟑𝑿𝒄𝒕
𝟐̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝜶𝒄𝒕̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝒆𝒄𝒕̅̅ ̅̅   
 
where a subscript c refers to birth cohort. Birth cohort is a group of individuals i born in the 
same year. Data on log wages, years of schooling, working experience, and fixed effects of 
each cohort is the average value from those cohort’s members. Under a large sample per each 
cohort, Verbeek and Nijman (1992, 1993, and 2007) argue that  ?̅?𝑐𝑡 can be treated as the 
unobserved cohort fixed effect 𝛼𝑐. 
 
(3-9)   𝐥𝐨𝐠 𝒚𝒄𝒕̅̅ ̅̅ = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑺𝒄𝒕̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝜷𝟐𝑿𝒄𝒕̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝜷𝟑𝑿𝒄𝒕
𝟐̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝜶𝒄𝒕 + 𝒆𝒄𝒕̅̅ ̅̅  
 
Hence, after taking a first difference, the unobserved cohort fixed effect 𝛼𝑐 is removed from 
the estimation model. In other words, the regression model is possibly free from the 
endogeneity bias. 
With individual sample, the OLS estimate is around 11 per cent, while the IV estimate is 
approximately 14 per cent. In contrast, the rates of return to schooling are roughly 15 per cent 
for IV estimation and fixed effects estimation with pseudo-panel data. The estimates show a 
downward bias of the returns to education in least squares regressions with individual data. 




pseudo-panel estimations, the problem of endogeneity bias is possibly eliminated from the 
estimated rates of return to schooling.   
Nonetheless, several problems regarding internal validity of both IV and pseudo-panel 
estimations can be raised. In terms of the IV estimation, since the identification strategy 
cannot be tested by any statistical methods, it tends to be easily refuted by any arguments 
convincing that there is a correlation between the instrument variable and the error term. 
Carneiro and Heckman (2002) and Meghir and Rivkin (2011) argue that the college proximity 
is potentially correlated with individual ability; therefore, the IV does not satisfy the condition 
of exclusion restriction. Individuals and schools are not randomly allocated as individuals 
with higher endowment, both in terms of innate ability and family wealth, tend to live in a 
more developed city in which schools tend be located. Regarding the pseudo-panel estimation, 
the assumption that the unobserved ability is time-invariant may not hold true (Ding and 
Lehrer, 2014) because the heterogeneous ability evolves over the lifecycle. Regardless of 
time-variant or time-invariant nature of the ability, the panel regression with fixed effect may 
suffer from further upward bias as running panel regression with fixed effect excludes 
time-invariant independent variables from the regression, such as region controls and 
schooling quality. Stephen Jr. and Yang (2014) find that adding region and school quality 
control leads the effect of compulsory education on earnings towards zero or even 
wrong-signed. They argue that without the interaction between region control and year of 
birth, changes across regions over time of school quality cannot be captured in the estimation. 
The effects of differences in school quality may cause estimates to be biased since the source 
of upward bias is not limited to only an individual’s ability, but also includes family 












Table 3-6 Literature Review of Rates of Return to Schooling from Thailand 






- Random sample of households in 
metropolitan area (urban) of Thailand (2,000 
men). 
- A quota sample of highly educated people 
(3,000 men and women) to prevent unknown 
biases. 
- 5,000 individuals (1,485 college graduates). 
Regressions with stepwise technique. 
Independent variables: age, education 
(years), sex, parents’ education (sum total in 
years), language spoken at home, father’s 
occupation, types of schooling, higher 
education filed, employment, and occupation. 
(*): standard error. 







- 1994-1996 and 1998-2000 Labour Force Survey. 
- Only sample from metropolitan Bangkok (less 
than 40 years of age) to 1) avoid heterogeneities in 
labour-demand conditions across local labour 
markets; 2) seasonal fluctuations in production are 
minor in Bangkok; 3) the share of migrants is 
large. 
- Sample sizes are 3,471 and 4,273. 
Pooled cross-section regressions. 
Independent variables: age, education 
(years), sex, and time and origin fixed 
effects. 
(*): absolute t value 













- 1989 - 1995 Labour Force Survey. 
- 15 - 60 years of age. 
- Sample is restricted to individuals who are 
sons or daughters of the household heads. This 
suggests that the sample is a selected group, 
especially if those who live with parents tend 
to be those who cannot afford to live apart on 
their earnings. 
a 
Pooled cross-section regressions 
Independent variables: experience, 
vocational education, region of residence, are 
of residence, marital status, migration status, 
survey year and birth cohort. 
(*): corrected standard errors for 
self-selection corrected and normal standard 
































Hawley (2004) - 1985, 1995, and 1998 Labour Force Survey. 
- 24-35 years of age. 





OLS Regressions by years. 
Independent variables: education (years), 
experience, area of residence, region, and 
sector of employment. 


































- Surveys conducted in some manufacturing 
industries in the Bangkok region in July to 
October 2001. 
- Sample size is 1,867.
 
- The data do not represent worker population 
in manufacturing as a whole. The sample of 
plants is biased toward large scale 
establishments which imply that the estimates 
of returns to schooling can be larger than the 
population estimates if there is a positive 
correlation between establishment size and 
wages. 
OLS Regression. 
Independent variables (base model): years of 
schooling, age, sex, company fixed effects. 
c
 
Second model includes parents’ schooling, 
school quality (GAT and SAT), and 
elementary-school province fixed effects. 
Third model is the second model excluding 
company fixed effects.  
(*): absolute t value. 
















- 1986-2005 Labour Force Survey. 
- 199,833 individual observations and 440 
OLS, IV and WLS (Pseudo-panel) 










(2010) cohort-year observations. age, and cohort dummies variables (for 
WLS). 
IV: a dummy variable identifying the 
provinces in which universities or teacher 
training colleges are located. 
(*): standard error. 





















2012 Labour Force Survey with sample size of 
19,099 individuals. 
Cross-sectional regression. 
Independent variables: education (years), 








2007-2010 Labour Force Survey with sample 
size of 200,000 (approximately). 
Cross-sectional regression. 
Independent variables: education (years), and 
experience. 



















Note: a As argued by Bedi and Gaston (1997), given the prevalence of joint families in developing countries, the individuals may simply live with their parents out of convenience in location 
or because they are participating in family enterprises. It is premature to assume that all the individuals living with their parents are still subsidized by their parents’ incomes. 
b This study uses data collected during the agricultural season and thereby is more likely to survey people who were at their permanent place of residence. Thailand is primarily an agricultural 
economy. Many of the farmers migrate to the cities in the dry season to find work (Chalongphob & Yongyuth, 1996). See critiques on advantages and disadvantages of LFS data pp. 275. 
c Province fixed effects are included here because origin-specific heterogeneity (mostly unobservable in our data) that affect labour productivity could be important. 
Source: Author’s compilation. 





Section 5. RETURNS TO SCHOOLING AND SELECTION BIAS  
 Schultz (1988) argues that a bias may occur when sample selection is related to the 
schooling-wage relationship. Sample selection criteria leading to a bias includes the choice of 
occupation, labour force participation, or migration, to name a few. In this section, the sample 
selection bias in returns to schooling is introduced according to individuals’ demographic 
characteristics that are usually related to sample selection criteria such as choice of occupation, 
labour force participation, and migration, especially in the case of developing economies. 
Those individuals’ characteristics involve gender and area of residence.    
3.5.1. Gender 
 In estimation of returns to education, it is inconclusive whether the “real” female rates of 
return should be higher or lower than the estimated one. Both Psacharopoulos (1985) and 
Schultz (1988) argue that the estimated female returns to schooling are either underestimated 
or overestimated due to the fact that the estimates are from unrepresentative sample of 
females. Female labour participation rate is low as females tend to concentrate in 
self-employed occupations or a non-wage labour market. Hence, the sample of estimation 
from LFS does not cover all females and deems to be unrepresentative.  However, Schultz 
(1988) posits that women may choose to work fewer hours than do men regardless of female 
labour force participation rate. Therefore, the problem of sample selection may be 
underestimated.  
3.5.2. Area of Residence 
 Estimates of returns to schooling may be also subject to a sample selection bias due to a 
rural-urban migration. In general, better educated individuals tend to migrate from rural areas 
to urban areas due to higher urban real wages (Greenwood (1975); Schwartz (1976); Schultz 
(1982b, 1988); Orazem and King (2007)). This phenomenon is described as, “human capital 
drain from rural to urban areas” (Amare, et al., 2012) and can be observed in other developing 
countries, namely Taiwan (Speare, 1974), Venezuela (Levy and Wadycki, 1974), Papua New 
Guinea (Ross, 1984). The evidence from the previous studies of Thailand also indicates the 
same pattern (Prachuabmoh et al., 1979, Tirasawat, 1985). Thus, the estimated urban rates of 
return do not purely represent the “real” urban rates of return as they also reflect rural 
immigrants’ rates of return.  
 Without migration, the “real” rates of return to schooling in urban areas should be higher 
than the estimated rates. Conversely, the “real” rates of return to schooling in rural areas 
should be lower than the estimated rates. The underlying reason is that, without rural 




and supply of educated workers since there are more job opportunities that educated workers 
can utilise their skills honed from their higher school years. However, an influx of rural 
migrants drives up the supply of educated workers in urban areas. Thus, returns to schooling 
decrease as the supply increases. Psacharopoulos (1987) posits that returns to schooling 
among different areas will converge through the process of labour migration. In contrast, the 
“real” rates of return in rural areas should be lower since there is less demand for educated 
workers in rural areas and there is no absorption of educated workers to urban areas to relieve 
the excess supply of educated workers in rural areas. Given that there is no migration, rural 
educated workers enjoy much smaller rents than those from urban areas. Nevertheless better 
educated individuals are more likely to migrate from rural areas to urban areas owing to 
higher urban real wages. Therefore, the rural-urban migration can be observed.  
 There are implicit assumptions underlying above discussion. First, Schultz (1988) and 
Agesa (2001) argue that net migration flow is characterised by the flow from rural to urban 
areas owing to higher real wages in urban areas and unbalance between demand for and 
supply of educated workers in rural areas. With the modern educational expansion, the supply 
of educated workers in rural areas increases rapidly, while the development of rural labour 
market cannot keep pace with the increase in educated labour supply. This results in an influx 
of migration flow from rural to urban areas. The trend can be observed in Latin American 
countries and Kenya (Schultz, 1988; Agesa, 2001). Second, regarding education of migrants, 
more educated individuals tend to migrate to urban areas as they can exploit their skills and 
earn higher wages in the urban labour market. Furthermore, those migrants are more likely to 
migrate after graduation (Schultz, 1988). The previous study from Colombia finds that the 
estimated returns to rural schooling indicate extremely downward bias as there is a large 
number of rural migrants in Colombia (Orazem and King, 2007). On the other hand, Schultz 
(1998) and Duraisamy (2002) argue that the sample selection bias is moderate in Côte 
d’Ivoire, Ghana, and India.  
 On one hand, it is possible that the rates of return to schooling in rural areas may be 
downwardly biased due to the problem of sample selection. The conventional estimations of 
returns to schooling usually ignore the selected nature of the rural samples. Rural labour 
participation rate is substantially low and rural individuals tend to concentrate in 
self-employed occupations or a non-wage labour market. Hence, the sample of estimation 
does not cover all rural individuals and deems to be unrepresentative.  
 However, the effect of bias due to outmigration may reduce the effect of selection bias 
due to an unrepresentative sample. As argued above, individuals with higher ability tend to 
migrate to urban areas to find a better schooling or jobs. Moreover, there is evidence showing 
that the selection bias due to unrepresentative sample may be modest in developing countries, 
e.g. Côte d’Ivoire (Schultz, 1988), Ghana (Schultz, 1988), and India (Duraisamy, 2002). After 




to schooling are fairly close to uncorrected estimates.  
Section 6. RESEARCH CONTRIBUTION  
This study makes three main contributions in terms of methodology and also substantive 
aspect in the context of Thailand and, by implication, developing countries in general.  
First, the previous literature reveals that there is a quite different pattern of the relative 
magnitudes of the estimates from OLS and instrumental variables (IV) estimation using 
compulsory schooling as IV between developed and developing countries. Investigating this 
difference can contribute to a better understanding of (a) how and when the conventional 
“ability bias” matters in estimating returns to schooling and (b) the impact of compulsory 
schooling in different settings. 
The second contribution is in terms of substantive aspect in the context of Thailand. As 
Thailand experienced rapid economic development and structural transformation during 
1960-1990, obtaining the rates of return to education in this period helps us better understand 
the process of Thai economic development as well as the interplay between the rates of return 
to schooling and the economic development process during 1980 to 1990. The overall social 
and economic conditions of the development in Thailand are consistent with the general 
characteristics of other developing countries. Hence, estimating the rates of return to 
schooling in Thailand, by implication, also provides better understandings on the role of 
human capital in the process of development in other developing countries. Due to the fact 
that developing countries possess radically different degrees of market completeness and 
different quality of institution from those of developed countries, this warrants value for 
investigation of the returns to schooling in the context of developing countries. This further 
investigation possibly gives a different economic pattern and implications of the returns to 
schooling. 
Finally, the third contribution is on the construction of the database and discussion of the 
descriptive analysis for the discrepancies among different demographic characteristics, 
including gender, cohort, area of residence, region of residence, and economic sector. In 
addition to the overall estimates of returns to schooling, another important issue is an issue of 
heterogeneity in educational returns across individuals. Heterogeneity in individuals’ 
demographic characteristics tends to distort the returns to education; for example, the female 
rates of return to education is likely to be higher than those of male. Hence, it is worth 
examining heterogeneous returns to schooling from different demographic characteristics. 
 





Section 7. CONCLUSION  
 The rates of return to schooling is one of the most important topics that economists have 
been investigating, especially by utilising the Mincerian equation. Despite the fact that the 
Mincer model is still alive and well in fitting the actual age-wage data, there has been a long 
debate that the OLS estimate from Mincer equation is possibly biased due to the endogeneity 
problem. Hundreds of studies with different methods of estimation attempt to deal with the 
endogeneity bias but they fail to establish a causal effect of schoolings on earnings in the 
absence of randomised experiment. Even though a randomised controlled trial (RCT) is the 
ideal estimation method, it is not feasible to conduct the RCT in most of the studies of returns 
to education. The second-best candidate, which is close to the RCT, is the estimation with 
quasi-experiment, e.g. regression discontinuity design (RDD), differences-in-differences, to 
name a few. However, the studies utilising those methods of estimation are rare, especially in 
developing countries where the issue of data scarcity is prevalent. 
 This study mainly focuses on the IV estimation using compulsory schooling as IV. There 
are two main debates in the literature from developed countries. The first debate is that the 
LATE is far from the ATE as the interventions do not affect a majority of the population. Thus, 
the IV estimates tend to be higher than those of OLS since the estimated results indicate the 
estimated returns to schooling of a socially disadvantaged group that usually has higher 
returns to schooling. The second debate raised by Stephen Jr. and Yang (2014) is the concern 
of potential bias from the omitted variables, including school quality and family background. 
They argue that without the interaction between region control and year of birth, changes 
across regions over time of school quality cannot be captured in the estimation. The effects of 
differences in school quality may cause estimates to be biased since the source of upward bias 
is not limited to innate ability, but also includes family background and quality of schooling 
(Schultz, 1988, Behrman, 1990, Strauss and Thomas, 1995). Even though there is no specific 
debate to the literature from developing countries, the overall results show that the estimates 
between developed and developing countries are different. The results from developing 
countries show that the OLS estimates are higher than those of IV estimation, while the 
estimates from developed countries tend to produce OLS estimates that are lower than those 
of IV. It implies that the ability bias is dominant in the OLS estimation of developing 
countries. 
 This study make three main contributions to the existing debates in the literature in terms 
of methodology and also substantive aspect in the context of Thailand and, by implication, 
developing countries in general. First, the previous literature reveals that there is a different 
pattern of the relative magnitudes between OLS and IV estimates using compulsory schooling 
as IV between developed and developing countries. Investigating this contrast can contribute 




estimating returns to schooling and of (b) the impact of compulsory schooling in different 
settings. Second, as Thailand experiences rapid economic development and structural 
transformation during 1960-1990, obtaining the rate of returns to education in this period 
helps us better understand the process of Thai economic development as well as the interplay 
between the rate of returns to schooling and the economic development process during 1980 
to 1990. This also helps understand the role of human capital in the process of development in 
other developing countries. Finally, the third contribution is on the construction of the 
database and discussion of the descriptive analysis for the discrepancies among different 
demographic characteristics, including gender, cohort, area of residence, region of residence, 
and economic sector. In addition to the overall estimates of returns to schooling, another 
important issue is an issue of heterogeneity in educational returns across individuals. 
Heterogeneity in individuals’ demographic characteristics tends to distort the returns to 
education; for example, the female rates of return to education is likely to be higher than those 





CHAPTER 4. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Section 1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter briefly presents a general theoretical framework of the analysis of returns to 
education. It mainly focuses on the Mincer’s (1974) human capital earnings function. Willis et 
al. (1986) quote Griliches’ (1977) questions regarding the Mincerian earnings equation in 
their article as followings: 
 
“Why it (Mincer model) should work so well …Why should there be a 
relation like this in the first place? In other words: (a) what interpretation 
can be given to such an equation? (b) What interpretation can be given to 
the estimated [schooling] coefficient? (c) Can one expect it to be "stable" 
across different samples and different time periods?” 
 
This chapter explores Griliches’ questions by beginning with a derivation of the 
Mincerian earnings function from the human capital theory. Secondly, it discusses the implicit 
assumptions behind the Mincer model and their implications on estimated coefficient of years 
of schooling.  
Due to its simplicity yet strong explaining power, the Mincer’s human capital earnings 
function is utilised widely as a starting point to examine the effects of investment in education, 
and on-the-job training, especially in the field of economics of education, labour economics, 
and development economics.  




    𝐥𝐨𝐠 𝒚 = 𝒂 + 𝒃𝑺 + 𝒄𝑿 + 𝒅𝑿𝟐 + 𝒆  
 
where y represents incomes/earnings, b can be interpreted as an educational premium for 
wages and/or an internal rate of return to schooling under a set of certain assumptions that are 
discussed later in this chapter, S represents years of education an individual attended, X 
represents number of years an individual has worked after completing his/her education, and e 
represents the disturbance term.
                                                        
12 Although it is commonly written as log y, it is a natural log of y. Thus, it is more accurate to write as ln y 
instead of log y. However, this study follows the convention and use log y and ln y interchangeably throughout 




Section 2. THE DERIVATION OF MINCER’S HUMAN CAPITAL EARNINGS FUNCTION  
4.2.1. Simplified Derivation 
The Mincer model is originally derived from the human capital theory, pioneered by 
Becker (1964, 1975), Becker and Chiswick (1966), and Mincer (1958, 1962, 1974). In the 
human capital theory (Becker, 1964) individuals make a decision to trade-off between current 
and future consumption. Matt (2013) spells out the implicit assumptions underlying Becker 
(1964) model of human capital as followings: i) individuals choose a certain level of 
education to maximise the expected present value of the stream of future returns; ii) 
individuals do not work while being in school; and individuals do not acquire any education 
while being in the labour market, meaning that time of schooling is independent of time of 
working; iii) there are only opportunity costs and no direct costs of education; and iv) the 









𝒕=𝟏 =  𝒘𝒔−𝟏 +  𝒄𝒔  
where w stands for incomes, T represents an amount of time until retirement, 𝑐𝑠 represents 
the costs of education, and 𝑟𝑠 is the internal rate of return. If T is approaching the large 
number, the equation (4-2) can be approximated as: 
(4-3)    
𝒘𝒔 − 𝒘𝒔−𝟏
𝒓𝒔
=  𝒘𝒔−𝟏 + 𝒄𝒔  
The equation (4-3) can be rearranged further if the costs of education, 𝑐𝑠, is sufficiently small. 
  
(4-4)   𝒓𝒔 ≈  
𝒘𝒔 − 𝒘𝒔−𝟏
 𝒘𝒔−𝟏
  ≈  𝐥𝐨𝐠 𝒘𝒔 − 𝐥𝐨𝐠 𝒘𝒔−𝟏  
 
Harmon, Oosterbeek, and Walker (2003) posit that from equation (4-4) the empirical 
approximation of the human capital theoretical framework can be derived as the Mincer 
model, equation (4-1). 
4.2.2. Derivation from Mincer’s Frameworks 
Heckman et al. (2006) elaborate the derivation of Mincerian earnings equation in more 
detail by utilising two different Mincer’s frameworks, including the compensating difference 
model (Mincer, 1958), and the accounting-identity model (Mincer, 1974) 
                                                        
13  More details of the derivation can be found in the survey article, “The Returns to Education: 




4.2.2.1 The Compensating Difference Model 
 In the compensating difference model, as certain jobs require different amount of 
schooling, individuals are compensated for opportunity costs for acquiring different levels of 
education, forgone earnings while they are in school. This fact explains the reason that 
everyone earns different amount of earnings over their lifetime. For example, in Thailand, 
medical students are required to study six years for the undergraduate level, while students 
from economics department complete their course within four years, meaning that medical 
students’ forgone earnings are higher than those of students from economics school. Hence, in 
general, medical doctors would earn more since they get compensated for being in the school 
longer.  
 The main assumption under the compensating difference model is that individuals are ex 
ante identical, that implies i) individuals have identical abilities and opportunities; ii) credit 
markets are perfect and there is no credit constraint; and iii) the environment is perfectly risk 
free. The compensating differential is determined by equating the expected present value of 











(𝒆−𝒓𝑺 − 𝒆−𝒓𝑻)  
where Y(S) represents the annual earnings of an individual with S years of education, r stands 
for an interest rate, and T is an amount of time until retirement. The equation (4-5) can be 
rearranged further by equating earnings streams across schooling and taking logs: 
 
(4-6)   𝐥𝐧 𝒀(𝑺) = 𝐥𝐧 𝒀(𝟎) + 𝒓𝑺 + 𝐥𝐧((𝟏 − 𝒆−𝒓𝑻) (𝟏 − 𝒆−𝒓(𝑻−𝑺))⁄ )   
 
Similar to the derivation illustrated by Harmon et al. (2003), if T is approaching the large 
number, the equation (4-6) can be approximated as: 
 
(4-1)    𝐥𝐧 𝒚 = 𝒂 + 𝒃𝑺 + 𝒄𝑿 + 𝒅𝑿𝟐 + 𝒆  
 
Again, this ends up with the common Mincer model, equation (4-1). In this model, it is 
possible to illustrate that the (internal) rate of return to schooling and the interest rate are 
equal, which is, in fact, similar to the equation (4-4): 
 
(4-7)     𝐥𝐧 𝒀(𝑺) − 𝐥𝐧 𝒀(𝟎) = 𝒓𝑺 
𝒃𝑺 = 𝒓 
                                                        
14 More details of the derivation can be found in the handbook chapter, “Chapter 7 Earnings Functions, Rates of 




4.2.2.2 The Accounting-Identity Model 
 In the accounting-identity model, it assumes that each individual has his/her own unique 
identity (ex ante heterogeneity), which implies that the rates of return to education vary in the 
population to reflect differences in returns. Card (1999) also emphasises that, “the return to 
education is not a single parameter in the population, but rather a random variable that may 
vary with other characteristics of individuals, such as family background, ability, or level of 
schooling”. This model is closer to the common Mincerian earnings function as it 
incorporates the effects of investment in education, and on-the-job training into the model. 
The incorporation of these two components is motivated by the dynamic human capital 
investment model of Ben-Porath (1967).     
 Directly quoted from Heckman et al. (2006), “Let 𝑃𝑡 be potential earnings at age t, and 
express costs of investments in training 𝐶𝑡 as a fraction 𝑘𝑡 of potential earnings, 𝐶𝑡 = 𝑘𝑡 𝑃𝑡. 
Let 𝑏𝑡 be the average return to training investments made at age t. Potential earnings at t 
are”: 
 




 From the equation (4-8), Heckman et al. (2006) show that the final product of the 
accounting-identity model is the common Mincer’s human capital earnings function, equation 
(4-1). Through approximation, the equation (4-8) is rearranged into: 
 






𝑿𝟐      (4-9) 
 
Replacing the potential earnings into the observed earnings equation: 
Observed earnings: 𝐥𝐧 𝒀(𝑺, 𝑿) ≈ 𝐥𝐧 𝑷𝑿+𝑺 − 𝒌 (𝟏 −  
𝑿
𝑻
)   









𝑿𝟐   
 
Mincerian equation: 𝐥𝐧 𝒚 = 𝒂 + 𝒃𝑺 + 𝒄𝑿 + 𝒅𝑿𝟐 + 𝒆 
 
 Comparing the observed earnings equation and Mincerian equation, the intercept, a, 
represents the first component of the equation (4-10), [ln 𝑃0 − 𝑘], b or 𝑏𝑆 is the rate of return 









 represent the return to on-the-job training, which 






 Heckman et al. (2006) argue that 𝑏𝑆 is an educational premium for wages but not the 
internal rate of return to schooling. Hence, it cannot use to justify whether we should invest in 
education or how much we should invest in education. In most applications of the Mincer 
model, it is assumed that an educational premium for wages and an internal rate of return to 
schooling are the same across persons and across school years. This point is discussed later in 
the chapter. Table 4-1 summarises the differences between the compensating differences 
model and the accounting-identity model. 
Table 4-1 The Differences between the Compensating Differences Model and the 
Accounting-Identity Model 
The compensating differences model (1958) The accounting-identity model (1974) 
Main assumption: Individuals are  
ex ante identical 
Main assumption: Individuals are 
ex ante heterogeneous 
𝜌𝑠 is the same for all individuals 
𝜌𝑠 varies in the population to reflect 
heterogeneity in returns 
𝜌𝑠 = 𝑟 = 𝐼𝑅𝑅 𝜌𝑠 ≠ 𝐼𝑅𝑅 
Source: Author’s compilation based on the analysis of Heckman et al. (2006). 
Section 3. ASSUMPTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS ON ESTIMATED COEFFICIENT OF YEARS 
OF SCHOOLING 
 Based on a certain set of assumptions, the Mincer model, equation (4-1), looks clean and 
simple. However, its underlying set of assumptions is often less explicit. A set of assumptions 
generally implies limitations of a particular model and interpretations of its results such as 
estimated coefficients of interest. To better understand the Mincer model, it is worth 
examining its underlying assumptions. Card (1999) describes the set of Mincerian earnings 
function assumptions as followings: i) the numbers of years of schooling is the only correct 
measurement of educational attainment; ii) the returns to schooling is constant with respects 
to years of education, meaning that whether an individual moves up from grade 4 to grade 5 
or from grade 5 to grade 6, each additional year of schooling affects earnings indifferently and 
are perfectly substitutable for each other (Meghir and Rivkin, 2011); iii) time of formal 
schooling is independent of time of working and their effects are separable; iv) there are only 
opportunity costs and no direct costs of education; and v) the rate of returns to schooling is 
constant across individuals (homogeneity assumption). Assumption iii) and iv) are directly 
derived from the human capital theory (Becker, 1964).  
 Under the assumption i) and ii), the coefficient b in equation (4-1) can be interpreted as 
an educational premium for wages but not as an internal rate of return to schooling. It reflects 
the effect of schooling in the labour market. The coefficient b is often addressed by the term, 
“the rate of return to schooling/education”, and this may confuse with the term, “the internal 




after satisfying the additional assumptions iii) and iv), the coefficient b is referred to the 
internal rate of return (Willis, 1986). The mathematical illustration is out of scope of this 
study; however, Heckman et al. (2006) provide a thorough analysis on this matter in the 
Handbook of the Economics of Education.     
 Regarding the coefficient of years of schooling as a wage premium from education, the 
Mincer model is still well and alive in estimating the relationship between wage and 
schooling conditioned by other factors. It is relatively easier to satisfy assumptions i) years of 
schooling as educational attainment and ii) constant returns. If the research interest focuses on 
the average returns to years of schooling, rather than returns from other measurement of 
education (e.g. cognitive skills), or exact returns to each year of education, assumption i) and 
ii) are already satisfied. Thus, under these two assumptions, the estimated coefficient of years 
of schooling is considered as growth of earnings with respect to schooling or a price of 
schooling from a market wage equation (Heckman, et al., 2006). 
 However, the main criticisms of Mincer model’s assumptions are often on the 
assumptions iv) cost of education and v) homogeneity of returns across individuals as some 
studies are interested in estimating the internal rate of returns to education. Estimating the 
internal rates of return for any investment projects have to take into account all costs and 
incomes involved in the investment project. Nevertheless, the Mincer model explicitly 
excludes the cost component and assumes that there are only opportunity costs and no direct 
costs of education. Hence, the estimated coefficient of education attainment cannot be 
interpreted as the internal rate of return, which is required to consider a complete accounting 
of the costs and benefits (Heckman, et al. 2006; Meghir and Rivkin 2011). Instead, the 
estimated coefficient of education attainment should be interpreted as growth of market 
earnings in terms of schooling. Moreover, with assumption v), the model ignores the 
heterogeneity in discount rates and uncertainty, which may affect decision making towards 
schooling. Violation of this assumption possibly results in biased estimation of returns to 
schooling. 
Section 4. CONCLUSION 
 Even though Mincer model seems unrealistic and some assumptions can be challenged, 
the estimation based on Mincer model still shows a positive effect of schooling on earnings 
(Harmon, et al., 2003) and well fit the actual age-wages profiles (Card, 1999). Chapter 3 
Section 1 shows that Mincer model with the OLS estimation can fit the actual recent data 
fairly well in both developed and developing countries. On the other hand, Heckman, et al. 
(2006) argues that Mincer model can only be used as a good starting point to develop a more 
complicated analytical framework. They criticise Mincer model on three main bases. First, 




coefficient of years of schooling is ambiguous and difficult to make a meaningful economic 
interpretation. Finally, even a theoretically credible method of estimation such as IV 
estimation with RDD may possibly produce biased estimates as its instruments are generally 
found to be weak in many cases. A more comprehensive theoretical and empirical discussion 
can be found in the work of Heckman, Lochner and Todd (2003).  
 Lastly, this study shall explicitly limit the definition of estimated coefficient of education 
attainment to a wage premium from education, but still follows the convention by using the 





CHAPTER 5. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 This chapter provides comprehensive discussion regarding the data, methodology, and 
identification strategy employed in this study. In general, this study exploits an opportunity of 
quasi-experiment in Thailand which occurs from a change in compulsory education law to 
estimate the rates of return to schooling. The main estimation method is the IV estimation and 
the only source of data used in the estimation is the pooled cross-sectional Labour Force 
Survey (LFS) data from 1986 to 2012.   
Section 1. DATA 
 The data set used in this analysis is drawn from the Thailand’s Labour Force Survey 
(LFS) conducted by the National Statistical Office (NSO) for the years 1986 to 2012. The 
Thai Labour Force Surveys are collected quarterly
15
 on about 80,000 random households for 
a total of about 200,000 observations per quarter, representing 0.1–0.5 per cent of the total 
Thai population. The LFS is the only national data set that comprehensively includes 
information both on demographic characteristics and labour related characteristics.
16
  
 The sample of estimation in this study is obtained by pooling the 27 consecutive annual 
LFSs. Only the data from the third quarter of the LFS is used in this study to control for the 
seasonal migration of agricultural labour. In general, agricultural workers move back and 
forth between urban manufacturing sector and rural agricultural sector. Nevertheless, they 
tend to migrate back to rural agricultural sector during the rainy season (Sussangkarn & 
Chalamwong, 1996), which is the third quarter of the year. Moreover, this study limits the 
sample to 1,307,988 wage workers aged 15-60 in the year of interview. The age restriction of 
15-60 years is imposed because 15-years-old is the minimum legal age that individuals can 
start working and 60-years-old is usually the retirement age in Thailand. In addition to the age 
restriction, a birth cohort restriction is also employed in this study. The analysis is limited to 
individuals born between 1955 and 1985 since these cohorts are the observations around the 
cut-off for the instrumental variable. Individuals born in 1966 is the first cohort affected by 
the 1978 compulsory education law. This point is further discussed in the next section. The set 
of variables in this study covers age, birth cohort, years of schooling, region of residence, area 
of residence, industrial sector, and estimated monthly wages. A summary of descriptive 
statistics of these variables is given in Table 5-1. 
 
                                                        
15 (i) January–March (dry or nonagricultural season), (ii) April–June (the period in which a large group of new 
workers enter the labor force after graduation), (iii) July–September (rainy and agricultural season), and (iv) 
October–December. 
16




Table 5-1 Descriptive Statistics 




Age Age at the time of the survey   32.24 9.65 15 60 
Year 
Year of Labour Force Survey (1986 = 86, 1987 = 87, …, 2011 = 
111, 2012 = 112) 
100.62 6.98 86 112 
Cohort Birth cohort (Born in year 1955 = 55, …, born in year 1985 = 85) 68.38 8.28 55 85 
Schooling 
Number of years of schooling (No school = 0; Primary school 
grade 1 - 6 = {1, ..., 6}; Lower secondary school grade 7 - 9 = {7, 














 year = {19, …, 
21}    
8.37 4.91 0 21 
Bangkok 
Living in Bangkok Metropolitan Area including Bangkok and the 
five adjacent provinces of Nakhon Pathom, Pathum Thani, 
Nonthaburi, Samut Prakan, and Samut Sakhon. (Bangkok = 1, 
otherwise = 0) 
0.15 0.36 0 1 
North Living in North region (North = 1, otherwise = 0) 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Northeast Living in Northeast region (Northeast = 1, otherwise = 0) 0.20 0.40 0 1 
South Living in South region (South = 1, otherwise = 0) 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Centre Living in Central region (Centre = 1, otherwise = 0) 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Agriculture 
Working in agricultural sector including agriculture, hunting, 
forestry, fishing, mining, and quarrying. (Agriculture = 1, 
otherwise = 0) 
0.25 0.43 0 1 
Manufacture 
Working in manufacturing sector including electricity, gas and 
water supply, construction, and general manufacturing, e.g. food 
products and beverages, tobacco products, textiles, to name a few. 
(Manufacture = 1, otherwise = 0) 
0.20 0.40 0 1 
Service 
Working in service sector including wholesale and retail trade; 
repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal and household 
goods; hotels and restaurants; transport, storage and 
communication; financial intermediation; real estate, renting and 
business activities; public administration and defence; 
compulsory social security; education; health and social work; 
other community, social and personal service activities; and 
private households with employed persons. (Service = 1, 
otherwise = 0) 
0.30 0.46 0 1 
Urban Living in urban area (Urban = 1; Rural = 0) 0.58 0.49 0 1 
Male Male (Male = 1; Female = 0) 0.48 0.50 0 1 
Log wage  
Log monthly wage adjusted for inflation using regional headline 
CPI. 
8.80 0.78 3.98 13.88 
Compulsory  
education 
Experienced 1978 compulsory education law (Experienced = 1; 
Not experienced = 0) 
0.52 0.50 0 1 
Source: Author’s compilation based on LFS, 1986-2012. 
 The dependent variable in the estimation of returns to schooling is “log monthly wage”. 
Monthly wages are calculated from different types of wages reported by each observation. 
The calculation is done by the National Statistical Office. As this study pools multiple years 
of data together, the data in nominal value such as monthly wage requires adjustment for 
inflation. This nominal wage is deflated by the regional headline Consumer Price Index (CPI), 
which 2011 is used as the reference base year.
17
 Finally, monthly wage adjusted for inflation 
is transformed into a log form.    
                                                        





Furthermore, there are two school-related variables including years of schooling and 
compulsory education. A “years of schooling” variable is one of the main independent 
variables in the Mincer model. In the Labour Force Survey, the measure of school attainment 
is not the actual number of years spent at school but the highest degree attained by each 
individual. Hence, the school attainment variable is recoded into years of schooling ranging 
from zero (no education) to 21 years for those with PhD degree. On the other hand, 
compulsory education is a dummy variable indicating whether individuals experienced the 
1978 compulsory education law (Experienced = 1; Not experienced = 0). This variable is 
utilised as the instrument variable in this analysis. 
 In this study, there are three time-related variables. First, “age” refers to the age at the 
time of the survey. “age” and its quadratic term are also the main independent variables in the 
Mincer model. Second, “year” refers to the year conducting the Labour Force Survey. This 
study pools multiple years of cross-sectional LFS data together and covers the data from 1986 
to 2012. Lastly, “cohort” represents year in which individuals were born, birth cohort. Due to 
the cohort restriction, the oldest cohort is 1955 birth cohort, while the youngest one is the 
birth cohort born in 1985.  
 Other variables are included in the estimation model as control variables. First, the 
regional control variables, namely Bangkok, North, Northeast, South, and Centre are a set of 
dummy variables indicating the region in which each individual resides. For example, 
Bangkok is the dummy variable indicating whether individuals living in Bangkok 
Metropolitan Area, including Bangkok and the five adjacent provinces of Nakhon Pathom, 
Pathum Thani, Nonthaburi, Samut Prakan, and Samut Sakhon. Second, industrial control 
variables are also added into the estimation model. It is a set of dummy variables identifying 
the economic sector in which individuals are working. Agricultural sector includes agriculture, 
hunting, forestry, fishing, mining, and quarrying, while manufacturing sector covers electricity, 
gas and water supply, construction, and general manufacturing, e.g. food products and 
beverages, tobacco products, textiles, to name a few. Service sector involves wholesale and 
retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal and household goods; hotels 
and restaurants; transport, storage and communication; financial intermediation; real estate, 
renting and business activities; public administration and defence; compulsory social security; 
education; health and social work; other community, social and personal service activities; 
and private households with employed persons. Furthermore, the variables of area of 
residence and gender also serve as the control variables in the estimation model. An “urban” 
variable refers to a dummy variable indicating whether individuals live in the urban area 
(Urban = 1; Rural = 0). Finally, “male” is a dummy variable indicating whether individuals 




Section 2. METHODOLOGY 
5.2.1. What Are Impact Evaluation, Natural Experiment and Quasi-Experiment? 
 Impact evaluation is an evaluation seeking to find a causal effect of a particular 
programme e.g. policy on a specific outcome by controlling or excluding other factors that 
may also have an effect on that specific outcome, for example, the impact of merit awards on 
future academic outcomes (Thistlethwaite and Campbell, 1960)
18
. However, to estimate the 
causal effect of the programme, other factors must be controlled for, which is almost 
impossible, infeasible, and unethical (in some cases) to do so. For example, to understand the 
(causal) effect of education on wages, ideally we can estimate the effect by randomly 
selecting sample and dividing them into two groups. The first group receives a proper 
education, while another group is controlled not to have access to education. However, it is 
unethical to conduct such a programme because education is a fundamental right of each 
individual. To evaluate this type of programme, researchers tend to rely on a natural 
experiment or a quasi-experiment. A natural experiment is an empirical study in which 
individuals are divided into a treatment group and a control group by nature or by other 
factors outside the control of the researchers. Thus, it is arguable that a natural experiment 
resembles a randomized experiment
19
. It is, however, very rare to have such a phenomenon. 
Thus, researchers resort a new method which is similar to the randomized experiment, except 
that quasi-experiment lacks the element of randomization. The quasi-experiments are 
introduced into the research field as it is often the case that randomization is not possible or 
feasible. The quasi-experiments such as regression discontinuity design can help researcher 
exploit implementation features of the programme to measure its impact by solving problems 
of unobserved factors, and generating unbiased estimates of the causal effects of a treatment. 
5.2.2. What Is Regression Discontinuity?20 
 According to Gertler, P.J., et al (2011), the regression discontinuity design is defined as, 
“an impact evaluation method that can be used for programs that have a continuous eligibility 
index with a clearly defined cut-off score to determine who is eligible and who is not”. This 
method relies on knowledge of the selection process under two main conditions: first, the 
selection criteria, a continuous “score” or index
21
, needs to be known and quantifiable; second, 
                                                        
18 Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960) are the very first researchers who introduced the method of regression 
discontinuity design into economic academia. The regression discontinuity design is also discussed in the main 
text. 
19 For more details see: “Impact Evaluation in Practice” (Gertler, P.J., et al, 2011)  
This book provides a good introduction to the topic of impact evaluation and its practice in development. 
20 For basic references regarding regression discontinuity design see: Lee and Lemieux, 2009, 2010, and Imbens 
and Lemieux, 2008. 
21 There are few different terms to address the continuous indicator, namely an assignment variable, a forcing 




assignment to “treatment” depends discontinuously on the “score” at a threshold or cut-off. 
For example, the scholarship programme is implemented with an expectation that students 
earning scholarship will do better than those who did not receive the scholarship. Given that 
the allocation of the scholarship based on an observed GPA, let say 3.00, students with GPA 
from and above 3.00 are eligible for the scholarship, while students with GPA below 3.00 are 
illegible. It is obvious that students with GPA 4.00 will do better academically than those with 
GPA 1.50. However, students with GPA just below the cut-off, GPA 3.00, (who did not 
receive the scholarship) are good comparisons to those just above the cut-off (who did receive 
the scholarship) since students with GPA 2.99 and students with GPA 3.00 should not be 
different. It is simply that the group just above and the group just below the cut-off point are 
very similar in nature, both observable and unobservable characteristics. The only difference 
between these two groups, treatment group (receiving scholarship) and comparison group (not 
receiving scholarship), therefore, should be due to the arbitrary cut-off. Hence, within narrow 
bandwidth around cut-off, treatment assignment approximates randomization or treatment 
effect. This method is equivalent to random assignment in a neighbourhood, which explains 
the reason that the regression discontinuity design is closer to randomised experiment than 
other quasi-experimental methods e.g. differences-in-differences (Raju and Trias, 2010)
22
.  
 There are two types of regression discontinuity design, including sharp discontinuity and 
fuzzy discontinuity
23
. On the one hand, the main characteristic of sharp discontinuity is that 
discontinuity precisely determines treatment status. In other words, everyone in both 
treatment and control groups completely follows the policy rule (perfect compliance). On the 
other hand, in fuzzy discontinuity design, treatment assignment is probabilistic. It exploits 
discontinuities in the probability or expected value of treatment conditional on a covariate. 
Probability of treatment changes discontinuously at the cut-off, but not from zero to one, since 
not everyone strictly follows the policy rule, which is similar to a randomized experiment 
with imperfect treatment compliance. Some participants would always find a way to get 
treated, regardless of treatment assignment; other participants would never participate the 
treatment programme even if assigned. The cut-off becomes an instrumental variable for 
treatment status. This point will be elaborated in the discontinuity model identification section. 
In contrast, in the case of the sharp discontinuity, the probability of treatment changes from 
zero to one when the sample crosses the cut-off. Consequently, the gap in the relationship 
between outcome and the assignment variable cannot be interpreted as an average treatment 
effect. Nevertheless, Hahn et al. (2001) mathematically illustrates that the estimated treatment 
effect can be interpreted as a local average treatment effect when the assignment variable is 
                                                        
22 This material is meant to be a supporting material for the book called, "Impact Evaluation in Practice" 
(Gertler, et al., 2010). 




treated as an instrumental variable for treatment status.
24
 
5.2.3. Discontinuity Model Identification: (Sharp) Regression Discontinuity 
 The identification for sharp regression discontinuity is as following: 
Treatment status or (actual) treatment indicator, 𝐷𝑖, is a deterministic and discontinuous 
function of a covariate 𝑥𝑖. Once 𝑥𝑖 is known, 𝐷𝑖 is known. 
(5-1)    𝑫𝒊 = 𝟏 ↔  𝒙𝒊  ≤ 𝒙𝟎. 25 
𝑫𝒊 = 𝟎 ↔  𝒙𝒊 > 𝒙𝟎. 
Where: 
𝐷𝑖  = 1 if observation i receives treatment and  
0 if observation i does not receive treatment. 
𝑥0  = the cut-off point. 
Potential outcomes, E[𝑌0𝑖|𝑋𝑖], can be described by a linear, constant effects model: 
(5-2)    𝐄[𝒀𝟎𝒊|𝑿𝒊] =  𝜶 +  𝜷𝑿𝒊 
𝒀𝟏𝒊 =  𝒀𝟎𝒊 +  𝝆 
This results in the regression: 
(5-3)    𝒀𝒊 = 𝜶 +  𝜷𝑿𝒊 + 𝝆𝑫𝒊 + 𝜼𝒊 
The key identifying assumption is that 𝐷𝑖 is not only correlated with 𝑋𝑖 but it is a 
deterministic function of 𝑋𝑖: 
E[𝑌0𝑖|𝑋𝑖] and E[𝑌1𝑖|𝑋𝑖] are continuous in 𝑋𝑖 at 𝑋0 
This means that all other unobserved determinants of Y are continuously related to the 
running variable X, meaning that the only difference between these two groups, treatment 
group, 𝑌1𝑖 , and comparison group, 𝑌0𝑖 , is due to the arbitrary cutoff. Hence, a valid 
counterfactual is formed. 
In case of nonlinear relationship, potential outcomes can be described as:  
(5-4)    𝒀𝒊 = 𝜹(𝒙𝒊) + 𝝆𝑫𝒊 + 𝜼𝒊. 
 
 
                                                        
24 For more details on mathematical illustration, see: Hahn et al. (2001), Angrist and Pischke (2009), Lee and 
Lemieux (2009, 2010), and Moscoe, Bor, and Bӓrnighausen (2015) 
25 The assignment rule can be the other way around depending on the definition of the dummy variable, 𝐷𝑖. For 





𝛿(𝑥𝑖) = function that is continuous around the cut-off point. 
With IV estimation, the first stage is as following: 
(5-5)    𝒙𝒊 = 𝝀𝟎 + 𝝀𝟏𝑫𝒊 + 𝝂𝒊 
The second stage is:  
(5-6)    𝒚𝒊 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑫𝒊 + 𝜹(𝒙𝒊) + 𝜺𝒊 
It is common to approximate 𝛿(𝑥𝑖) by using a pth order polynomial: 
(5-7)   𝒚𝒊 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑫𝒊 + 𝜷𝟏𝒙𝒊 + 𝜷𝟐𝒙𝒊




5.2.4. Advantages and Disadvantages of Regression Discontinuity 
5.2.4.1 Advantages 
 The IV estimation with RDD has a strong internal validity with relatively weaker 
assumptions. Other methods of estimation such as a traditional IV estimation still possibly 
produce biased estimates since it is difficult to justify the internal validity, both in terms of 
relevance and exogeneity conditions. Regarding the assumption of relevance, the IV with 
RDD ensures that there is a causal relationship between the event (law change) and the 
endogenous variable (years of schooling); and between the event (law change) and the 
outcome (wage) through the effect of the endogenous variable (years of schooling). In terms 
of exogeneity condition, the regression discontinuity yields an unbiased estimate of treatment 
effect at the discontinuity. The IV with a quasi-experiment is exogenous to an individual as 
the RDD exploits a particular event, e.g. compulsory education law change, which is random 
to an individual. Hence the IV with RDD is not correlated with individual unobserved 
variables, e.g., ability and preferences. As previously discussed, the regression discontinuity 
exploits the fact that the groups just above and just below the cut-off (selection criteria to 
treatment) are very similar in nature, both observable and unobservable characteristics. The 
only difference between these two groups, treatment group and comparison group, should be 
due to the arbitrary rule or cut-off. The closer to the cut-off is, the more similar the treatment 
and control groups are. As a result, the comparison between those two groups is as good as if 
the treatment and comparison groups are chosen by randomized assignment to treatment. 
Therefore, it has less possibility to have an endogeneity bias and yields the strongest internal 






5.2.4.2 Disadvantages  
However, the IV utilising a quasi-experiment is not without a caveat. Even though the IV 
estimation with RDD satisfies both conditions of relevance and exogeneity for the internal 
validity, the causal relationship may not be generalised to other populations and settings. The 
issue of generalisation refers to the external validity. In fact, the IV estimation with RDD 
lacks the element of randomization since it mainly relies on the arbitrary cut-off. Hence, only 
within narrow bandwidth around the cut-off, treatment assignment approximates 
randomization or treatment effect. This method is equivalent to random assignment in a 
neighbourhood, which explains the reason that the regression discontinuity design is closer to 
randomised experiment than other quasi-experimental methods. Imbens and Angrist (1994) 
argue that RDD estimates the average treatment effect from those who comply with the 
treatment. This estimated average treatment effect is commonly referred to Local Average 
Treatment Effect (LATE). Even though it is difficult to estimate Average Treatment Effect 
(ATE) as a full compliance from the whole population may not happen, the LATE converges 
to the ATE as the number of compliers becomes an increasingly large proportion of the 
sample (Oreopoulos, 2006). Nevertheless, this limitation of RDD depends on the research 
question or evaluation question of interest. If the main question is to verify the effect of the 
treatment on the whole population, RDD may not be a perfect method of estimation but still 
produces satisfactory results. On the other hand, if the main question is to verify the treatment 
effect of a particular group of observations, RDD possibly best serves the purpose.   
In addition, RDD implicitly assumes that there are no other rules or policy changes at the 
same cut-off. As those changes complicate identification strategy, it is not obvious whether 
the treatment effect comes from the rule identified by RDD or from other changes that happen 
to occur at the same time. Nonetheless, this issue is rather simple to identify by examining 
other possible rule or policy changes that may affect the dependent variable of interest and 
check whether they happen at the same or near the cut-off.      
Section 3. A BRIEF HISTORY OF PRIMARY EDUCATION AND COMPULSORY EDUCATION 
ACT  
According to Table 5-2, there were several changes to the compulsory education level in 
Thailand between 1921 and 2002. The first Primary Education Act was issued in 1921 and 
enforced the first compulsory education in Thailand. Students were required to complete six 
years of compulsory education. However, this Primary Education Act was applied to only 
certain areas due to the scarcity of educational resources, namely, schools, teachers, and 
educational budget. Thereafter, the 1935 Primary Education Act was enacted. After realising 
the difficulties in achieving a universal primary education, the Government decided to lower 




Government wanted more than half of the school-age population to complete compulsory 
education. During 1935-1978, there were few trivial changes in the Primary Education Acts, 
e.g. administration tasks expected to perform by education-related officers. In 1960, the 
Government launched National Education Reform plan to expand the education system as it 
realised that students who graduated from four years of primary education are still too young 
to work and should be educated more to understand cultural, social, and economic context of 
Thailand. Thus, in 1962, a primary education covered seven years, including four years of 
lower primary education and three years of upper primary education (Figure 5-1). The 
approximate age to enter the first year of primary education was seven years old. Age range of 
first year students was between six years old to eight years old. According to the 1962 
Primary Education Act, every child of age eight years old had to be in school until age 15 
years, unless they graduated from the 4th grade of primary education. Nonetheless, the 
compulsory education still covered only four years of primary education. It took around 40 
years for the Government to change the compulsory education from four years to six years in 
1978. 






















1 1921 7 (8-10) 14 2 6   Primary education   
Primary Education 
Act 
  1935 8 (9-10) 15   4   Primary education 3 
Primary Education 
Act (2) 
4 1940              
Primary Education 
Act (3) 






4 1966              
Primary Education 
Act (5) 
  1978 8 15   6 6 Primary education   
Primary Education 
Act 
  1980 8 15   6 7 Primary education   
Compulsory 
Education Act 





Note: 1 This Act is applied to only certain areas. 
  2 It is flexible and can be extended. 
3 A primary education covers only 4 years in this period as the Government wants more than half of 
the school-age population to complete compulsory education. 
  4 There were changes only in the administration tasks. 
5 A primary education covers 7 years, including 4 years of lower primary education and 3 years of 
higher primary education. 
  6 There is an exception in some areas where the highest level of primary education was only grade 4. 
  7 There is an exception in some areas where the highest level of primary education was only grade 5. 
  8 6 years of primary education and 3 years of lower secondary education. 




Compulsory Education Act (2002). 
Figure 5-1 National Education Reform 1960* 
 
Source: Author’s compilation based on information from Ministry of Education. 
 The 1978 Primary Education Act seemed to have a substantial impact on students’ school 
attainment as it was the first education act with which every individual was forced to comply. 
As the Government foresaw a growing demand for educated workers in the labour market, it 
set out a National Education Reform plan to improve the national education system and also 
revised the level of compulsory education. The main motivation of the plan was to prepare 
future labour force for the on-going structural transformation from agriculture-based economy 
to industrialised economy. At that time, the whole educational structure was changed from 
4-3-3-2 (Figure 5-1) to 6-3-3 (Figure 5-2). Previously, Thai education system consisted of 
four years of lower primary education, three years of upper primary education, and five years 
of secondary education. In contrast, the 1978 Primary Education Act reduced the total year of 
primary education to six years of primary education without division between lower and 
upper level and the secondary education remained the same. In addition, the Government 
expanded the compulsory education from four years to six years of primary education.  
The first birth cohorts affected by the 1978 compulsory education change are cohorts born 
between 1966 and 1968. To identify the affected cohorts, the timeline between individuals’ 
ages and school year is calculated (Table 5-3). As the law was issued and took effect 
immediately on the fifth of April 1978 which is a month before the 1978 academic year starts. 
Therefore, every student enrolled in grade 4 in 1977 were forced to move up to grade 5 in 
1978. The possible age range of the fourth year students is between nine and elven years old 
that represent the 1966-1968 cohorts.   
During the process of compulsory education expansion process, the Government provided 




compulsory education reform. Due to the fact that nation-wide education reform required a 
number of human resources, financial resources, and time, a universal compulsory education 
could not be achieved within one year. The readiness of each district did not only limit to the 
financial issue but also involve technical issues such as classroom building and teacher 
reallocation. Before 1978, schools were divided into four years of lower primary school and 
three years of upper primary school. Only large-scale schools such as province-funded 
schools had comprehensive seven years of primary education so they could easily adjust to 
the 1978 compulsory education law. However, a majority of schools had either four years of 
lower primary education or three years of upper primary education. These schools found it 
difficult to comply with the new compulsory education law. They needed more times to build 
more classrooms or combined with another school. Moreover, even though the school 
facilities were ready, human resources such as teachers might not be enough. However, the 
Government declared that by 1982 every student and every school must comply to the 1978 
Primary Education and Compulsory Education Act. This five-years-adjustment period plays 
an important role in the identification strategy of this study. 
Figure 5-2 National Education Reform 1977* 
 
Source: Author’s compilation based on information from Ministry of Education. 
Table 5-3 The Identification of the First Cohorts Affected by the 1978 compulsory 
education change  
Cohort 
Year 
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
School 
Grade          
1 2 3 4 5 
1969 
    
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1968    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1967     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1966   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 




Source: Author’s compilation. 
Section 4. IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY 
This study exploits an opportunity of quasi-experiment in Thailand that occurs from a 
change in compulsory education law in 1978 to estimate the rates of return to schooling. In 
fact, there are a few compulsory education law changes in Thailand (Table 5-2). However, the 
change in 1978 is exploited due to its exceptional effect on education attainment of Thai 
population. The law change affects almost half of the population; therefore, the estimated 
LATE is possibly closer to the ATE than those of previous literature. As suggested by 
Oreopoulos (2006), “the magnitude of this impact provides a rare opportunity to estimate 
LATE of primary education that come close to population ATEs.” Moreover, it is possible to 
link the finding of returns to schooling to the development process in Thailand. During the 
compulsory education law change period (1978), Thailand experienced rapid economic 
development and structural transformation. Estimating the rates of return to education in this 
period helps understanding Thai economic development as well as the effect of human capital 
in the process of development in general. 
Figure 5-3 Fraction Graduating at Most 4 and 6 Years of Education, 1986-2012, 
Thailand 
 
Note: The lower line shows the proportion of adults aged 15 to 60 from 1986 to 2012 Labour Force Surveys who 
report the highest attained level of education is at most 4 years. The upper line shows the proportion of adults 
aged 15 to 60 who report the highest attained level of education is at most 6 years. The vertical solid line 
indicates the first cohort affected by the 1978 compulsory education law. The dash line indicates that, in case 
there was no 5-year-adjustment period, it is expected to see a sharp drop of the fraction graduated at most 4 years 
of education from 40 per cent to less than 10 per cent. Hence, the vertical dash line represents the discontinuity. 




The change to the compulsory education law in Thailand from four years to six years in 
1978 has a powerful and immediate effect that redirected almost half the population of the 
fourth grade of primary education to stay in school for two more years (until grade 6 which is 
the final grade of primary education). Figure 5-3 indicates the effect of the change of 
compulsory education law on the fraction of individuals graduating at most four years of 
education. There has been a gradual declining trend of individuals who decide to quit school 
at grade 4. It is not obvious to see a sharp drop of individuals graduating at most four years of 
education due to the 5-year-adjustment period of compulsory education expansion project. 
The lower line shows the proportion of adults aged 15 to 60 who report the highest attained 
level of education is at most four years, while the upper line shows the proportion of adults 
aged 15 to 60 who report the highest attained level of education is at most 6 years. The dash 
line indicates that, in case there was no 5-year-adjustment period, it is expected to see a sharp 
drop of the fraction graduated at most four years of education from 40 per cent to less than 10 
per cent. Hence, the vertical dash line represents the discontinuity and a sharp drop after 
cohort 1965 can be seen.  
In this study, the cut-off or the selection criteria is defined by the introduction of the 1978 
compulsory education law and the 5-year-adjustment period of compulsory education 
expansion project. According to the 1978 compulsory education law, the compulsory 
education changes from four years to six years. The first cohorts affected by the compulsory 
education change are the cohorts born between 1966 and 1968. Thus, the cohorts born in 1966 
and thereafter are in a treatment group, which is forced to be in school two more years until 
the end of the 6
th
 grade of primary education. On the other hand, the cohorts born before 1966 
are in a control group, that complies with the previous compulsory education law (four years 
of compulsory education). However, the Government provided a five-years-adjustment period 
(1978-1982) to those districts that were not ready for the compulsory education reform. 
Therefore, the treatment group during 1978-1982 includes only individuals from the districts 
that comply with the 1978 compulsory education law. As discussed above, without the 
5-year-adjustment period of compulsory education expansion project, it is expected to see the 
discontinuity beginning from cohort 1966.  
Section 5. ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
This section spells out the econometric models employed in the main estimation. 
Fundamentally, the model is based on the Mincer wage equation, that is represented by the 
OLS regression model (5-10). The presentation of the models is organised in terms of the 
analytic order of IV estimation. First, the first stage least square regression is conducted to test 
the internal validity of the instrument in terms of relevance. The estimated result from first 




sufficiently strongly correlated with independent variable of interest, ceteris paribus.  
First stage least square regression: 
(5-8)   𝑺𝒊 = 𝝅𝟎 + 𝝅𝟏𝑭𝒊 + 𝝅𝟐𝑨𝒊 + 𝝅𝟑𝑨𝒊
𝟐 + 𝝅𝟒𝑪𝒊 + 𝝅𝟓𝑹𝒊 + 𝜺𝒊 
where years of education an individual i attended (Si) is a function of a dummy variable 
indicating whether an individual experiencing the 1978 compulsory education law (Fi), age of 
an individual as a proxy of working experience (Ai), birth cohort dummies (Ci), and regional 
dummies (Ri). 𝑖 represents a disturbance term. 
Furthermore, the reduced form is estimated to see the effect of the instrument on the 
dependent variable of interest. The reduced form equation is expressed an endogenous 
variable in terms of exogenous variables.  
Reduced form: 
(5-9)  𝐥𝐨𝐠 𝒚𝒊 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝑭𝒊 + 𝜶𝟐𝑨𝒊 + 𝜶𝟑𝑨𝒊
𝟐 + 𝜶𝟒𝑪𝒊 + 𝜶𝟓𝑹𝒊 + 𝜽𝒊 
where the log of monthly wages (yi) of individual i is a function of a dummy variable 
indicating whether an individual experiencing the 1978 compulsory education law (Fi), age of 
an individual as a proxy of working experience (Ai), birth cohort dummies (Ci), and regional 
dummies (Ri). 𝜃𝑖 represents a disturbance term. 
OLS regression model is the standard estimation exploited excessively in the literature of 
returns to education. As it is expected that the OLS estimates suffers from the omitted variable 
bias, the estimated results from OLS regression is used mainly to compare and contrast with 
those of IV estimation that possibly provides more reliable estimates. 
OLS regression:  
(5-10)  𝐥𝐨𝐠 𝒚𝒊 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑺𝒊 + 𝜷𝟐𝑨𝒊 + 𝜷𝟑𝑨𝒊
𝟐 + 𝜷𝟒𝑪𝒊 + 𝜷𝟓𝑹𝒊 + 𝒆𝒊 
where the log of monthly wages (yi) of individual i is a function of years of education an 
individual attended (Si), age of an individual as a proxy of working experience (Ai), birth 
cohort dummies (Ci), and regional dummies (Ri). ei represents a disturbance term. 
Theoretically, after estimating the first stage least square, the two stage least squares 
(2SLS) is performed to obtain the estimated coefficient of the instrument. However, in this 
study, 2SLS is not explicitly estimated.   
Second stage least squares regression: 
(5-11)  𝐥𝐨𝐠 𝒚𝒊 = 𝜸𝟎 + 𝜸𝟏𝑺?̂? + 𝜸𝟐𝑨𝒊 + 𝜸𝟑𝑨𝒊
𝟐 + 𝜸𝟒𝑪𝒊 + 𝜸𝟓𝑹𝒊 + 𝝑𝒊  
where the log of monthly wages (yi) of individual i is a function of the fitted value estimated 
from the first stage least square regression. (𝑆?̂?), age of an individual as a proxy of working 








CHAPTER 6. INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE (IV) ESTIMATION USING 
THAI DATA 
 This chapter presents the empirical results from IV estimation by using Thai Labour 
Force Survey data. The results include the estimates from the first stage least square 
regression, the reduced form, the OLS regression (years of schooling on log wage), and the IV 
regression. The results are discussed by comparing and contrasting the estimated returns to 
schooling among different model specifications, among different estimation methods (mainly 
between OLS and IV estimations), and with the results from previous literatures. At the end of 
the chapter, a discussion of estimated results and endogeneity bias in the OLS regression is 
provided.   
Section 1. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
6.1.1. First Stage  
 Table 6-1 shows the estimated results of compulsory education law on education 
attainment. Each regression includes controls for a birth cohort quadratic polynomial or birth 
cohort dummies, regional dummies (except for the models with explicit region variables), and 
an indicator whether a cohort faced a new compulsory education law (six years of compulsory 
education). Column (3) to (5) also include age controls: a quartic polynomial and fixed effects 
where indicated. Each regression includes the sample of 15 to 60 years old from the 1986 
through 2012 Labour Force Surveys. Data are first aggregated into cell means and weighted 
by cell size. Regressions are clustered by birth cohort.  
 According to Table 6-1, the coefficients of compulsory education are statistically 
significant and robust across different specifications. The first-stage effect for all 
specifications is considerably powerful and it is possible to reject the hypothesis that the 
coefficients are zero. The compulsory education law change leads to six additional years of 
schooling which is roughly corresponding to the first year of the upper secondary school 
(grade 10). Even though the new compulsory education law increases the minimum year of 
schooling from four years to six years, it seems that the impact of the law is beyond its 
expected initial impact. Lochner and Moretti (2004), and Oreopoulos (2003) also find that the 
compulsory education law has an additional effect on education attainment beyond its 
minimum requirements for North America.  
Table 6-2 indicates the estimated results of compulsory education law on education 
attainment from other studies. The coefficients of compulsory education are also statistically 
significant in other countries. However, the compulsory education variable (IV) is defined 




age or specified minimum compulsory level of education. Moreover, the dependent variable 
from different studies can also refer to either the number of years of schooling or 
school-leaving age.   
 The first-stage regressions indicate that the effects of compulsory education on the years 
of schooling are quite small in most studies, for example, in the United States and Canada, 
raising the minimum school-leaving age by one year increases the total number of years of 
completed schooling by only about 0.11 to 0.13 years. This may imply that compulsory 
education does not affect most of the sample in those countries. Moreover, in UK and France, 
the effects of compulsory education on the age left full-time education are approximately 0.5 
and 0.2 year, respectively. This does not exactly correspond to the compulsory education law 
that forces students to stay in schools one year longer.  
Table 6-1 Estimated Effect of Compulsory Education Law on Education Attainment, 
Thailand, Ages 15-60, 1986-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 (First Stage) 
 Dependent Variable: Number of Years of Schooling 
Compulsory 
Education 
4.358*** 6.385*** 6.395*** 6.413*** 6.057*** 
(0.713) (0.087) (0.105) (0.105) (0.084) 
Fixed Effects:      
Regional Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Birth Cohort  Quartic Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Additional 
Controls: 






    Gender Gender 
     Urban 
      
Observations 1,307,988 1,307,016 1,307,016 1,307,016 1,307,016 
R-squared 0.091 0.123 0.137 0.138 0.192 
Note: The dependent variables are number of years of schooling. Each regression includes controls for a birth cohort quartic 
polynomial or birth cohort dummies, regional dummies (except for the models with explicit region variables), and an 
indicator whether a cohort faced a new compulsory education law (six years of compulsory education). Column (3) to (5) 
also include age controls: a quadratic polynomial and fixed effects where indicated. Each regression includes the sample of 
15 to 60 years old from the 1986 through 2012 Labour Force Surveys. Data are first aggregated into cell means and weighted 
by cell size. Regressions are clustered by birth cohort. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate p < 0.01, 
p < 0.05, and p < 0.1, respectively.  





Table 6-2 Estimated Effect of Compulsory Education Law on Education Attainment 
from Previous Studies 
 First Stage 
 Dependent Variable:  









































Women: 0.615 *** 




 Men: 0.955 *** 
91,756 
 (0.049) 


























Note: (Robust) standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively. 
※ No reported statistically significant level. 
Source: Author`s compilation based on the information from a Oreopoulos (2008); b Stephen and Yang (2014); c 
Pon and Gonzalo (2002); d Fang et al. (2012); e La Vincent and College (2014); f Aydemir and Murat (2015); g 
Grenet (2013). 
The result from Table 6-1 shows much larger effect of compulsory education law in 
Thailand than those of other countries. The plausible reason is the timing, which the 
compulsory education law was issued. For example, Thai 1978 compulsory education law 
was issued in the period before the fast-growing economic development, while there was no 
universal education at that time. The majority of school-age children were still out of school 
and the compulsory education law forces them to stay in schools. Thus, a large increase in 
completed years of schooling and also a sharp drop of sample with education at most four 
years can be observed. In contrast, in other countries, especially developed countries, e.g. the 
United Stated, Canada, to name a few, the compulsory education law was issued when those 




already enrolled in schools. For instance, Psacharopoulos (2006) argues that the compulsory 
education law has an impact on only would-be dropouts in case of the United States. Hence, 
the compulsory education law affects only a certain group of school-age children.  
6.1.2. Reduced Form 
 Table 6-3 shows the reduced form estimates of the effects of the compulsory education 
law change on monthly wages. The reduced form estimation use similar specifications as 
those of the first-stage regression, except for that the dependent variable is log monthly wage, 
instead of education attainment. The coefficients of compulsory education are statistically 
significant and robust across different specifications. The change in compulsory education 
level has a very large effect on the monthly wages. It yields approximately 36 per cent to 50 
per cent increase in the monthly wages. The fit predicts that average wages increase for the 
cohorts that come after the change of the law. On the other hand, reduced form effects of 
compulsory education law on wages and earnings from previous studies are significantly 
smaller than those of Thailand (Table 6-4). Only the study of Harmon and Walker (1995) 
shows a similar effect of the compulsory education on earnings
26
. However, the coefficients of 
compulsory education are statistically significant in all previous studies.  
Table 6-3 Estimated Effect of Compulsory Education Law on Log Monthly Wages, 
Thailand, Ages 15-60, 1986-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 (Reduced Form) 
 Dependent Variable: Log Monthly Wages 
Compulsory Education 0.355*** 0.523*** 0.547*** 0.537*** 0.476*** 
 (0.071) (0.033) (0.029) (0.030) (0.026) 
Fixed Effects:      
Regional Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Birth Cohort  Quartic Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Additional Controls: None None Age Quadratic Age Quadratic Age Quadratic 
    Gender Gender 
     Urban 
Observations 1,307,988 1,307,016 1,307,016 1,307,016 1,307,016 
R-squared 0.017 0.088 0.125 0.133 0.199 
Note: The dependent variables are log monthly wages. Each regression includes controls for a birth cohort 
quartic polynomial or birth cohort dummies, regional dummies (except for the models with explicit region 
variables), and an indicator whether a cohort faced a new compulsory education law (6 years of compulsory 
education). Column (3) to (5) also include age controls: a quadratic polynomial and fixed effects where indicated. 
Each regression includes the sample of 15 to 60 years old from the 1986 through 2012 Labour Force Surveys. 
Data are first aggregated into cell means and weighted by cell size. Regressions are clustered by birth cohort. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.1, respectively.  
Source: Author’s compilation based on LFS 1986-2012. 
 
                                                        
26 The results from Table 3and Table 4 may not be directly comparable. The comparison of those results should 




 The large estimated effect of compulsory education in Thailand can be explained by the 
fact that there is a wide income gap between individuals with different levels of education 
attainment. According to the result from the first-stage estimation, the compulsory education 
induces students to study, on average, additional six years, corresponding to grade 10. Hence, 
the cohorts affected by the compulsory education law tend to have much higher level of 
education. For individuals who have less than six years of education (compulsory education 
level), an average monthly wage is approximately 5,900 baht, while an average monthly wage 
of those with secondary education is about 10,000 baht (Labour Force Survey, 1986-2012). 
The wage of secondary education graduates is at least 40 per cent higher than that of 
individuals with less than primary education. This is consistent with the estimated results of 
Table 6-4, which indicates that the 36-50 per cent increase in the monthly wages is due to the 
compulsory education. 
Table 6-4 Reduced Form Effects of Compulsory Education Law on Wages and Earnings 
from Previous Studies 
 Reduced Form 
 Dependent Variable:  




0.016 ***  
 (0.0015) 2,814,203 
 Dependent Variable:  












 0.047 ** 73,954 
 (0.018) 





 15 years old: 0.541※ 34,336 
 (0.055) 
 16 years old: 0.110※ 
 (0.076) 
Note: (Robust) standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively. 
※ No reported statistically significant level. 
Source: Author`s compilation based on the information from a Oreopoulos (2008); b Harmon and Walker 
(1995). 
6.1.3. OLS and IV Estimation 
 The OLS results are shown in Table 6-5. The dependent variable is log monthly wages. 
Each regression includes controls for a birth cohort, regional dummies, age controls, and a 
dummy for the compulsory education law. The OLS point estimates of the coefficients of the 
years of schooling are statistically significant and robust across different specifications. The 




consistent with those of the previous study from Thailand (Warunsiri and McNown, 2010)
27
. 
It confirms that the data quality of both studies is fairly similar and a comparison can possibly 
be directly made between these two studies. Table 6-7 shows OLS, IV-RD, and fixed effect 
panel estimates of the returns to schooling from previous studies. Even though the OLS 
estimates of Thailand are higher than those of developed countries, the magnitudes are still 
comparable. The OLS results among different developed countries are similar in terms of 
magnitude of the coefficients and statistical significance level. The estimates are 
approximately 8 to 10 per cent and statistically significant at 1 per cent. The OLS estimates 
from developing countries are lower than those of developed countries. However, the OLS 
estimate from China is around 9 per cent, which is consistent to overall estimates from other 
countries.  
Table 6-5 OLS Returns to Schooling Estimates for Log Monthly Wages, 15-60 Years Old, 
1986-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 (OLS) 
 Dependent Variable: Log Monthly Wages 
Year of Schoolings 0.113*** 0.111*** 0.112*** 0.112*** 0.109*** 
(0.00366) (0.00378) (0.00425) (0.00412) (0.00389) 
Fixed Effects:      
Regional Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Birth Cohort  Quartic Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Additional Controls: None None Age Quadratic Age Quadratic Age Quadratic 
    Gender Gender 
     Urban 
Observations 1,307,988 1,307,016 1,307,016 1,307,016 1,307,016 
R-squared 0.528 0.567 0.602 0.614 0.621 
Note: The dependent variables are log monthly wages. Each regression includes controls for a birth cohort 
quartic polynomial or birth cohort dummies, regional dummies (except for the models with explicit region 
variables), and an indicator whether a cohort faced a new compulsory education law (6 years of compulsory 
education). Column (3) to (5) also include age controls: a quadratic polynomial and fixed effects where indicated. 
Each regression includes the sample of 15 to 60 years old from the 1986 through 2012 Labour Force Surveys. 
Data are first aggregated into cell means and weighted by cell size. Regressions are clustered by birth cohort. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.1, respectively.  
Source: Author’s compilation based on LFS 1986-2012. 
 The IV estimates of returns to schooling are shown in Table 6-6. All discussed controls 
in the OLS estimation are also included in the IV estimation. The coefficients of years of 
schooling are statistically significant and robust across different specifications. This confirms 
a causal relationship between education attainment and earnings. One additional year of 
schooling leads to approximately 8 per cent increase in monthly wages which is lower than 
those of Warunsiri and McNown (2010) by half (Table 6-7). Although the OLS estimates 
from Table 6-5 and Warunsiri and McNown’s study (2010) are similar, the IV estimates from 
both studies indicate significantly contradicting results. The IV estimates from this study is 
                                                        




less than but somewhat consistent with those of Canada and the United Kingdom, which are 
approximately 10 per cent. The rates of return to schooling from Warunsiri and McNown’s 
study (2010) are around 14 per cent, which is similar to those of the United States. These rates 
of return are the highest among all studies, while the lowest rates of return are from China, 2 
per cent. The overall IV results from developing countries are roughly 2-5 per cent, which is 
lower than those of developed countries. Some of the estimates from developing countries are 
even not statistically significant. 
Table 6-6 IV Returns to Schooling Estimates for Log Monthly Wages, 15-60 Years Old, 
1986-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 (IV) 
 Dependent Variable: Log Monthly Wages 
Years of Schooling 0.0813*** 0.0819*** 0.0856*** 0.0837*** 0.0787*** 
(0.00548) (0.00424) (0.00354) (0.00363) (0.00352) 
Fixed Effects:      
Regional Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Birth Cohort  Quartic Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Additional Controls: None None Age Quadratic Age Quadratic Age Quadratic 
    Gender Gender 
     Urban 
      
Observations 1,307,988 1,307,016 1,307,016 1,307,016 1,307,016 
R-squared 0.486 0.533 0.575 0.581 0.588 
Note: The dependent variables are log monthly wages. Each regression includes controls for a birth cohort 
quartic polynomial or birth cohort dummies, regional dummies (except for the models with explicit region 
variables), and an indicator whether a cohort faced a new compulsory education law (6 years of compulsory 
education). Column (3) to (5) also include age controls: a quadratic polynomial and fixed effects where indicated. 
Each regression includes the sample of 15 to 60 years old from the 1986 through 2012 Labour Force Surveys. 
Data are first aggregated into cell means and weighted by cell size. Regressions are clustered by birth cohort. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.1, respectively.  
Source: Author’s compilation based on LFS 1986-2012. 
 Comparing the OLS estimates with those of IV from Table 6-5 and Table 6-6, the result 
shows that the OLS estimates are greater than those of IV around 3 per cent. This indicates the 
upward bias (overestimation) in the OLS regression, which is consistent with the argument of 
ability bias in returns to schooling. According to Table 6-7, the studies of Canada, China, and 
Turkey also indicate that the OLS estimates are larger than those of IV. The rates of return to 
schooling in those countries are also overestimated in the OLS estimation. However, the 
difference between the OLS and IV estimates are very subtle in Canada (0.099 - 0.096 = 
0.003). On the contrary, the other previous studies show that the OLS results are lower than 
those of IV. It implies that the returns to schooling are underestimated in the OLS regression 
model. In the United States, the IV estimates are double than those of the OLS, while the 
differences between OLS and IV estimates are relatively moderate in the United Kingdom and 
Thailand (Warunsiri and McNown, 2010). Warunsiri and McNown (2010) conclude that the 




endogeneity bias is fixed in their estimations. Different from other studies, they use the 
existence of a university or teacher training college within a province as the instrument in the 
IV estimation. Meghir and Rivkin (2011) argues that such IV adopted by Warunsiri and 
McNown (2010) may be correlated with individual ability due to the non-random nature of 
individuals and school allocation. This implies that the estimates of IV are possibly subject to 
the endogeneity bias.  
 Table 6-7 OLS, IV-RD, and FE Panel Estimates of the Returns to Schooling from 
Previous Studies 
 OLS IV-RD FE Panel 
 Dependent Variable: Log Weekly Wage 
United States 
a 
0.078 *** 0.142 *** na 
 (0.0005) (0.0119) na 
 Dependent Variable:  
Log Annual Wage 
Canada 
a 
0.099 *** 0.096 *** na 
 (0.0007) (0.0254) na 
United Kingdom 
a 
0.085 *** 0.108 *** na 
 (0.002) (0.0328) na 
Britain 
a 
0.083 *** 0.101 *** na 
 (0.003) (0.0421) na 
 Dependent Variable: Log Annual Earning 
China 
b
 0.09 *** 0.02 *** na 
 (0.004) (0.06) na 
China 
c 
0.0842 *** 0.0585 na 
 (0.00369) (0.0684) na 
Turkey 
d 
0.050*** 0.005 na 
Male (0.002) (0.014) na 
Female 0.063*** 0.038** na 
 (0.003) (0.015) na 
 Dependent Variable: Log Hourly Wage 
Thailand 
e 
0.115 ** 0.148 ** 0.151 ** 
 (0.000250) (0.0194) (0.0100) 
Notes: a Region, birth cohort, age quartic, survey year, and gender are controlled in the regressions. Data are 
first aggregated into cell means and weighted by cell size. Regressions are clustered by birth cohort. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively. 
e Age quadratic, and cohort dummies are included in the regressions. The instrument variable is a dummy 
variable identifying the provinces in which universities or teacher training colleges are located. Standard errors 
in parentheses. ** indicates that coefficients are significant at or below the 0.05 level. na – not available. 
Source: Author’s compilation based on the information from a Oreopoulos (2008), b Fang et al. (2012), c La 
Vincent and College (2014), d Aydemir and Murat (2015), and e Warunsiri and McNown (2010). 
 This main finding of this study is consistent with the theoretical discussion regarding the 
size of IV coefficients compared to that of OLS which IV estimates should be smaller than 
those of OLS estimation (Heckman, et al., 2006)
28
. Furthermore, the finding also supports 
Behrman’s (1999) view towards the ability bias. Behrman (1990, 1999) argues that there is a 
substantial large ability bias, especially in the case of developing countries. A number of 
                                                        




studies controlling for unobserved ability, family background, and school quality find that the 
OLS estimates suffer from the ability bias which the impact of years of schooling is 
overestimated 40-100 per cent. 
Section 2. DISCUSSION OF THE ESTIMATED RESULTS 
6.2.1. Methodological Discussions 
6.2.1.1 Dominant Source of Bias  
 In general, the OLS estimation has a possibility to be biased due to the problem of 
endogeneity. Endogeneity biases occur when an explanatory variable is correlated with the 
error term. There are three main sources of endogeneity, including simultaneity, measurement 
errors, and omitted variables. In the context of returns to schooling, the omitted variable is the 
most frequently debated source of endogeneity bias (Willis, 1986, Schultz, 1988, Card, 1999, 
Deere and Vesovic, 2006). 
 The result shows clearly that the effect of ability bias (upward bias) outweighs the effect 
of discount rate bias (downward bias) since the difference between the OLS estimates and the 
IV estimates indicates an upward bias in the OLS estimation (OLS estimates > IV estimates). 
Hence, a positive correlation between ability and schooling is stronger than that of a negative 
one (discount rate bias).    
 The measurement error bias is substantially low and possibly offset by the ability bias in 
this analysis. It is found that the random (or classical) measurement errors tend to bias 
towards zero (Griliches, 1977; Angrist and Krueger, 1991). Thus, if the measurement error is 
significantly dominant, the downward bias should have been observed in the estimated results 
(IV estimates > OLS estimates). The plausible explanation is that as years of schooling and 
other wage determinants are measured relatively well compared with other micro-level 
variables, it is possible that the measurement error bias is of modest magnitudes (Schultz, 
1988; Card, 1999; Krueger and Lindahl, 2001; Orazem and King, 2008).  
 Regarding the simultaneity bias, as comprehensively discussed in Chapter 3, the bias is 
not relevant in the study of returns to education as individuals’ current wages received from 
working in the labour market cannot determine individuals’ past levels of education. It is 
possible that individuals may enter the labour market after finishing compulsory education 
and then come back to study later. Nevertheless, the practice is not common, especially during 
the early period of economic development.  
 In conclusion, the results from OLS estimation indicate that a net effect of different 
sources of bias leads to the overestimated rates of return to schooling in the context of 
Thailand (OLS estimates > IV estimates). This implies that the ability bias outweighs other 




6.2.1.2 Methodological Implications on the Issues of Estimation 
 The finding rules out certain issues that may occur in the case of estimates with 
downward bias (IV estimates > OLS estimates). First, the upward ability bias implies that the 
IV estimation does not suffer from further unobserved heterogeneity biases. Bound and Jaeger 
(1996) argue that, in the case of downward bias, the IV estimation may produce further 
upward biased results due to the unobserved heterogeneous characteristics between the 
control and the treatment groups, e.g. family backgrounds, and schooling quality. The second 
implication is that the measurement error bias is substantially low in this analysis. As 
discussed earlier, if the measurement error is significantly dominant, the downward bias 
should have been observed in the estimated results (IV estimates > OLS estimates). Lastly, the 
upward ability bias rules out the argument that LATE estimated from the IV method is far 
from ATE. Card (1999, 2001) and Lang (1993) suggest that LATE estimates from the IV 
method tend to be higher than OLS estimates due to the fact that the instrument variable, 
especially compulsory schooling, affects only a particular group of population. It is often 
argued that the compulsory schooling may affect only socially and economically 
disadvantaged individuals who tend to have high returns to schooling. Nevertheless, this 
argument does not apply to the estimated results of this study as the OLS estimates are higher 
than those of IV. Thus, it may imply that the instrument variable in this study affects the 
majority of the population and the estimated results (LATE) are probably close to the ATE.  
6.2.1.3 Remaining Puzzle 
 The contradiction between the IV estimates from this study and the estimates from panel 
with fixed effects (Warunsiri and McNown, 2010) is puzzling. In general, these two studies 
use similar data set with similar statistical quality as the OLS estimates from both studies 
indicate similar magnitude of the estimated coefficients and the level of significance. 
However, after correcting for the endogeneity bias with different estimation methods, the 
results are different not only in terms of magnitude of returns to schooling, but also the 
direction of the bias.  
 As discussed in Chapter 3, the panel regression with fixed effect may suffer from further 
upward bias since running panel regression with fixed effects excludes time-invariant 
independent variables from the regression, such as region controls and schooling quality. 
Stephen Jr. and Yang (2014) find that adding region and school quality control leads the 
effect of compulsory education on earnings towards zero or even wrong-signed. They argue 
that without the interaction between region control and year of birth, changes across regions 
over time of school quality cannot be captured in the estimation. The effects of differences in 
school quality may cause estimates to be biased since the source of upward bias is not limited 
to only an individual’s ability, but also includes family background and quality of schooling 




6.2.2. The Upward Ability Bias in Thai Context  
 According to the result of estimation from previous section, it shows that OLS estimates 
are higher than those of IV estimation which implies the upward ability bias in the OLS 
estimates. The upward ability bias can also be observed in other studies from developing 
countries such as China and Turkey. On the other hand, studies from developed countries, e.g. 
US and UK, tend to produce OLS estimates that are lower than those of IV. It is possible that 
the stage of social and economic development may explain a direction of bias in the OLS 
estimation of returns to schooling.   
 In this study, the dominance of ability bias is mainly explained by the inequality of 
income and educational opportunity during the early period of social and economic 
development. At that time, Thailand was characterised as a developing and agriculture-based 
economy with relatively high poverty rate and income gap. A majority of population still 
depended heavily on agricultural sector and rural labour activities, which earn relatively lower 
than other sectors. It was common for family members to help working without formal pay in 
those sectors. Moreover, there was low school enrolment rate observed during the same 
period. Overall, it was common to observe the inequality, both in terms of income and access 
to basic public services such as basic education, between different socio-economic groups. 
Individuals from agricultural families are socially discriminated, poorer, and having greater 
immediate need to work. Their opportunity cost of schooling is also higher. It is likely that 
individuals from agricultural families may quit school at younger ages. Due to high costs of 
schooling and demand for household labour, agricultural households cannot afford to send all 
children to school. Thus, they may select only one or few children with the highest ability 
among all children to receive proper education, while the rest of the children are expected to 
help household agricultural activities. As a result, children with higher ability tend to have 
more schooling in agricultural households. This is consistent with the general ability bias 
hypothesis which argues that more-able individuals are more likely to have higher years of 
schooling. On the other hand, individuals from a higher socio-economic class are likely to 
have higher investments in education qualitatively (better school quality) and quantitatively 
(more years of schooling) (Behrman, 1999). This reflects the ability bias usually discussed in 
both studies of developed and developing countries. In sum, there are two sources of ability 
bias in case of Thailand which includes the ability bias from a selection of more-able child 
within poor households and the ability bias due to higher financial endowment of rich 
families.  
 The argument of the ability bias due to a selection of more-able child within poor 
households is more relevant and specific to the case of Thailand and, perhaps, other 
developing countries. In other words, this type of ability bias is less relevant in developed 




education, are less pronounced. Due to high economic development and standard of living, 
individuals in developed countries have more economic power to afford education for their 
children regardless of their level of ability. In addition, a universal access to free education is 
commonly observed, especially for basic education. Therefore, the equal education 
opportunity is more prevalent in developed countries. Even though there is a tendency that 
individuals with higher ability are more likely to attain more years of schooling, the ability 
bias seems to be less dominant in developed countries, at least for the basic level of education. 
This is possibly the main reason that the upward ability bias is observed in Thailand and other 
developing countries, but not in developed countries. Instead, OLS estimation from developed 
countries suffers from downward bias (IV estimates > OLS estimates). Hence, other sources 
of bias seem to dominate the effect of the upward ability bias in case of developed countries. 
 Explaining the upward ability bias in terms of inequality of income and educational 
opportunity during the early period of Thai social and economic development may possibly be 
generalised to other developing countries, which share similar social and economic context 
with Thailand. The main result shows that the magnitude of OLS estimates in Thailand is 
comparable with those of other developing countries. However, the IV estimates are fairly 
different. As different instruments from different studies define different parameter (Heckman 
et al., 2006), a similarity of magnitude of IV estimates should not be expected to observe from 
different estimations. In other words, it is usually the case that IV varies across different 
studies. Nonetheless, similar instruments and identification strategies correct the same 
endogeneity bias, given that those studies share similar sample characteristics. As a result, the 
difference between estimates from OLS and IV estimations should indicate a similar direction 
of bias whether OLS estimates are higher than those of IV.  
Section 3. CONCLUSION 
 This chapter presents the empirical results from IV estimation by using Thai Labour 
Force Survey data. The results include the estimates from the first stage least square 
regression, the reduced form, the OLS regression (years of schooling on log wage), and the IV 
regression. First, the first stage estimation shows that the coefficients of compulsory 
education are statistically significant and robust across different specifications. The 
compulsory education law change leads to six additional years of schooling which is roughly 
corresponding to the first year of the upper secondary school (grade 10). Even though the new 
compulsory education law increases the minimum year of schooling from four years to six 
years, it seems that the impact of the law is beyond its expected initial impact. Second, the 
reduced form finds that the coefficients of compulsory education are statistically significant 
and robust across different specifications. The change in compulsory education level has a 




increase in the monthly wages. The large estimated effect of compulsory education in 
Thailand can be explained by the fact that there is a wide income gap between individuals 
with different levels of education attainment. Third, the OLS point estimates of the 
coefficients of the years of schooling are statistically significant and robust across different 
specifications. The rates of return to schooling from the OLS estimation is approximately 11 
per cent and consistent with that of the previous study from Thailand (Warunsiri and McNown, 
2010). Finally, the IV estimation indicates that the coefficients of years of schooling are 
statistically significant and robust across different specifications. One additional year of 
schooling leads to approximately 8 per cent increase in monthly wages. Comparing the OLS 
estimates with those of IV, the result shows that the OLS estimates are greater than those of 
the IV around 3 per cent. This indicates the upward bias (overestimation) in the OLS 
regression, which is consistent with the argument of ability bias in returns to schooling.  
 This main finding of this study is consistent with the theoretical discussion showing that 
IV estimates should be smaller than those of OLS estimation (Heckman, et al., 2006). 
Furthermore, the finding also supports Behrman’s (1999) arguments regarding the ability bias. 
Behrman (1990, 1999) argues that there is a substantial large ability bias, especially in the 
case of developing countries. A number of studies controlling for unobserved ability, family 
background, and school quality find that the OLS estimates suffer from the ability bias which 
the impact of years of schooling is overestimated 40-100 per cent. 
 There are three main concluding remarks from the discussion of the results in terms of 
methodological perspectives. First, the results from OLS estimation indicate that a net effect 
of different sources of bias leads to the overestimated rates of return to schooling in the 
context of Thailand (OLS estimates > IV estimates). This implies that the ability bias 
outweighs other sources of bias, including the discount rate bias and the measurement error 
bias. Second, the finding rules out certain issues that may occur in the case of estimates with 
downward bias (IV estimates > OLS estimates), including further unobserved heterogeneity 
biases, the classical measurement error bias, and the argument that LATE estimated from IV 
method is far from ATE. Finally, there still a remaining puzzle as the IV estimates from this 
study and the estimates from panel with fixed effects (Warunsiri and McNown, 2010) are 
different not only in terms of magnitude of returns to schooling, but also the direction of the 
bias, even though these two studies use similar data set with similar statistical quality.  
 The last section concludes that the dominance of ability bias is mainly explained by the 
inequality of income and educational opportunity during the early period of social and 
economic development and there are two sources of ability bias in case of Thailand that 
includes the ability bias from a selection of more-able child within poor households and the 
ability bias due to higher financial endowment of rich families. However, the argument of the 
ability bias due to a selection of more-able child within poor households is more relevant and 




type of ability bias is less relevant in developed countries where poverty and inequality of 
educational opportunity, especially for the basic education, are less pronounced. Even though 
there is a tendency that individuals with higher ability are more likely to attain more years of 
schooling, the ability bias seems to be less dominant in developed countries, at least for the 
basic level of education. This is possibly the main reason that the upward ability bias is 
observed in case of Thailand and other developing countries, while the OLS estimation from 
developed countries suffers from downward bias (IV estimates > OLS estimates). Hence, the 
other sources of bias seem to dominate the effect of the upward ability bias in case of 
developed countries. Furthermore, explaining the upward ability bias in terms of the 
inequality of income and educational opportunity during the early period of Thai social and 
economic development may also possibly be generalised to the case of other developing 




CHAPTER 7. FURTHER ANALYSIS: DISAGGREGATED 
ANALYSIS OF RETURNS TO SCHOOLING  
 In addition to the overall estimates of returns to schooling, another important issue is 
an issue of heterogeneity in educational returns across individuals. In Chapter 2, several 
education trends in Thailand during the period of analysis (1950-1990) are portrayed. 
Coupled with international social mandates and financial aids, the structural 
transformations raise the demand for educated workers. Thus, there has been a rapid 
expansion of the education system in the primary education for past 20 years (1960-1980), 
both in terms of student enrolment and number of teachers. However, the enrolment trend 
indicates that there is inequality in educational opportunities among individuals from 
different socio-economic groups. For example, the female enrolment was significantly 
lower than those of men during the period of the structural transformation. Ideally, given 
same levels of education, ceteris paribus, same returns to education should be observed 
among individuals regardless of their characteristics. However, heterogeneity in 
individuals’ demographic characteristics tends to distort the returns to education; for 
example, the female rates of return to education is likely to be higher than those of male. 
Hence, it is worth examining heterogeneous returns to schooling from different 
demographic characteristics.  
 This section presents disaggregated analyses of returns to schooling and their results 
by dividing the sample into five demographic domains, including gender, birth cohort, area 
of residence (urban and rural areas), region, and occupational industry. The analysis with 
these broad domains refers to a one-level disaggregated analysis of returns to schooling, in 
short a one-level disaggregation. Nevertheless, each individual possesses multiple 
characteristics and those combinations of characteristics give different levels of returns, for 
example, females living in a rural area may earn less than those from an urban area. Thus, 
to better understand the issue of heterogeneity in educational returns, interactions between 
different demographic characteristics are introduced into the disaggregated analysis. The 
analysis refers to a two-level disaggregated analysis of returns to schooling or a two-level 
disaggregation. The sample is disaggregated based on different combinations of two 
demographic characteristics. Table 7-1 illustrates an analytical matrix indicating both 
one-level and two-level disaggregated analyses. “1.x” refers to one-level disaggregated 
analysis, whereas “2.x” refers to two-level disaggregated analysis. There are some 
overlapping aspects presented in the analytical matrix, e.g., Gender-Cohort and 
Cohort-Gender. "See" represents an overlapping section and indicates the section that has 
been previously discussed. In addition, "na" indicates the section that the results are not 
significantly different from the main results or they are consistent with the main results. 




better understanding of the issue of heterogeneity in returns to schooling. Second, as a 
by-product, the analyses serve as a robustness check among different sub-samples based on 
different demographic domains. In addition, further analysis on aggregation biases can be 
examined to explain the biases in the OLS estimates (Warunsiri and McNown, 2010). 
 The disaggregated analyses are not without caveats. Schultz (1988) argues that 
stratifications of samples based on heterogeneous demographic characteristics lead to 
selection bias in estimating returns to education, especially in case of developing countries. 
Developing countries share similar economic and social phenomena, namely prevalence of 
self-employment and non-wage labour, imbalanced economic development among 
different areas and regions, and gender-based segregation in occupational choices. These 
phenomena affect individuals’ decision making towards investments in education and 
returns to education. Each demographic domain has its own specific issues discussed in the 
following sections. With comprehensive investigation of the process of economic 
development, the disaggregated analyses indicate the estimated results and suggest trends 
and directions of the returns to schooling across different demographic characteristics.   
Table 7-1 Analytical Matrix 
 Gender Cohort Area Region Economic Sector 








































Note:   "1.x" refers to one-level disaggregated analysis. 
"2.x" refers to two-level disaggregated analysis. 
"See" represents an overlapping section. 
"na" means not available due to the fact that the results are not significantly different from the main 
results or they are consistent with the main results. 




Section 1. ONE-LEVEL DISAGGREGATED ANALYSIS OF RETURNS TO SCHOOLING 
 A one-level disaggregation refers to an estimation with different subsamples stratified 
by certain demographic characteristics, namely gender, cohort, area of residence, region, 
and occupational industry. Table 7-2 shows the estimated results of the one-level 
disaggregated analyses. The overall results are consistent with the results from the main 
analysis in which the upward bias in cross-sectional OLS regressions can be observed. It 
seems that the ability bias is still dominant in the disaggregated results. The bias gap refers 





Table 7-2 Disaggregated Analysis of OLS and IV Returns to Schooling 
     
Comparison 




Log monthly wages,  0.112*** 0.0856*** 0.0264 1,307,016 
  
all workers (0.00425) (0.00354) 
    







male (0.00439) (0.00374) 
  
Log monthly wages,  0.116*** 0.0856*** 0.0304 644,263 
female (0.00391) (0.00367) 
  







cohort 1955-1970 (0.00354) (0.00347) 
  
Log monthly wages, 0.101*** 0.0856*** 0.0154 1,016,749 
cohort 1961-1985 (0.00377) (0.00354) 
  







urban (0.00369) (0.00169) 
  
Log monthly wages,  0.105*** 0.0709*** 0.0341 450,399 
rural (0.0053) (0.00622) 
  









BKK (0.00204) (0.00116) 
  
Log monthly wages,  0.124*** 0.0990*** 0.025 256,236 
North (0.00439) (0.00436) 
  
Log monthly wages,  0.140*** 0.0977*** 0.0423 298,137 
Northeast (0.0038) (0.00683) 
  
Log monthly wages,  0.0928*** 0.0733*** 0.0195 222,181 
South (0.00473) (0.00343) 
  
Log monthly wages,  0.0973*** 0.0766*** 0.0207 369,035 
Centre (0.00459) (0.00225) 
  











Agricultural sector (0.00479) (0.0044) 
  
Log monthly wages,  0.0936*** 0.0706*** 0.023 238,274 
Manufacturing sector  (0.00468) (0.00285) 
  
Log monthly wages,  0.102*** 0.0825*** 0.0195 637,105 
Service sector (0.00325) (0.00078) 
  
Notes: The dependent variables are log monthly wages. Each regression includes controls for a birth cohort dummies (except for the models 
with explicit cohort variables), regional dummies (except for the models with explicit region variables), and an indicator whether a cohort faced 
a new compulsory education law (6 years of compulsory education). Moreover, each model also includes age controls: a quadratic polynomial. 
Each regression includes the sample of 15 to 60 years old from the 1986 through 2012 Labour Force Surveys. Data are first aggregated into cell 
means and weighted by cell size. Regressions are clustered by birth cohort. ***, **, and * indicate p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.1, respectively. 
Bias gap refers to the difference between OLS estimate and the IV estimate. 




7.1.1. Gender  
7.1.1.1 Rates of Return to Schooling 
Table 7-3 Disaggregated Analysis of OLS and IV Returns to Schooling by Gender 
     Dependent Variables OLS IV Bias Gap Sample Size 
Log monthly wages,  0.112*** 0.0856*** 0.0264 1,307,016 
all workers (0.00425) (0.00354) 
  
Log monthly wages,  0.108*** 0.0808*** 0.0272 662,753 
male (0.00439) (0.00374) 
  
Log monthly wages,  0.116*** 0.0856*** 0.0304 644,263 
female (0.00391) (0.00367) 
  
Notes: The dependent variables are log monthly wages. Each regression includes controls for a birth cohort dummies 
(except for the models with explicit cohort variables), regional dummies (except for the models with explicit region 
variables), and an indicator whether a cohort faced a new compulsory education law (6 years of compulsory education). 
Moreover, each model also includes age controls: a quadratic polynomial. Each regression includes the sample of 15 to 
60 years old from the 1986 through 2012 Labour Force Surveys. Data are first aggregated into cell means and weighted 
by cell size. Regressions are clustered by birth cohort. ***, **, and * indicate p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.1, respectively. 
Bias gap refers to the difference between OLS estimate and the IV estimate. 
Source: Author’s compilation based on LFS 1986-2012. 
According to Table 7-3, in terms of gender, the OLS coefficients on years of schooling 
for men and women are 0.108 and 0.116, respectively, while those of the IV estimation are 
0.081 for men and 0.086 for women. With disaggregation by gender, the upward ability 
bias in the returns to education estimated from the OLS regression remains. This 
disaggregation shows the rates of return to schooling for women are marginally higher than 
those of men and they are somehow similar in magnitude. This is consistent with most of 
previous studies, e.g., Chiswick (1976), Warunsiri and Mcnown (2010), Parinduri (2014), 
Hawley (2004), Devereux and Fan (2011), and Grenet (2013) (Table 7-4), which the rates 
of return to education of women are higher than or comparable to those of men. It seems 
that the result shows a transition towards gender equality in access to education and labour 
market.  
 Figure 7-1 and Figure 7-2 illustrate that women in Thailand earn on average 
substantially less than do men. However, it is common to observe the rates of return to 
schooling for women exceed those of men. The reason is simply that the concept of rates of 
return is rather relative (Psacharopoulos, 1985). Education helps women expand their job 
opportunities, both in terms of access to labour market and occupational choice 
(Psacharopoulos, 1988, 1992, Dougherty, 2005). As women have much more limited 
access to both education and labour market, investing in one additional year of schooling 
for women would allow them to earn much more than those with less education. On the 
other hand, it is quite common among men to attain more education and to have a better 
job position in the labour market; therefore, investing just one additional year of schooling 
would marginally increase their returns to schooling. Moreover, as the occupational choice 
for women expands, women move away from lower-paid traditionally female jobs to 
higher-paid ones. This also contributes to the fact that the female rates of return to 




Table 7-4 Summary of Returns to Education by Gender 













OLS < na na 




with panel data 
> 0.178** 0.126** 
This study IV with RDD > 0.0856*** 0.0808*** 
2. Developed Countries 
Devereux and Fan 
(2011), UK 
IV with RDD: 
Hourly wages 












France and UK 
IV with RDD 
(France) 








3. Developing Countries 
Fang, et al. (2012), 
China 
IV with RDD < 0.10* 0.51** 
La Vincent and 
College (2014), 
China 






IV with fuzzy 
RDD 
> 0.26** 0.14* 
Aydemir and Murat 
(2015), Turkey 
IV with RDD > 0.038** 0.005 
(not significant) 
Note: a Level of statistical significance is not reported.  
b No information on the estimates. The direction of the inequality sign is taken from Warunsiri and 
Mcnown (2010). 
***, **, and * indicate p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively. na means “not available”. 




7.1.1.2 Ability Bias (Bias Gap)  
According to Table 7-3, the bias gap for women is around 3 per cent, while for men is 
approximately 2.7 per cent. The magnitude of the male bias gap is consistent with that of 
Warunsiri and McNown (2010). The bias gaps indicate that there is an upward ability bias 
in the OLS estimates in both genders. Even though the estimated returns to schooling are 
higher for women, the difference between female and male bias gaps is fairly small 
(0.0304 – 0.0272 = 0.0032). Hence, there is no obvious difference between female and 
male bias gaps. In contrast, the bias gaps for women and for men are 0.05 and 0.02, 
respectively in the study of Warunsiri and McNown (2010). The bias gap is greater for 
women than for men (3 per cent). Although the estimated results of the female returns are 
different, both studies indicate that the bias gap of women is larger than that of men.   
Even though the magnitude of the difference between male and female bias gap is 
small, it seems that the ability bias is more dominant for women. In Thailand, the gender 
gap in educational attainment at all levels has closed in 1990 (Figure 2-14). This implies 
that during the economic transformation, 1970-1990, there has been a gender gap in all 
levels of education. エラー! 参照元が見つかりません。Figure 2-14 shows a percentage 
of female students of total number of students enrolled in each education level. Even 
though the situation has been improving over time, gender gap in all levels of education 
can be observed. In the primary education female students are still less than half of the 
total number of enrolled students, whereas in the secondary education female represents 
approximately 40 per cent of the total number of enrolled students. The situation is even 
worse in vocational secondary schools and higher education. There was discrimination 
against women in education at all levels; therefore, women seem to face higher opportunity 
costs in attaining education. Gandhi-Kingdon (2002) explains this situation as 
“unexplained parental discrimination”: given the same level of ability, women would get 
less support from their families. Compared to men, women are socially disadvantaged. In 
the early stage of social and economic development, market distortions such as gender 
discrimination prevent socially disadvantaged groups, e.g. women, to attend schools. 
Hence, only women with higher ability and better family background are given an 
opportunity to attend schools. As Behrman (1999) put it, “individuals with higher 
investments in schooling are likely to be individuals with more ability and more motivation 
who come from family and community backgrounds that provide more reinforcement for 
such investments and who have lower marginal private costs for such investments and 
lower discount rates for the returns from those investments and who are likely to have 
access to higher quality schools”. This is consistent with the ability bias hypothesis which 
states that more-able individuals are more likely to attain more years of schooling. Hence, 




 However, the estimated result also implies that there is a trend towards equal 
educational opportunity between women and men as the differences of the estimated 
returns to schooling and the bias gaps between women and men is substantially small. As 
previously discussed, gender gaps in educational attainment at all levels have closed since 
1990 (Knodel, 1997). Hence, it is highly possible that the movement towards gender 
equality starts even before 1990. The situation has also been improving in the secondary 
education where female is approximately 40 per cent of total number of enrolled students. 
In other words, women and men face similar opportunity costs in attending the primary 
and secondary education. Moreover, economic development during 1980s raises a demand 
for labour, which provides an opportunity for women to enter the labour market. Through 
modernisation, gender roles have changed overtime (Nakavachara, 2010). Women have 
more chance to enrol in the education system partly to meet the demand for high-skilled 
workers. These facts reflect in the results of disaggregated analysis by gender, both in 




Figure 7-1 Gender Earnings Gap in Thailand (1985-2005) 
  







Figure 7-2 Ratio of Female-to-Male Hourly Wages by Sector 
 
Note: World Bank staff estimates using household income and expenditure surveys. 
Source: World Bank, 2012.  
7.1.1.3 Selection Bias 
 In fact, the “real” female rates of return can be either higher or lower than the 
estimated ones due to the high probability of sample selection bias. The conventional 
estimations of returns to schooling usually ignore the selected nature of the female samples. 
Both Psacharopoulos (1985) and Schultz (1988) argue that the estimated female returns to 
schooling can be either ooverestiamted or underestimated due to the fact that the estimates 
are from unrepresentative sample of females. Female labour participation rate is fairly low 
and females tend to concentrate in self-employed occupations or a non-wage labour market. 
According to Table 7-5, in Thailand, the female percentage in labour force is 
approximately 46 per cent, which accounts for less than half of the total number of labour 
force. In addition, a labour force participation rate, on average, indicates that 66 per cent of 
the total number of female population participates in the labour market, while male 
participation rate is approximately 81 per cent (Figure 7-3). Hence, the sample of 
estimation does not cover all females and deems to be unrepresentative.  
 Nevertheless, Schultz (1988) posits that women may choose to work fewer hours than 
do men regardless of female labour force participation rate. Hence, the problem of sample 




hours for the self-employed by gender are unique among developing countries. Normally, 
the distribution of working house is relatively flat and likely to be evenly distributed, while 
in the case of Thailand hours spent working for both genders are heavily centred in the 
category of 40 hours per week and above (Lee, McCann, and Messenger, 2007). Table 7-6 
indicates that the number of individuals working more than 40 hours per week account for 
79 per cent for women and 83 per cent for men. Thai women and men tend to spend time 
working for long hours; therefore, the argument of Schultz may not apply to the case of 
Thailand. 
7.1.1.4 Conclusion 
 Within the wage labour market, the estimated returns to schooling for women are 
higher than those for men. It implies that women face higher opportunity costs in attaining 
education and participating in the labour market. This is possibly due to the gender 
discrimination practice during the early period of social and economic development. 
Moreover, the estimated result shows that women have a higher bias gap than that of men. 
This implies that the ability bias is more dominant in the female OLS estimates since 
gender discrimination causes the situation in which only more-able women can obtain 
higher level of education. Nevertheless, the result also indicates that there is a movement 
towards equality of access to education and also labour market between women and men as 
the difference between female and male returns to schooling is fairly small. Through the 
process of social and economic development, women have more chance to enrol in the 
education system partly to meet the demand for high-skilled workers and partly to meet the 
international expectation towards modernisation. This reflects in the results of 
disaggregated analysis by gender, both in terms of IV estimates and the bias gaps, in which 
the gaps of each result are marginally small between women and men.    





Source: Haspels and Majurin, 2008. 
Table 7-5 Share of Female Wage Employment, 1996-2010 
Year 
Share of Female Wage Employment 
To Total Female Employment (%) To Total Wage Employment (%) 
1996 34.2 40.8 
1997 35.2 42.4 
1998 35.3 43.5 
1999 37.5 43.9 
2000 38.8 44.1 
2001 39.9 42.3 
2002 39.3 41.4 
2003 40.2 42.3 
2004 42.9 44.2 
2005 42.7 44.7 
2006 42.9 44.0 
2007 42.9 43.9 
2008 42.6 43.8 
2009 42.1 43.4 
2010 41.5 44.7 
Source: International Labour Office, 2013. 
Table 7-6 Average Hours Worked per Week for Male and Female Workers (Wage 
and Salary Sector) 
Types of Jobs Hours 
Female Male 
1995 2000 1995 2000 
Paid 
Employees 
1-9 0.13 0.38 0.04 0.16 
10-19 0.73 1.13 0.55 1.07 
20-29 2.12 2.73 1.46 2.88 
30-34 1.85 1.98 1.57 2.53 
35-39 12.88 14.68 11.48 13.10 
40-49 42.44 47.90 38.53 42.99 
50+ 39.84 31.20 46.36 37.27 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Self-Employed 
1-9 0.51 0.67 0.29 0.41 
10-19 2.27 2.94 1.64 2.71 
20-29 6.64 7.11 5.88 5.64 
30-34 2.61 2.80 2.22 2.36 
35-39 10.87 9.59 7.12 6.56 
40-49 23.47 25.63 20.63 21.26 
50+ 53.63 51.25 62.21 61.06 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Total 
Employment 
1-9 0.35 0.54 0.17 0.30 
10-19 1.63 5.16 1.11 1.95 
20-29 4.77 2.14 3.76 4.37 
30-34 2.30 2.44 1.91 2.44 
35-39 11.70 11.86 9.22 9.58 
40-49 31.32 35.55 29.25 31.31 
50+ 47.93 42.32 54.58 50.07 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 





7.1.2. Cohort  
7.1.2.1 Rates of Return to Schooling 
Table 7-7 Disaggregated Analysis of OLS and IV Returns to Schooling by Cohort 
Dependent Variables OLS IV Bias gap Observations 
Log monthly wages,  0.112*** 0.0856*** 0.0264 1,307,016 
all workers (0.00425) (0.00354) 
  
Log monthly wages, 0.126*** 0.0872*** 0.0388 812,522 
cohort 1955-1970 (0.00354) (0.00347) 
  
Log monthly wages, 0.101*** 0.0856*** 0.0154 1,016,749 
cohort 1961-1985 (0.00377) (0.00354) 
  
Notes: The dependent variables are log monthly wages. Each regression includes controls for a birth cohort 
dummies (except for the models with explicit cohort variables), regional dummies (except for the models 
with explicit region variables), and an indicator whether a cohort faced a new compulsory education law (6 
years of compulsory education). Moreover, each model also includes age controls: a quadratic polynomial. 
Each regression includes the sample of 15 to 60 years old from the 1986 through 2012 Labour Force Surveys. 
Data are first aggregated into cell means and weighted by cell size. Regressions are clustered by birth cohort. 
***, **, and * indicate p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.1, respectively. Bias gap refers to the difference between 
OLS estimate and the IV estimate. 
Source: Author’s compilation based on LFS 1986-2012. 
In terms of cohort, the OLS coefficients on years of schooling for the older cohort 
(cohorts born in 1955-1970) and the younger cohort (cohorts born in 1961-1985) are 0.126 
and 0.101, respectively, while those of the IV estimation are 0.0872 for the older cohort 
and 0.0856 for the younger one (Table 7-7). The OLS estimates from cohort 
disaggregation still indicate the upward ability bias. (IV estimates are bigger than OLS 
estimates), which is consistent to the standard estimates (the first row of Table 7-7). This 
disaggregation shows the rates of return to education for cohort 1955-1970 is marginally 
higher than that of cohort 1961-1985. It seems that the result shows a transition towards a 
lower equilibrium of demand for and supply of educated labour. It is the equilibrium in 
which the returns to schooling become smaller as the supply of educated workers shifts to 
the right (an increase in labour supply) at a faster rate than the shift of demand for educated 
workers (an increase in labour demand).  
Psacharopoulos (1985, 1993) argues that as education keeps expanding over time, 
diminishing returns should be observed. In other words, ceteris paribus, there is a negative 
correlation between education expansion and returns to schooling (Psacharopoulos, 1981, 
1982). At early stages of development, a rapid economic expansion creates rents or surplus 
earnings for a small proportion of educated population to enjoy (Psacharopoulos, 2011). 
Educated workers can enjoy new rents created by the new demand. As a consequence, the 
expansion of education produces a supply of educated workers to meet a demand for 
educated workers and, therefore, the rents are eliminated. It is this interaction between the 




education. A rapid increase in the supply responding towards the shift in the demand could 
lead to a decline of returns to schooling (an elimination of the rents). As the process of 
economic development deepens, it is also possible that the rates of return remain constant 
if the demand keeps pace with the increasing supply (Psacharopoulos, 1981, 1988, and 
Welch, 1971). Tinbergen (1975) explains this situation in terms of a race between 
education and technology, shifts to the right of the supply of and the demand for educated 
labour.  
Table 7-8 Demand and Supply of Skilled Workers 1960-1980 
Skilled Workers  
   1960 Stock 80,000 
   1980 Stock 288,000 
Average Annual Demand  
   For Replacement 9,300 
   For Expansion 10,400 
Total Skilled Workers Required Annually 19,700 
Source: World Bank, 1989 
The above hypothesis possibly explains the reason that the rates of return to education 
for cohort 1955-1970 is marginally greater than that of cohort 1961-1985. On one hand, the 
older cohort (1955-1970) experienced the early stages of economic development 
characterised by the sharp increasing demand of educated workers (Table 7-8). Figure 2-4 
shows that, during 1960-1990, there was a rapid growth in the industrial sector, that 
required more educated workers to sustain the growth of this sector and the whole 
economy. This created rents or surplus earnings for a small group of educated population at 
that time to enjoy. Hence, the rates of return to schooling are higher for the older cohort. 
On the other hand, the younger cohort (1961-1985) experienced the prosperous stages of 
economic development that the excess demand of educated workers was relieved by the 
expansion of the supply of educated workers due to the Government’s education expansion 
policy. After 1990, the contribution of industrial sector to the overall GDP remained 
constant (Figure 2-14). This implies a constant growing demand for educated workers. 
The education premium becomes smaller as the supply of educated workers keeps 
increasing. Thus, the estimated result indicates a transition towards equilibrium of demand 
for and supply of educated labour in Thailand which the returns to schooling become 
smaller since the supply of educated workers becomes larger and keeps pace with the 




7.1.2.2 Ability Bias (Bias Gap)  
According to Table 7-7, the bias gap of the older cohort is approximately 4 per cent, 
while that of the younger cohort is around 1.5 per cent. The ability bias is more dominant 
in the older cohort, cohort 1955-1970. The magnitude of ability bias is possibly higher for 
the older cohort as they experienced the beginning stage of economic development, which 
there was still a much more limited access to education. At this period, most of families 
were under poverty. Hence, they might select only the most-able child among other 
children to study at school since they could not afford to send all children to school. This 
was due to high costs of schooling and demand for household labour. Moreover, schools 
were mainly concentrated in Bangkok and large cities. This imposed higher indirect costs 
of education, both in terms of time and transportation, to those who live far from the centre. 
As a result of financial constraint, only children with higher ability tended to be selected to 
study at schools. This is consistent with the ability bias hypothesis which states that 
more-able individuals are more likely to have higher years of schooling. On the other hand, 
the younger generation enjoyed an era of a higher level of economic development with an 
intensive education expansion. Due to an economic development and a higher standard of 
living, families gained more economic power to afford education for their children 
regardless of their level of ability. In addition, a universal access to education promoted 
free compulsory education and expansion of schools to remote areas; therefore, both direct 
and indirect costs of schooling have been reduced. The younger generation faced smaller 
costs of schooling and had higher opportunities to acquire education. Thus, an equality of 
access to education among the young generation reduces the ability bias in the estimation. 
As a result, the ability bias is more dominant in the OLS estimates of the older generation 
than those of younger generation. In addition, the higher ability bias implies that there is an 
inequality of opportunity in access to education between the older and younger 
generations.   
The data from Table 7-9 and Figure 7-4 support the above argument. Table 7-9 
shows poverty incidence in Thailand during 1962-2002. It illustrates that during the social 
and economic period (1960-1980) Thailand experienced very high poverty incidence both 
in rural and urban areas. In 1962, the aggregate poverty incidence was as high as 88 per 
cent. This supports the above argument regarding the poverty and low standard of living in 
the older generation. Since 1990, the aggregate poverty incidence has become moderate 
and even lower than 10 per cent after 2000. This implies that the younger generation is 
benefited from economic development and suffer from poverty substantially lesser than 
those from older generation. Moreover, Figure 7-4 indicates that there was much lower 
number of students enrolled in each education level for the older cohort, especially after 
four years of compulsory education (1962 Compulsory Education Act). This may be 




individuals from the older cohort have less opportunity to attend school. As shown in 
Table 7-9, most of families are under poverty for the older cohort. Thus, it is possible that 
only the most-able child is allowed to study at school, while the rest is expected to help 
household work. On the other hand, the younger generation enjoys an era of a higher level 
of economic development and standard of living. This possibly explains a higher number 
of enrolments at each education level of the younger cohort and supports the fact that the 
younger generation face smaller costs of schooling and have higher opportunities to 





Table 7-9 Thailand: Poverty Incidence, 1962 to 2002 (Headcount Measure, Per Cent 
of Total Population) 
 
Aggregate Rural Urban 
1962 88.3 96.4 78.5 
1969 63.1 69.6 53.7 
1975 48.6 57.2 25.8 
1981 35.5 43.1 15.5 
1986 44.9 56.3 12.1 
1988 32.6 40.3 12.6 
1990 27.2 33.8 1.6 
1992 23.2 29.7 6.6 
1994 16.3 21.2 4.8 
1996 11.4 14.9 3 
1998 12.9 17.2 3.4 
2000 14.2 21.5 3.1 
2002 9.8 12.6 3 
Poverty share 2000 100 92.6 7.4 
Population share 2000 100 68.4 31.6 
Note: Poverty incidence means the number of poor within a reference population group expressed as a 
proportion of the total population of that group. The headcount measure of aggregate poverty incidence is the 
percentage of the total population whose incomes fall below a poverty line held constant over time in real 
terms; rural poverty is the percentage of the rural population whose incomes fall below a poverty line held 
constant over time in real terms, and so forth. Poverty share means the number of poor within a reference 
population group expressed as a proportion of the total number of poor within the whole population. 
Population share means the population of a reference group expressed as a proportion of the total population 
of that group 
Source: Siriprachai (2009) based on Development Evaluation Division, National Economic and Social 
Development Board, Bangkok and Medhi (1993). 
Figure 7-4 Number of Students Enrolment by Education Level (Grade), 1964-1984 
 
Source: Author’s compilation based on UNESCO and Ministry of Education (1968-1986). 
7.1.2.4 Conclusion 
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younger cohort within the wage labour market. This implies that the older generation faces 
higher opportunity costs in attaining education. This is possibly due to the interaction 
between the demand for and the supply of skilled workers in different periods of social and 
economic development experienced by the older and younger cohorts. At early stages of 
development, a rapid economic expansion creates rents or surplus earnings for a small 
proportion of educated population to enjoy. In contrast, the younger cohort enjoys smaller 
rents as the supply of educated workers keeps pace with the increasing demand in the later 
stage of development. In addition, the result also implies that there is a transition towards a 
lower equilibrium of the demand and supply of educated labour. The lower equilibrium 
indicates the lower returns to schooling since the supply of educated workers increase at a 
faster rate than does the demand for educated workers.  
Furthermore, the bias gap for the older cohort is larger than that of the younger cohort. 
This implies that the ability bias is more dominant in the OLS estimates of the older 
generation. At the early stage of development, poverty and low standard of living, e.g. 
undeveloped school system influence household’s decision making in sending their 
children to schools. It is likely that most of households may have to select only the 
most-able child to study at school due to the high direct and indirect costs of schooling and 
demand for household labour. Hence, there is a tendency that schools accumulate 
more-able children, which arguably causes the higher ability bias in the OLS estimates of 
the older cohort. Furthermore, the higher ability bias also implies that there is an inequality 




7.1.3. Areas of Residence (Urban and Rural Areas)  
7.1.3.1 Rates of Return to Schooling 
Regarding areas of residence, the OLS coefficients on years of schooling for the urban 
area and the rural area are 0.108 and 0.105, respectively, while those of IV estimation are 
0.085 for the urban area and 0.071 for the rural area (Table 7-10). The OLS estimates are 
greater than those of IV; therefore, the upward ability bias still persists in both estimates of 
the urban and rural areas. There is a consistency between the estimates of disaggregated 
analysis and those of the standard estimates (the first row of Table 7-10). The results from 
this study and that of Warunsiri and McNown (2010) are at least qualitatively similar in 
terms of the direction. Both studies report that the estimates of the urban area are higher 
than those of the rural area (Table 7-11). Moreover, the result is consistent with other 
studies both from Thailand (Chriswick, 1983) and other countries, e.g. Indonesia 




Table 7-10 Disaggregated Analysis of OLS and IV Returns to Schooling by Area of 
Residence 
Dependent Variables OLS IV Bias gap Observations 
Log monthly wages,  0.112*** 0.0856*** 0.0264 1,307,016 
all workers (0.00425) (0.00354) 
  
Log monthly wages,  0.108*** 0.0849*** 0.0231 856,617 
urban (0.00369) (0.00169) 
  
Log monthly wages,  0.105*** 0.0709*** 0.0341 450,399 
rural (0.0053) (0.00622) 
  
Notes: The dependent variables are log monthly wages. Each regression includes controls for a birth cohort 
dummies (except for the models with explicit cohort variables), regional dummies (except for the models 
with explicit region variables), and an indicator whether a cohort faced a new compulsory education law (6 
years of compulsory education). Moreover, each model also includes age controls: a quadratic polynomial. 
Each regression includes the sample of 15 to 60 years old from the 1986 through 2012 Labour Force Surveys. 
Data are first aggregated into cell means and weighted by cell size. Regressions are clustered by birth cohort. 
***, **, and * indicate p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.1, respectively. Bias gap refers to the difference between 
OLS estimate and the IV estimate. 
Source: Author’s compilation based on LFS 1986-2012. 
As there are more sophisticated jobs that need skilled workers in the urban labour 
market, urban individuals have more chance to utilise their skills than do those living in 
rural areas (Warunsiri and McNown, 2010). On the contrary, jobs in rural areas require less 
skill; therefore, rural skilled workers cannot exploit their skills honed through higher 
                                                        
29 Studies from Kenya (Agesa, 2001), China (de Brauw, Rozelle and Zhang, 2005), and Mexico (Schultz, 
2004) are not included in Table 7-11 Summary of Return to Education by Areas of 
ResidenceTable 7-11 since the method of estimation is different from those reported in the table. Table 
7-11 mainly focuses on the studies using IV with RDD. However, regardless of the estimation methods, all 




education (Jamison and Lau, 1982). In addition, the lesser quality of schools in rural areas 
also contributes to the lower returns to schooling (Behrman and Birdsall, 1983). Thus, the 
result implies that there is an inequality of job opportunities and school quality between 
rural and urban areas, in which better job opportunities and school with higher quality tend 
to concentrate in urban areas.  
7.1.3.2 Ability Bias (Bias Gap) 
 The bias gap of urban areas is 0.023, whereas that of rural areas is approximately 
0.034. In contrast, Warunsiri and McNown (2010) find that the bias gaps of urban and rural 
areas are 0.074 and 0.029, respectively. The magnitude of the rural bias gap (0.034) is 
somewhat consistent with that of Warunsiri and McNown (2010), 0.029. However, Table 
7-10 shows that the bias gap of rural areas is greater than that of urban areas, whereas the 
bias gap is greater for urban areas (7 per cent) in the study of Warunsiri and McNown 
(2010). The result of this study indicates that the ability bias is more dominant in rural 
areas. This implies that there is an inequality of opportunity in access to education between 
the rural and the urban areas, which supports the main IV estimated results showing that 
the urban IV estimate is greater than that of rural areas.    
Table 7-11 Summary of Return to Education by Areas of Residence 












Warunsiri and Mcnown 
(2010) 
Fixed effects 
with panel data 
> 0.189** 0.142** 
This study IV with RDD > 0.0849*** 0.0709*** 
2. Others 
Fang, et al. (2012), 
China 
IV with RDD < 0.14 0.18*** 
La Vincent and College 
(2014), China 








IV with fuzzy 
RDD 
> 0.22* 0.16** 
Source: Author’s compilation.    
 The higher ability bias in rural samples can be explained by the fact that rural residents 
have lower opportunity in access to schooling than do urban residents. Rural residents can 
be regarded as one of socially disadvantaged groups as they are socially discriminated, 
more credit constrained and having greater immediate need to work. Rural residents have 
limited access to schools as most schools are concentrated in urban areas during the 
beginning of social and economic development period. Transportation system and basic 




access to such basic infrastructure. This contributes to a higher cost of attending school. 
Aside from the limited access to school, rural residents tend to be poorer than those living 
in urban areas. As rural residences’ main source of income is from agriculture, the average 
income is smaller than those of other sectors. Furthermore, agriculture is labour-intensive, 
and family-oriented; therefore, labour from family members is required. Rural agricultural 
households exploit their own family members including their school-age children to 
cultivate the land. Hence, rural children have a greater immediate need to work and find 
that the opportunity cost of schooling is high. Due to higher costs of education and low 
income, rural households cannot afford to send their children to school. However, there is a 
tendency that, with the hope that an educated child will bring fortune to the family, poor 
households choose only one or few children with the highest ability among others to 
receive a proper education. As a result, children with higher ability tend to be selected to 
study at schools. This is consistent with the ability bias hypothesis which argues that 
more-able individuals are more likely to have higher years of schooling. On the other hand, 
urban residents have better access to schooling and are less credit constrained. Urban 
households can afford to send their children to schools regardless of ability level of their 
children. Thus, the urban OLS estimates suffer from ability bias at a lesser extent than 
those of the rural sample. In sum, inequality of access to education between rural and 
urban residents causes the higher ability bias in the OLS estimation and possibly explains 
the situation which a rural bias gap is greater than that of urban areas. 
Table 7-9 supports the argument that rural residents are poorer than urban residents. In 
1962, the rural poverty incidence accounts for 96.4 per cent, while the urban poverty 
incidence is approximately 78.5 per cent. Moreover, the gap between rural and urban 
poverty incidence keeps expanding over time. In 1990, the rural poverty incidence reduces 
to 33.8 per cent, whereas that of urban areas is only 1.6 per cent. Hence, it can be observed 
that rural residents have always been poorer than urban residents. Moreover, Table 7-12 
supports the fact that rural residents are lower educated than those from urban areas. There 
are approximately 88 per cent of rural residents who have only primary education or less, 
while just 2 per cent hold a university degree. In contrast, around 50 per cent of urban 
residents have only primary education or less, whereas 16 per cent hold a university degree. 
Warr (2011) reports that 94.7 per cent of the total number of poor people in 2002 have only 
primary education or less, while just 0.31 per cent hold a university degree. Hence, poor 
people tend to have low education level. This implies a negative correlation between 
poverty and education. Combining the information from Table 7-9, Table 7-12, and 
Warr’s report (2011), it can be concluded that, with a high level of poverty, rural residents 
possibly have lower opportunity to access schooling than do urban residents and, therefore, 





Table 7-12 Percentage Distribution of Educational Attainment of Populations Aged 
Six Years and Above in Rural and Urban Areas, 1993 
Education Rural Urban 
Males 
  
No Education 9.6 6.3 
Primary 76.0 44.4 
Secondary 11.7 32.6 
University 2.5 16.3 
Other 0.2 0.3 
Total 100 100 
Females 
  
No Education 14.2 9.4 
Primary 75.8 44.4 
Secondary 7.8 25.4 
University 2.2 16.0 
Other na 0.1 
Total 100 100 
Note: na: not available. 
Source: Author’s compilation adapted from Vutthisomboon (1998) based on data from the National 
Statistical Office, Thailand, 1993. 
7.1.3.3 Selection Bias 
The area-disaggregated estimates may be subject to a sample selection bias. A 
potential selection bias may occur due to a rural-urban migration. In general, better 
educated individuals tend to migrate from rural areas to urban areas due to higher urban 
real wages (Greenwood (1975), Schwartz (1976), Schultz (1982b, 1988), Orazem and King 
(2007)). This phenomenon is described as, “human capital drain from rural to urban areas” 
(Amare, et al., 2012) and can be observed from other developing countries, namely Taiwan 
(Speare, 1974), Venezuela (Levy and Wadycki, 1974), Papua New Guinea (Ross, 1984). 
Evidence from the previous studies of Thailand also indicates the same pattern 
(Prachuabmoh et al., 1979, Tirasawat, 1985). Thus, the estimated urban rates of return does 
not purely represent the “real” urban rates of return as it also reflects rural immigrants’ rate 
of returns.  
Without migration, the “real” rates of return to schooling in urban areas should be 
higher than the estimated rates. Conversely, the “real” rates of return to schooling in rural 
areas should be lower. The underlying reason is that, without rural immigrants, urban 
workers can enjoy higher rents from disequilibrium between demand for and supply of 
educated workers since there are more job opportunities that educated workers can utilise 




drives up the supply of educated workers in urban areas. Thus, returns to schooling 
decrease as the supply increases. Psacharopoulos (1987) posits that the returns to schooling 
among different areas will converge through the process of labour migration. In contrast, 
the “real” rates of return in rural areas should be lower since there is less demand for 
educated workers in rural areas and there is no absorption of educated workers to urban 
areas to relieve the excess supply of educated workers in rural areas. Given that there is no 
migration, rural educated workers enjoy much smaller rents than those from urban areas. 
Owing to higher urban real wages, better educated individuals are more likely to migrate 
from rural areas to urban areas; therefore, the rural-urban migration can be observed.  
There are implicit assumptions underlying above discussion. First, Schultz (1988) and 
Agesa (2001) argue that net migration flow is characterised by a flow from rural to urban 
areas owing to higher real wages in urban areas and unbalance between demand for and 
supply of educated workers in rural areas. With the modern educational expansion, the 
supply of educated workers in rural areas increases rapidly, while the development of rural 
labour market cannot keep pace with the increase in educated labour supply. This results in 
an influx of migration flow from rural to urban areas. The trend can be observed in Latin 
American countries and Kenya (Schultz (1988), Agesa (2001)). Second, regarding 
education of migrants, more educated individuals tend to migrate to urban areas as they 
can exploit their skills and earn higher wages in the urban labour market. Those migrants 
are more likely to migrate after graduation (Schultz, 1988).  
Table 7-13 Migration Streams of Migrants 
Migration Stream 
1965-70 1975-80 1985-90 
Number Per cent Number Per cent Number Per cent 
Total migrants 3,331,100 100 2,947,700 100 4,026,100 100 
Urban migrants 763,400 23.0 1,024,900 34.8 1,448,700 36.0 
Urban-urban 297,000 8.9 506,000 17.2 545,100 13.5 
Rural-urban 348,000 10.5 420,600 14.3 738,400 18.4 
Unknown-urban 118,400 3.6 98,300 3.3 165,200 4.1 
Rural migrants 2,567,700 77.0 1,922,800 65.2 2,677,400 64.0 
Rural-rural 2,086,700 62.6 1,532,900 52 1,645,100 40.9 
Urban-rural 180,400 5.4 278,300 9.4 508,900 12.6 
Unknown-rural 300,600 9.0 111,600 3.8 423,400 10.5 
Source: Pejaranonda et al, 1995 and Vutthisomboon (1998). 
In Thailand, the phenomenon of “human capital drain from rural to urban areas” seems 
to occur as well. Migration streams of migrants can be broken down into six categories, 
including urban-urban, rural-urban, unknown-urban, rural-rural, urban-rural, and 




destination) represents 77, 65.2, and 64 per cent of the total migration streams in the period 
of 1965-70, 1975-80, and 1985-90, respectively. Even though the decline in the number of 
rural migrants can be seen, the majority of the migration streams concentrate in rural 
migrants. In contrast, the rural-urban migration stream keeps increasing during the period 
of 1965–1990. The rural-urban migration flow makes up for 10.5-18.4 per cent. This 
indicates a growing trend of human capital drain from rural to urban areas.  
In terms of education distribution of migrants, Table 2-17 supports the second 
assumption of Schultz (1988). Rural-urban migrants consist of more educated individuals 
than those of rural non-migrant. The majority of rural-urban migrants attain at most 
primary education, which amounts to 59.6 per cent of the rural-urban migration flow, while 
76 per cent of the rural non-migrant population complete only primary education. The 
percentage of persons completes secondary and university of rural-urban migrants (27.4 
per cent and 10.2 per cent, respectively) are higher than those of rural non-migrants (11.7 
and 2.5 per cent, respectively). The flow of rural-urban migrants is dominated by the group 
of more educated individuals. In other words, more educated individuals have higher 
mobility. This pattern can also be observed from each of migration flows, even within 
rural-rural migration stream.  
Taking into account the rural-urban migration, the area-disaggregated estimates suffer 
from a sample selection bias as both assumptions of higher mobility among more educated 
persons and increasing rural-urban migration flow hold true in case of Thailand. The 
previous study from Colombia finds that the estimated returns to rural schooling indicate 
extremely downward bias as there is a large number of rural migrants in Colombia 
(Orazem and King, 2007). On the other hand, Schultz (1998) and Duraisamy (2002) argue 
that the sample selection bias is moderate in Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and India. It is worth 
examining the degree of sample selection by comparing corrected estimated returns to 
schooling with uncorrected ones in the case of Thailand. Nonetheless, with the Labour 
Force Survey data, it is not possible to test these empirical questions but the issues warrant 
further investigation. 
7.1.3.4 Conclusion 
The estimated result shows that returns to schooling in urban areas are greater than 
those of rural areas. This implies that there is an inequality of job opportunities and school 
quality between rural and urban areas, in which better job opportunities and school with 
higher quality tend to concentrate in urban areas. Urban labour market provides more 
sophisticated jobs that need skilled workers than does rural market. Thus, urban individuals 
have more chance to utilise their skills than do those living in rural areas (Warunsiri and 
McNown, 2010). In addition, the lesser quality of schools also contributes to the lower 




Birdsall, 1983).  
Moreover, the estimated result indicates that the ability bias is more dominant in 
rural areas as the bias gap for the rural residents is larger than that of the urban residents. 
This also supports the fact that there is an inequality of opportunity to access education 
between the rural and urban areas, which is consistent with the main IV estimated results 
showing that the urban IV estimate is greater than that of rural areas. The higher ability 
bias in rural samples can be explained by the fact that rural residents have lower 
opportunity to access schooling than do urban residents. The factors contribute to the lower 
opportunity include social discrimination and high poverty. Poor households tend to choose 
only the most-able child to send to school. This is consistent with the ability bias 
hypothesis which argues that more-able individuals are more likely to have higher years of 
schooling. On the other hand, urban households can afford to send their children to schools 
regardless of ability level of their children. Thus, the urban OLS estimates suffer from 
ability bias at a lesser extent than those of the rural sample.  
Table 7-14 Percentage Distribution of Educational Attainment of Populations Aged 
Six Years and Above 
 Migrant Non-migrant Migrant Non-migrant 
Education Urban-Rural Rural-Rural Rural Urban-Urban Rural-Urban Urban 
Males 
      
No Education 3.5 5.6 9.6 3.2 2.5 6.3 
Primary 48.4 71.2 76.0 39.4 59.6 44.4 
Secondary 34.6 18.1 11.7 34.0 27.4 32.6 
University 13.2 4.5 2.5 23.0 10.2 16.3 
Other 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.3 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Females 
      
No Education 7.0 8.9 14.2 4.6 4.1 9.4 
Primary 54.7 73.9 75.8 42.2 63.6 44.4 
Secondary 24.2 12.0 7.8 30.5 21.4 25.4 
University 14.1 5.2 2.2 22.7 10.8 16.0 
Other na na na na 0.1 0.1 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Note: na: not available. 
Source: Author’s compilation adapted from Vutthisomboon (1998) based on data from the National 




7.1.4. Region  
7.1.4.1 Rates of Return to Schooling 
Table 7-15 Disaggregated Analysis of OLS and IV Returns to Schooling by Region 
Dependent Variables OLS IV Bias gap Observations 
Log monthly wages,  0.112*** 0.0856*** 0.0264 1,307,016 
all workers (0.00425) (0.00354)   
Log monthly wages,  0.0956*** 0.0751*** 0.0205 162,399 
BKK (0.00204) (0.00116) 
  
Log monthly wages,  0.124*** 0.0990*** 0.025 256,236 
North (0.00439) (0.00436) 
  
Log monthly wages,  0.140*** 0.0977*** 0.0423 298,137 
Northeast (0.0038) (0.00683) 
  
Log monthly wages,  0.0928*** 0.0733*** 0.0195 222,181 
South (0.00473) (0.00343) 
  
Log monthly wages,  0.0973*** 0.0766*** 0.0207 369,035 
Centre (0.00459) (0.00225) 
  
Notes: The dependent variables are log monthly wages. Each regression includes controls for a birth cohort 
dummies (except for the models with explicit cohort variables), regional dummies (except for the models 
with explicit region variables), and an indicator whether a cohort faced a new compulsory education law (6 
years of compulsory education). Moreover, each model also includes age controls: a quadratic polynomial. 
Each regression includes the sample of 15 to 60 years old from the 1986 through 2012 Labour Force Surveys. 
Data are first aggregated into cell means and weighted by cell size. Regressions are clustered by birth cohort. 
***, **, and * indicate p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.1, respectively. Bias gap refers to the difference between 
OLS estimate and the IV estimate. 
Source: Author’s compilation based on LFS 1986-2012. 
In terms of region, the disaggregation shows the rates of return to education for the 
northern and north eastern regions are higher than those of Bangkok and metropolitan area, 
and the central and southern regions. The OLS coefficients on years of schooling for the 
northern and north eastern regions are 0.124 and 0.140, respectively, while those of IV 
estimation are 0.099 for the North and 0.098 for the North East (Table 7-15). The OLS and 
IV estimates of BKK, the South, and the Centre are on average around 9 per cent and 7 per 
cent, respectively. In all regions, the upward ability bias in the returns to education still 
persists in the disaggregation analysis. This supports the results of standard estimation 
where IV estimates are bigger than OLS estimates.  
Table 7-16 shows a summary of returns to education by region from previous studies. 
The result of this study is qualitatively consistent with those of previous literature. First, 
the previous study from Thailand (Chriswick, 1983) indicates that returns to schooling 
from the northern and north eastern regions are among the highest, at least for urban areas. 
Moreover, the order of the returns to schooling from different regions is similar to that of 




of the South region are the lowest. Second, the study from Canada (Oreopoulos, 2006) 
shows that the rate of returns is around 16 per cent after removing observations from the 
large and developed provinces, namely Quebec and Ontario. Thus, the remaining 
observations are from less developed regions which are comparable to the North and 
Northeast regions in Thailand. In contrast, the rates of return are about 10 per cent after 
removing observations from the Western provinces, which means that the remaining 
observations are from Quebec and Ontario. These two provinces are considered as 
developed provinces which are comparable to Bangkok and metropolitan areas and the 
Central region in Thailand. Hence, the result from Canada indicates that the rates of return 
to schooling from less developed regions are greater than those of more developed regions. 
This is consistent with the finding of this study which indicates that the returns from the 
North and Northeast regions, the least developed and poorest regions, are higher than those 
from the other regions which are relatively more developed.    






Northeast North South Central 
Urban 0.079*** 0.093*** 0.088*** 0.059*** 0.070*** 










0.127 *** 0.166 ** 0.117 ** 0.163 *** 0.102 *** 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.1, respectively. 
Source: Thailand: Chriswick (1983), Canada: Oreopoulos (2006). 
The main puzzle is that returns to schooling are higher in the agriculture-dominated 
North and Northeast than in the regions where non-agricultural opportunities are more 
widely available
30
. According to the cross-country analysis, Psacharopoulos (1981) finds 
that the returns to schooling in developing countries are greater than that of more 
developed countries. The North and the Northeast can be considered as developing 
economies since both are the poorest regions and still mainly depend on agriculture sector 
as a main source of income. Psacharopoulos (1983, 1985), and Montenegro and Patrinos 
(2013) explain the situation in terms of a relative scarcity of human-to-physical capital 
                                                        
30 In fact, the higher average monthly wages are observed in relatively more developed regions, e.g. 
Bangkok and the Central region, rather than those from less developed regions, e.g., the Northeast and North 
regions. It should be noted that the concept of rate of returns is rather relative and the rate of returns refer to 




within the regions. In less developed regions, there is a scarcity of skilled or educated 
labour; therefore, a small group of educated labour can enjoy the rents or education 
premium created from the process of economic expansion. On the other hand, the rents are 
relatively smaller in more developed regions due to a larger supply of educated labour. In 
addition, the scarcity of educated labour in less developed regions is exacerbated by the 
out-migration. In long run, the returns to schooling among different regions will converge 
through the process of labour migration (Psacharopoulos, 1987).        
It seems that the finding from regional disaggregation contradicts that of urban-rural 
disaggregation. The regional rates of return show that less developed regions provide 
higher returns, while the rates of return from urban-rural disaggregation indicate that there 
are higher returns in more developed areas (urban areas). The previous section argues that 
as there are more sophisticated jobs that need skilled workers in the urban labour market 
(more developed area), urban individuals have more chance to utilise their skills than do 
those living in rural areas (Warunsiri and McNown, 2010). Moreover, the higher quality of 
schools in urban areas also contributes to the higher returns to schooling (Behrman and 
Birdsall, 1983). However, the above lines of logic may not apply to the estimates from the 
regional disaggregation 
It is possible that a migration may explain the contradicting patterns between regional 
returns and area of residence’s returns. The migration stream is not simply limited to a 
rural-urban migration but also includes regional migration. The interaction between these 
two dimensions of area and region of residence possibly complicates the estimation. The 
plausible explanation is that the argument used in urban-rural disaggregation is weaker in 
the case of regional disaggregation due to the coexistence of urban and rural areas within 
each region. Even though the Northeast and North regions are the least developed regions 
in Thailand, their urban areas help absorb some of educated labour by providing 
opportunities for more educated workers to work in more sophisticated jobs.  
The higher returns to schooling in North and Northeast regions can be explained by a 
regional migration and a movement of demand for and supply of educated labour. In terms 
of regional mobility, both lifetime and temporary migrants tend to move to Bangkok and 
the Central region (Table 7-17). During 1970-1990, net migration losses are highest in the 
Northeast and the North regions. On the other hand, the Central area, and Bangkok and 
metropolitan areas have the highest net migration gains among all regions. Second, Table 
7-13 illustrates that the migration flow is dominated by the rural-rural and rural-urban 
migration streams. Although the decline in the number of rural migrants can be seen, the 
majority of the migration streams still concentrate in rural migrants. On the other hand, the 
rural-urban migration flow makes up around 10.5-18.4 per cent during the same period. It 
seems that the interregional migration flows from the Northeast and North regions to 




significant than the rural-urban migration flows. This implies that there is an increase in the 
supply of educated labour in regions absorbing educated migrants, mainly in rural areas. 
This increasing supply leads to a reduction of rents or education premium used to be 
enjoyed by a smaller group of educated workers in those migrants-absorbing regions. Thus, 
a decline of returns to schooling can be seen in those regions, including Bangkok, the 
Central region and the South region. In contrast, outmigration reduces the supply of 
educated labour in the Northeast and North regions. Hence, a small group of educated 
population who keep working in the regions from which migration is originated can enjoy 
higher rents or surplus earnings created by urban development in those regions. An 
increase in returns to schooling can be observed. In sum, the rate of returns to schooling in 
the North and Northeast regions are higher than those of other regions owing to the 
migration and the interaction of demand and supply within each region. 
Table 7-17 Regional Net Gains and Losses from Five-year Migration 1955-1990 
Current residence Total 
Region of Previous Residence 
Bangkok Central North Northeast South 
1955-60 
      
Bangkok 67,045 
 
41,208 5,047 17,855 2,935 
Central -46,643 -41,208 
 
-14,710 15,102 -5,827 
North 30,134 -5,047 14,710 
 
21,106 -635 
Northeast -59,809 -17,855 -15,102 -21,106 
 
-5,746 
South 9,273 -2,935 5,827 635 5,746 
 
1965-70 
      
Bangkok 168,863 
 
83,358 21,909 43,221 20,375 
Central -80,370 -83,358 
 
-10,804 17,290 -3,498 
North 6,340 -21,909 10,804 
 
17,790 -345 
Northeast -85,006 -43,221 -17,290 -17,790 
 
-6,705 
South -9,827 -20,375 3,498 345 6,705 
 
1975-80 
      
Bangkok 170,400 
 
29,042 22,233 99,602 19,523 
Central 49,454 -29,042 
 
14,981 63,748 -233 
North -17,713 -22,233 -14,981 
 
23,120 -3,619 
Northeast -194,815 -99,602 -63,748 -23,120 
 
-8,345 
South -7,326 -19,523 233 3,619 8,345 
 
1985-90 
      
Bangkok 365,900 
 
500 65,800 261,100 38,500 
Central 293,400 -500 
 
42,500 246,900 4,500 
North -89,300 -65,800 -42,500 
 
26,800 -7,800 
Northeast -553,700 -261,100 -246,900 -26,800 
 
-18,900 
South -16,300 -38,500 -4,500 7,800 18,900 
 
Source: Vutthisomboon (1998) based on 1955-60, 1965-70 and 1975-80 data from Goldstein and Goldstein 




7.1.4.2 Ability Bias (Bias Gap) 
According to Table 7-15, the bias gap of the North East and the North are about 4 and 2.5 
per cent, respectively, whereas those of other regions are approximately 2 per cent. The ability 
bias is more dominant in the North East and the North. This implies that the problem of 
inequality of opportunity in access to education is more prevalent in the northeast and 
northern regions where the economic and educational systems are less developed.   
 The Northeast and the North share similar social and economic characteristics. First, both 
regions are agriculture-dominated and considered to be least developed among all regions. A 
high poverty rate is also observed in both regions. During the structural transformation, the 
Government put more emphasis on the industrial sector concentrated in the Central area, the 
South, and Bangkok and metropolitan areas. Similar to most industrialisation process in other 
countries, the industrial sector is developed at the expense of the agricultural sector. As these 
two regions are mainly agriculture-based, less development budget and effort from the 
Government is allocated to develop basic infrastructure and transportation system. Thus, basic 
infrastructure and transportation system lag behind those of other regions. In terms of 
education, the Government implements educational development plan to prepare a supply of 
skilled workers since it foresees a large increase in a demand during the industrialisation. 
Even though the Government has a duty to provide a universal compulsory education 
throughout the country, priorities are given to certain regions due to limited Government 
budget and a fast-growing demand for skilled labour in those regions. As the industrial sector 
is mainly developed outside the North and the Northeast, the pilot education expansion 
project is implemented first in the Central and the South regions. As a result, northern and 
north eastern households have relatively limited access to schools. Moreover, the problem is 
aggravated by the undeveloped basic infrastructure which increases the indirect cost of 
schooling. For all discussed reasons, northern and north eastern households face higher direct 
and indirect costs of attending school than do residents from other regions.  
 The OLS estimates from the Northeast and the North possibly suffer from ability bias due 
to high poverty and high costs of attending school. In less developed regions, a majority of 
households are under a tight financial constraint and may not be able to afford education for 
every child in their households. There is a high possibility that only more-able children are 
likely to be enrolled in schools. This leads to the fact that schools tend to be crowded with 
more-able students. Hence, an upward ability bias in returns to schooling is relatively greater 
in less developed economies. This is consistent with the ability bias hypothesis arguing that 
more-able individuals are more likely to attain more years of schooling and the argument 





7.1.4.3 Selection Bias 
One concern regarding the region disaggregated analysis is that the analysis may face a 
similar problem of selection bias as does the area of residence disaggregated analysis 
(urban-rural). A potential selection bias may occur from interregional migration. In general, 
better educated individuals tend to migrate from less developed regions to more developed 
regions due to higher real wages and better job opportunities. This is similar to the case of 
rural-urban migration which human capital drain from rural to urban areas can be observed. 
Hence, the estimated rates of return of more developed regions do not purely represent the 
“real” rates of return as they also reflect immigrants’ rates of return. Without migration, the 
“real” rates of return to schooling in more developed regions should be higher than the 
estimated rates since domestic workers can enjoy higher rents from disequilibrium between 
demand for and supply of educated workers. With immigration of educated workers, the rents 
or education premium from disequilibrium is smaller due to an increase in the supply of 
educated workers. In contrast, the “real” rates of return to schooling in less developed regions 
should be lower than the estimated rate since there is less demand for educated workers in less 
developed regions. Given that there is no migration, they enjoy much smaller rents than those 
from more developed regions. However, the sample selection bias due to interregional 
migration is possibly smaller since there is absorption of educated workers to urban areas 
within each region. This intraregional migration helps relieve the influx of educated workers 
into more developed regions.   
7.1.4.4 Conclusion 
The estimated result indicates that returns to schooling in less developed regions, namely 
the North and the Northeast, are greater than those of more developed regions, e.g. Bangkok 
and metropolitan areas. This contradicts the finding from urban-rural disaggregation. The 
main puzzle is that returns to schooling are higher in the agriculture-dominated North and 
Northeast than in the regions where non-agricultural opportunities are more widely available. 
It is possible that a migration may explain the contradicting patterns between the regional 
rates of return and the area of residence’s rates of return. The higher returns to schooling in 
the North and the Northeast regions can be explained by a regional migration and a movement 
of demand for and supply of educated labour. The interregional migration flows from the 
Northeast and the North regions to the other regions lead to an increase in the supply of 
educated labour and, in turn, a reduction of rents or education premium used to be enjoyed by 
a smaller group of educated workers in regions that absorb educated migrants. Thus, a decline 
of returns to schooling can be seen in those regions, including Bangkok, the Central region 
and the South region. In contrast, outmigration reduces the supply of educated labour in the 




in both regions. In addition, the estimated result suggests that there is an inequality of job 
opportunities and access to schooling across regions.  
Furthermore, the estimated result indicates that the ability bias is more dominant in the 
Northeast and the North regions as the bias gaps for these two regions are larger than those for 
the other regions. The higher ability bias in estimates from less developed regions can be 
explained by the fact that residents of those regions have lower opportunity to access to 
schooling than do residents from more developed regions since northern and north eastern 
households face higher direct and indirect costs of attending school. Thus, in less developed 
regions most households are under poverty and may not be able to afford education for every 
child in their households. There is a possibility that only more-able children are likely to be 
enrolled in schools, which is consistent with the ability bias hypothesis arguing that more-able 
individuals are more likely to attain more years of schooling. On the other hand, households 
from more developed regions can afford to send their children to schools regardless of 
children’s ability. Thus, the OLS estimates from more developed regions suffer from ability 
bias at a lesser extent than those of less developed regions. In conclusion, an upward ability 
bias in returns to schooling is relatively greater in less developed economies. This finding also 




7.1.5. Economic Sector 
7.1.5.1 Rates of Return to Schooling 
Table 7-18 Disaggregated Analysis of OLS and IV Returns to Schooling by Industrial 
Sector 
Dependent Variables OLS IV Bias gap Observations 
Log monthly wages,  0.112*** 0.0856*** 0.0264 1,307,016 
all workers (0.00425) (0.00354) 
  
Log monthly wages,   0.101*** 0.0590*** 0.042 428,699 
Agricultural sector (0.00479) (0.0044) 
  
Log monthly wages,  0.0936*** 0.0706*** 0.023 238,274 
Manufacturing sector  (0.00468) (0.00285) 
  
Log monthly wages,  0.102*** 0.0825*** 0.0195 637,105 
Service sector (0.00325) (0.00078) 
  
Notes: The dependent variables are log monthly wages. Each regression includes controls for a birth cohort 
dummies (except for the models with explicit cohort variables), regional dummies (except for the models with 
explicit region variables), and an indicator whether a cohort faced a new compulsory education law (6 years of 
compulsory education). Moreover, each model also includes age controls: a quadratic polynomial. Each 
regression includes the sample of 15 to 60 years old from the 1986 through 2012 Labour Force Surveys. Data are 
first aggregated into cell means and weighted by cell size. Regressions are clustered by birth cohort. ***, **, and 
* indicate p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.1, respectively. Bias gap refers to the difference between OLS estimate 
and the IV estimate. 
Source: Author’s compilation based on LFS 1986-2012. 
In terms of economic sector, the OLS coefficients on years of schooling for agricultural 
workers, manufacturing workers, and service workers are approximately 0.10, 0.09, and 0.10, 
respectively, while those of IV estimation are about 0.06, 0.07, and 0.08, respectively (Table 
7-18)
31
. The difference between the estimated returns to schooling for the agricultural sector 
and the service sector is the largest, which is approximately 2 per cent, while the difference 
between other estimated returns is around 1 per cent. In each subsample of different economic 
sectors, there exists the upward ability bias which OLS estimates are higher than those of IV. 
Moreover, the returns to schooling are lowest in the agricultural sector, but highest in the 
service sector. This supports the results of standard estimation and implies that there is 
inequality of job opportunities across different economic sectors since each economic sector 
provides different degree of returns to schooling. Better job opportunities tend to be available 
in service and manufacturing sectors in which modern education matters in developing 
workers’ skills related to their work.  
                                                        
31  Agricultural sector includes agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing, mining, and quarrying, while 
manufacturing sector refers to electricity, gas and water supply, construction, and general manufacturing, e.g.  
food products and beverages, tobacco products, textiles, to name a few. in addition, service sector consists of 
wholesale and retail trade; repair of  motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal and household goods; hotels and 
restaurants; transport, storage and communication; financial intermediation; real estate, renting and business 
activities; public administration and defence; compulsory social security; education; health and social work; 




The higher returns to schooling in the manufacture and the service sectors can be 
explained by the fact that most of sophisticated jobs concentrate in these two economic 
sectors. This is similar to the line of logic explaining the higher estimated returns in urban 
areas. As jobs in the manufacture and the service sectors are mainly characterised as relatively 
more sophisticated jobs that need skilled workers, workers in these sectors have more chance 
to utilise their skills and knowledge gained from schooling than do those working in the 
agricultural sector. On the other hand, traditional jobs in the agricultural sector require less 
skill and education. Educated workers cannot exploit their skills honed through higher 
education. The conventional wisdom is that education is not important in traditional 
agriculture and education matters in agriculture only when there is new agricultural 
technology or knowledge to learn from (Schultz, 1964). In other words, human capital is more 
important for productivity growth in the modern sector rather than the traditional sector. It is 
usually found that education helps workers in the modern agricultural sector respond faster to 
the new technology, including new seeds, cultivating techniques, fertilizers, and animal breeds 
(Welch, 1970; Huffman, 1977; Besley and Case, 1993; Foster and Rosenzweig, 1996, 2004; 
Abdulai and Huffman, 2005). The result implies that there is an inequality of job 
opportunities across different economic sectors. Better job opportunities mostly concentrate in 
the service sector, whereas the agriculture sector provides the least job opportunities in terms 
of returns to schooling and opportunity to exploit skills learnt from higher level of education.    
Table 7-19 Total Factor Productivity Growth by Sectors, 1980 to 2002 
Average Growth Rates  
(Per Cent Per Annum) 
Aggregate Agriculture Manufacture Services 
Output 6.01 2.64 8.09 5.53 
Raw Labour 2.19 1.50 5.25 3.47 
Human Capital 2.49 9.43 11.35 6.90 
Physical Capital 9.05 8.50 13.84 18.47 
Agricultural Land 1.12 1.12 0 0 
Source: Author’s compilation adjusted from Warr (2011) based on data from National Economic and Social 
Development Board. 
There is evidence to show that Thailand also follows the pattern explained above. In 
Thailand, the agricultural sector is rather backward and traditional since farmers are slow to 
adopt new cultivating technology and there is less support from the Government. First, during 
the period of social and economic transformation, the agricultural growth is solely driven by 
expanding cultivated areas (Siriprachai, 2009) rather than utilising agricultural technology 
advancement. Land productivity remains very low and stable, while labour productivity 
increases substantially (James, et al., 1987; Timmer, 1991; Watanabe, 1992). An increase in 




observed that the output growth from the agricultural sector (2.64 per cent) is lower than those 
from the manufacture and the service sectors, 8.09 and 5.53 per cent, respectively (Table 
7-19). Second, there has been insufficient attention from the Government to invest in research 
and development regarding domestic agricultural technology. As a result, farmers still use the 
same traditional technology in cultivation. The significance of the agricultural sector has been 
declining since 1970s, while the manufacture and the service sectors have been growing 
(Figure 2-4). During the period of industrialisation, the Government budget is mainly 
distributed to the manufacturing sector; therefore, it is argued that the industrial sector is 
developed at the expense of the agricultural sector. This directly affects the growth of 
agricultural sector. Some may argue that even without domestic research and development it 
is still possible to utilise agricultural technology from abroad. However, Siamwalla (1996) 
argues that those imported agricultural technology cannot be directly applied to Thai 
agricultural sector without necessary adjustments owing to different physical and economic 
environment in Thailand. Without technical assistance from the Government, Thai farmers 
cannot develop or even adopt new agricultural technology in their cultivation. In sum, it can 
be concluded that Thai agricultural sector is rather traditional and backward; therefore, 
workers in the agricultural sector possibly marginally benefit from a modern education. As 
argued by Schultz (1964), education is not important in traditional agriculture and education 
matters in agriculture only when there is new agricultural technology or knowledge to learn 
from. 
In addition, the higher returns to schooling in the service sector may also possibly be 
explained by the interaction between the demand for and supply of high skilled and educated 
workers during the early period of economic and social development. Service workers are 
required to possess relatively higher skills and knowledge than those from other sectors, 
especially those from the agricultural sector. During the structural transformation period, a 
rapid growth of technology advancement causes excess demand for high skilled labour and 
excess supply of unskilled labour. These characteristics of early economic development may 
well explain the situation in which the returns to schooling for manufacturing and service 
workers are higher than those of the agricultural sector. Excess demand for high skilled labour 
creates rents or education premium in the manufacturing and the service sectors to a small 
group of high skilled labour (more educated labour) to enjoy. On the other hand, excess 
supply of lower skilled labour reduces education premium in the agricultural sector. Hence, 
the rate of return to schooling is highest in the service sector in which workers can enjoy the 
education premium due to the scarcity of high skilled labour supply. In contrast, the lowest 
returns to schooling would be expected to observe in the agricultural sector where education 




7.1.5.2 Ability Bias (Bias Gap) 
 Table 7-18 shows that the bias gap of the agricultural sector is 0.042, while those of the 
manufacture and the service sectors are 0.023 and 0.020, respectively. The result indicates that 
the ability bias is most dominant in the agricultural sector. This implies that there is an 
inequality of opportunity in access to education across different economic sectors.  
 Inequality of access to education across different economic sectors seems to be 
influenced by other individual characteristics rather than economic sector itself. As ability 
bias hypothesis argues that more-able individuals tend to attain more schooling, it implies that 
ability bias is determined when individuals are still at school age (long before entering labour 
market). Individual characteristics, e.g. gender, area of residence, and cohort, influence 
households’ decision making whether to send their children to school. In contrast, economic 
sector is a characteristic assigned to individuals after entering a labour market; therefore, it 
cannot be considered as one of the determinants of ability bias. However, in the context of 
disaggregated analysis by economic sector, area of residence chiefly explains ability bias 
within each economic sector. Table 7-20 shows that workers from different economic sectors 
seem to have a clear pattern of residence and working area. Agricultural workers tend to live 
and work in rural areas, while a majority of workers from manufacture and service sectors 
concentrate in urban areas. On the other hand, a specific pattern of gender or cohort for 
different economic sectors cannot be observed as the proportion of each gender and each 
cohort is similar across different sectors.   
 The same argument used to explain the higher rural ability bias may also explain the 
situation which the bias gap in the agricultural sector is the highest among all economic 
sectors. Workers from different sectors follow a certain pattern of location of habitation. In 
general, a majority of wage farmers live and work in rural areas. As Thai agricultural sector is 
very labour-intensive and family-oriented, workers in agricultural sector are usually from 
poor farmer households. They either have their own land to cultivate or serve as employees 
for other farmer households who own cultivating land. Those who serve as wage employees 
are from poorer families residing in rural areas, whereas a majority of workers in 
manufacturing and service sector are mainly from urban areas (Table 7-20). Agricultural 
wage workers who mainly reside in rural areas have limited access to schools because most 
schools are concentrated in urban areas during the early period of social and economic 
development. Moreover, transportation system and basic infrastructure such as roads are still 
under development. This contributes to a higher cost of attending school. Aside from the 
limited access to school, agricultural workers tend to be poorer than those working in other 
sectors. Table 7-21 indicates that agricultural workers earn the least among all sectors. 
During the period of industrialisation, the significance of agricultural sector has been 
declining, while the manufacturing and service sectors have been growing. It is argued that 




income level of agricultural workers. Moreover, a large supply of unskilled labour in 
agricultural sector also drives the equilibrium wage downward. Due to higher costs of 
education and lower wages, agricultural households inevitably have to choose only one child 
or few children to study at schools. It is often the case that parents make their judgment based 
on children’s ability. The most-able children are more likely to be selected to get proper 
education at schools. This is consistent with the ability bias hypothesis arguing that more-able 
individuals are more likely to have higher years of schooling. On the other hand, other sectors’ 
workers who tend to live in urban areas have better access to schooling and are less credit 
constrained. Those workers can afford to send their children to schools regardless of ability 
level of their children. Hence, it can be observed that the ability bias is more dominant in the 
OLS estimates from agricultural sector than those from other sectors through the effect of 
residence area.   
Table 7-20 Percentage of Workers in Different Economic Sectors by Areas of Residence 
Economic Sector 
Areas of Residence 
Rural Urban 
Agriculture 54.76 45.24 
Manufacture 38.58 61.42 
Service 36.93 63.07 
Source: Author’s compilation based on LFS 1986-2012. 
Table 7-21 Average Monthly Wages by Economic Sectors  




Source: Author’s compilation based on LFS 1986-2012. 
7.1.5.4 Conclusion 
In terms of economic sector, the returns to schooling in the manufacture and the service 
sectors are higher than those of the agricultural sector since there are more sophisticated jobs 
in these two sectors. Hence, better job opportunities are available in the service and 
manufacture sectors which a modern education matters. On the contrary, traditional jobs in the 
agricultural sector require less skill and education; therefore, educated workers cannot exploit 
their skills honed through the modern education. The conventional wisdom is that education is 
not important in traditional agriculture and education matters in agriculture only when there is 
new agricultural technology or knowledge to learn from (Schultz, 1964).    
In addition, the estimated result indicates that the ability bias is more dominant in less 
developed economic sector. The ability bias is largest in the agricultural sector and narrowest 




disaggregated analysis of economic sector. The reason is that ability bias is determined when 
individuals are still at school age, but economic sector is a characteristic assigned to 
individuals after entering a labour market. Inequality of access to education across different 
economic sectors can be explained by other individual characteristics rather than economic 
sector itself. It can be observed that workers from different economic sectors have a clear 
pattern of residence and working area. Agricultural workers tend to live and work in rural 
areas, while a majority of workers from manufacture and service sectors concentrate in urban 
areas. It is possible to utilise the same argument used to explain the urban-rural ability bias in 
the discussion of the bias gap of different economic sectors. Due to higher costs of education 
and lower wages in rural areas, agricultural households tend to choose only the most-able 
children to send to school. This is consistent with the ability bias hypothesis which argues that 
more-able individuals are more likely to have higher years of schooling. Other sectors’ 
workers who tend to live in urban areas have better access to schooling and are less credit 
constrained. Those workers can afford to send their children to schools regardless of ability 
level of their children. Thus, the OLS estimates from the manufacture and the service sectors 





With disaggregation by different demographic characteristics, the OLS estimates are 
greater than those of IV; therefore, the upward ability bias still persists even after estimating 
the rate of returns to schooling with different subsamples. This is consistent with the result 
from the standard estimation presented in Chapter 6.  
Table 7-22 Summary of One-Level Disaggregated Results 
 
Rate of Returns Bias Gap 
Gender Female > Male Female > Male 
Cohort Older cohort > Younger cohort Older cohort > Younger cohort 
Area Urban > Rural Rural > Urban 
Region North, Northeast > Others Northeast, North > Others 
Economic 
Sector 
Service > Manufacture > Agriculture Agriculture> Manufacture > Service 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
Table 7-22 summarises the results from the one-level disaggregated estimations with 
different subsamples stratified by gender, cohort, area of residence, region, and economic 
sector. First, in terms of gender, the rate of returns to schooling is marginally higher for 
women than for men. This implies a movement towards gender equality in access to education 
and also labour market in Thailand. Second, regarding the cohort disaggregation, the rate of 
returns is also marginally greater in the older than the younger generations. This is explained 
by different stages of economic development to which each generation belongs. At early 
stages of development, a rapid economic expansion creates rents or surplus earnings for a 
small proportion of educated population to enjoy (Psacharopoulos, 2011). Educated workers 
can enjoy new rents created by the new demand. As a consequence, the expansion of 
education produces a supply of educated workers to meet a demand for educated workers. 
Therefore, the rents are eliminated. As the process of economic development deepens, it is 
also possible that the rate of returns remains constant if the demand keeps pace with the 
increasing supply. Third, the urban rate of returns exceeds that of rural areas due to 
availability of more sophisticated jobs that need skilled workers in the urban labour market 
and higher quality of schools in urban areas. Urban individuals have more chance to utilise 
their skills acquired from better quality schools than do those living in rural areas (Behrman 
and Birdsall, 1983; Warunsiri and McNown, 2010). Fourth, in terms of regional 
disaggregation, the higher returns to schooling in least developed regions, the Northeast and 
the North regions, can be explained by a regional migration and a movement of demand for 
and supply of educated labour. The dominant effect of the interregional migration flows from 
the Northeast and the North regions to Bangkok, the Central, and South regions leads to an 
increase in the supply of educated labour and a reduction of returns to schooling in those 




the Northeast and the North regions; therefore, returns to schooling increase in those regions. 
Finally, an excess demand for high skilled labour in the early stage of economic development 
creates rents or education premium in the manufacturing and the service sector to a small 
group of more educated labour to enjoy. Hence, the rate of returns to schooling is higher in the 
service and the manufacturing sectors, while the lowest returns to schooling would be 
expected to observe in the agricultural sector. Moreover, the higher returns to schooling in 
manufacturing and service sectors can be explained by the relevancy of modern education to 
job description in those sectors. Workers have more chance to exploit their skills learnt from 
modern school in more developed sector, while there is less chance to apply the modern 
knowledge in a sector such as agriculture in which technology is still traditional and 
backward.  
Table 7-22 also reports the bias gap from the one-level disaggregated analysis. First, 
even though the magnitude of the difference between male and female bias gap is small, it 
seems that the ability bias is more dominant for women. In the early stage of social and 
economic development, market distortions such as gender discrimination prevent women to 
attend schools. Hence, only women with higher ability and better family background are 
given an opportunity to attend schools. This is consistent with the ability bias hypothesis 
which states that more-able individuals are more likely to attain more years of schooling. 
However, the estimated result also implies that there is a trend towards equal educational 
opportunity between women and men as the differences of the estimated returns to schooling 
and the bias gaps between women and men is substantially small. Second, the ability bias is 
more dominant in the OLS estimates of the older generation. At the early stage of 
development, poverty and low standard of living influence household’s decision making in 
sending their children to schools. It is likely that most of households may have to select only 
the most-able children to study at school due to the high direct and indirect costs of schooling 
and demand for household labour. Third, in terms of area of residence, the estimated result 
indicates that the ability bias is more dominant in rural areas. Similar results can be observed 
in disaggregated analysis by region and economic sector. The estimated results show that the 
ability bias is more dominant in the North East and the North regions, the least developed 
regions in Thailand, and in the agricultural sector, least developed economic sector both in 
terms of output growth and technology. The common characteristic is the stage of 
development of each unit, namely area, region, and economic sector. Less social and 
economic development implies higher bias gap or higher ability bias in the OLS estimates. A 
similar line of reasoning explained the ability bias in cohort disaggregated analysis can be 
applied to disaggregated analyses by area of residence, region, and economic sector. With less 
educational opportunity and high poverty, households tend to choose only the most-able 




household. This is consistent with the ability bias hypothesis arguing that more-able 
individuals tend to have higher education.   
 
In conclusion, with the disaggregated analyses by different demographic characteristics, it 
is generally observed higher returns to schooling for women, older cohort, urban area, the 
North and the Northeast regions, and service sector. These results can be explained in the 
context of Thai development process. In addition, higher bias gap is prevalent in subsamples 
of women, older cohort, rural area, the North and the Northeast regions, and agricultural 
sector. Again, income and educational opportunity inequality during the early period of social 
and economic development help explain the higher bias gap in those socially disadvantaged 
groups. With less educational opportunity and high poverty, socially disadvantaged 
households tend to choose only most-able children to send to school since they cannot bear 
costs of education for all children in the household. This is consistent with the general ability 




Section 2. TWO-LEVEL DISAGGREGATED ANALYSIS 
A two-level disaggregated analysis refers to an estimation based on different 
combinations of two demographic characteristics, e.g., gender-cohort, gender-region, 
cohort-industry, to name a few (Table 7-23). As each individual possesses multiple 
characteristics with different levels of return to schooling, interactions between different 
demographic characteristics in the two-level disaggregated analysis provide a better 
understanding towards the issue of heterogeneity in educational returns across individuals. 
Some of the estimates are relatively smaller or higher than those of the main results, but still 
comparable. In summary, the overall results are consistent with the results from the main 
analysis in which the upward bias in cross-sectional OLS regressions can be observed, and the 
ability bias is still dominant in the disaggregated results
32
. Some estimates from gender and 
region disaggregation with other characteristics show contradictions with the main results. 
Hence, results from two-level disaggregated analysis by gender and region with other 
demographic characteristics are discussed in this section (Table 7-23). The full estimated 
results of two-level disaggregated analyses of other demographic characteristics are provided 
in the Appendix IV.   
Table 7-23 Analytical Matrix of Two-Level Disaggregated Analysis 






















Note:   "2.x" refers to two-level disaggregated analysis. 
"See" represents an overlapping section. 
"na" means not available due to the fact that the results are not significantly different from the main 
results; they are consistent with the main results; or they are already discussed in the one-level 
disaggregated analysis. 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
                                                        




7.2.1. Gender  
7.2.1.1 Gender-Area of Residence 
Table 7-24 Two-Level Disaggregated Analysis of OLS and IV Returns to Schooling by 
Gender and Area of Residence  
Dependent Variables OLS IV Bias Gap Observations 
Base Model     
Log monthly wages,  0.112*** 0.0856*** 0.0264 1,307,016 
all workers (0.00425) (0.00354) 
  
Gender     
Log monthly wages,  0.108*** 0.0808*** 0.0272 662,753 
Male (0.00439) (0.00374) 
  
Log monthly wages,  0.116*** 0.0856*** 0.0304 644,263 
Female (0.00391) (0.00367) 
  
Area of Residence     
Log monthly wages,  0.108*** 0.0849*** 0.0231 856,617 
Urban (0.00369) (0.00169)   
Log monthly wages,  0.105*** 0.0709*** 0.0341 450,399 
Rural (0.0053) (0.00622)   
Gender and Area of Residence     
Log monthly wages, urban male  0.102*** 0.0776*** 0.0244 424,146 
 (0.00354) (0.00192) 
 
 
Log monthly wages, rural male  0.101*** 0.0687*** 0.0323 238,607 
 (0.00581) (0.00657) 
 
 
Log monthly wages, urban female  0.113*** 0.0871*** 0.0259 432,471 
 (0.00360) (0.00210) 
 
 
Log monthly wages, rural female  0.106*** 0.0668*** 0.0392 211,792 
 (0.00440) (0.00613) 
 
 
Notes: The dependent variables are log monthly wages. Each regression includes controls for a birth cohort 
dummies (except for the models with explicit cohort variables), regional dummies (except for the models with 
explicit region variables), and an indicator whether a cohort faced a new compulsory education law (6 years of 
compulsory education). Moreover, each model also includes age controls: a quadratic polynomial. Each 
regression includes the sample of 15 to 60 years old from the 1986 through 2012 Labour Force Surveys. Data are 
first aggregated into cell means and weighted by cell size. Regressions are clustered by birth cohort. ***, **, and 
* indicate p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.1, respectively. Bias gap refers to the difference between OLS estimate 
and the IV estimate. 
Source: Author’s compilation based on LFS 1986-2012. 
Regarding gender and area of residence, the OLS coefficients on years of schooling for 
each subsample are approximately 0.10-0.11, while those of IV estimation are around 
0.067-0.087. The magnitude of OLS and IV coefficients is consistent with those from the 
one-level analysis. The OLS estimates are greater than those of IV; therefore, the upward 
ability bias still persists in the estimates from two-level analysis by gender and area of 
residence. Regardless of gender, the result shows that the urban estimated returns are higher 
than those of the rural estimation. This pattern follows the estimated result of the one-level 




workers than does the rural market, urban individuals have more chance to utilise their skills 
honed from the modern education (Warunsiri and McNown, 2010). However, comparing the 
results between women and men in the same area of residence, the result shows a 
contradicting pattern. While the returns from urban women are greater than those of urban 
men, rural women have smaller returns to schooling than those of rural men (0.0668 < 
0.0687). Overall, most of the estimates and all bias gaps of disaggregated analysis are 
consistent with those of the standard estimates (the first row of Table 7-24). Considering the 
area of residence, it seems that a tendency of gender equality in access to education and 
labour market between women and men is higher in rural areas. The magnitude of estimated 
returns between women and men are fairly similar.  
7.2.1.2 Gender-Region 
In terms of gender and region, the overall estimates of returns to schooling and the bias 
gaps of disaggregated analysis are consistent with those of the standard estimates and the 
estimates from one-level disaggregated analysis (Table 7-25). Regardless of gender, the OLS 
and IV estimated results show that the returns to schooling for the North and the Northeast 
regions are the highest among all regions. This pattern can be found in the main estimated 
result and also the results from one-level aggregated analysis by region. The higher returns to 
schooling in the North and the Northeast regions can be explained by a regional migration and 
a movement of demand for and supply of educated labour. Outmigration reduces the supply of 
educated labour in the Northeast and the North regions; therefore, there is an increase of rents 
or education premium enjoyed by a smaller group of educated workers in both regions. On the 
other hand, regardless of region, most of the OLS and IV estimates of the returns to schooling 
for women exceed those of men. This is consistent with the main results and implies that 
women face higher opportunity costs in attaining education. This is possibly due to the gender 
discrimination practice during the early period of social and economic development. 
Moreover, the estimated result shows that women have a higher bias gap than that of men. 
This implies that the ability bias is more dominant in the female OLS estimates since gender 
discrimination causes a situation in which only more-able women can obtain higher level of 
education.  
 However, comparing the results between women and men in the North and the Central 
regions, the estimated results show a contradicting finding against the overall estimates. In 
both regions, the results show that the estimated returns to schooling are higher for men. In 
contrast, without considering the region, the results indicate that female returns are greater 
than those of men. This contradicting pattern may indicate that there is a higher tendency of 
gender equality in access to education and labour market between women and men in the 
North and the Central regions as the magnitude of estimated returns between women and men 
are very similar. It is worth noting that the disaggregated analyses suffer from a selection bias 








Table 7-25 Two-Level Disaggregated Analysis of OLS and IV Returns to Schooling by Gender and 
Region 
Dependent Variables OLS IV Bias 
gap 
Observations 
Base model     
Log monthly wages,  0.112*** 0.0856*** 0.0264 1,307,016 
all workers (0.00425) (0.00354) 
  
Gender     
Log monthly wages,  0.108*** 0.0808*** 0.0272 662,753 
male (0.00439) (0.00374) 
  
Log monthly wages,  0.116*** 0.0856*** 0.0304 644,263 
female (0.00391) (0.00367) 
  
Region     
Log monthly wages, 0.0956*** 0.0751*** 0.0205 162,399 
BKK (0.00204) (0.00116)   
Log monthly wages, 0.124*** 0.0990*** 0.025 256,236 
North (0.00439) (0.00436)   
Log monthly wages, 0.140*** 0.0977*** 0.0423 298,137 
Northeast (0.0038) (0.00683)   
Log monthly wages, 0.0928*** 0.0733*** 0.0195 222,181 
South (0.00473) (0.00343)   
Log monthly wages, 0.0973*** 0.0766*** 0.0207 369,035 
Centre (0.00459) (0.00225)   
Gender and Region     
Log monthly wages, male  0.0945*** 0.0656*** 0.0289 82,071 
Bangkok and Metropolitan (0.00214) (0.00261) 
 
 
Log monthly wages, male  0.121*** 0.101*** 0.02 126,355 
Northern area (0.00458) (0.00604) 
 
 
Log monthly wages, male  0.131*** 0.0871*** 0.0439 151,593 
North eastern area (0.00401) (0.00425) 
 
 
Log monthly wages, male  0.0862*** 0.0659*** 0.0203 116,980 
Southern area (0.00503) (0.00500) 
 
 
Log monthly wages, male  0.0959*** 0.0750*** 0.0209 186,181 
Central area (0.00462) (0.00324) 
 
 
Log monthly wages, female  0.0968*** 0.0796*** 0.0172 80,328 
Bangkok and Metropolitan (0.00195) (0.00118) 
 
 
Log monthly wages, female  0.125*** 0.0938*** 0.0312 129,881 
Northern area (0.00414) (0.00459) 
 
 
Log monthly wages, female  0.148*** 0.101*** 0.047 146,544 
North eastern area (0.00366) (0.0101) 
 
 
Log monthly wages, female  0.0998*** 0.0774*** 0.0224 105,201 
Southern area (0.00422) (0.00273) 
 
 
Log monthly wages, female  0.0981*** 0.0738*** 0.0243 182,854 
Central area (0.00435) (0.00232) 
 
 
Notes: The dependent variables are log monthly wages. Each regression includes controls for a birth cohort dummies (except for the models 
with explicit cohort variables), regional dummies (except for the models with explicit region variables), and an indicator whether a cohort faced 
a new compulsory education law (6 years of compulsory education). Moreover, each model also includes age controls: a quadratic polynomial. 
Each regression includes the sample of 15 to 60 years old from the 1986 through 2012 Labour Force Surveys. Data are first aggregated into cell 
means and weighted by cell size. Regressions are clustered by birth cohort. ***, **, and * indicate p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.1, respectively. 
Bias gap refers to the difference between OLS estimate and the IV estimate. 




7.2.1.3 Gender-Economic Sector 
Table 7-26 Two-Level Disaggregated Analysis of OLS and IV Returns to Schooling by 
Gender and Economic Sector  
Dependent Variables OLS IV Bias gap Observations 
Base model     
Log monthly wages,  0.112*** 0.0856*** 0.0264 1,307,016 
all workers (0.00425) (0.00354) 
  
Gender     
Log monthly wages,  0.108*** 0.0808*** 0.0272 662,753 
Male (0.00439) (0.00374) 
  
Log monthly wages,  0.116*** 0.0856*** 0.0304 644,263 
Female (0.00391) (0.00367) 
  
Economic Sector     
Log monthly wages,   0.101*** 0.0590*** 0.042 428,699 
Agricultural sector (0.00479) (0.0044)   
Log monthly wages,  0.0936*** 0.0706*** 0.023 238,274 
Manufacturing sector  (0.00468) (0.00285)   
Log monthly wages,  0.102*** 0.0825*** 0.0195 637,105 
Service sector (0.00325) (0.00078)   
Gender and Economic Sector     
Log monthly wages, male  0.0944*** 0.0596*** 0.0348 230,334 
agricultural and elementary workers (0.00488) (0.00381)   
Log monthly wages, male 0.0990*** 0.0687*** 0.0303 138,554 
non-agricultural manual workers (0.00522) (0.00284)   
Log monthly wages, male 0.0903*** 0.0709*** 0.0194 293,022 
desk, service, and intellectual workers (0.00290) (0.00126)   
Log monthly wages, female  0.104*** 0.0476*** 0.0564 198,365 
agricultural and elementary workers (0.00437) (0.00514)   
Log monthly wages, female 0.0831*** 0.0675*** 0.0156 99,720 
non-agricultural manual workers (0.00335) (0.00286)   
Log monthly wages, female 0.109*** 0.0850*** 0.024 344,083 
desk, service, and intellectual workers (0.00329) (0.00286)   
Notes: The dependent variables are log monthly wages. Each regression includes controls for a birth cohort 
dummies (except for the models with explicit cohort variables), regional dummies (except for the models with 
explicit region variables), and an indicator whether a cohort faced a new compulsory education law (6 years of 
compulsory education). Moreover, each model also includes age controls: a quadratic polynomial. Each 
regression includes the sample of 15 to 60 years old from the 1986 through 2012 Labour Force Surveys. Data are 
first aggregated into cell means and weighted by cell size. Regressions are clustered by birth cohort. ***, **, and 
* indicate p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.1, respectively. Bias gap refers to the difference between OLS estimate 
and the IV estimate. 
Source: Author’s compilation based on LFS 1986-2012. 
Regarding gender and economic sector, the OLS coefficients on years of schooling for 
each subsample are approximately 0.08-0.10, while those of the IV estimation are around 
0.05-0.09 (Table 7-26). The magnitude of the OLS and IV coefficients is consistent with 
those from the one-level analysis. The OLS estimates are greater than those of the IV; 
therefore, the upward ability bias still persists in the estimates from the two-level analysis by 
gender and economic sector. Regardless of gender, the result shows that the returns to 
schooling for agricultural sector are lowest, while those for service sector are highest. The 




implies that there is inequality of job opportunities across different economic sectors since 
better job opportunities tend to be available in service and manufacturing sectors in which 
modern education matters. Regardless of economic sector, only the result from service sector 
is consistent with the standard estimation in which the female returns to education are higher 
than those of men. It argues that education helps women expand their job opportunities, both 
in terms of access to labour market and occupational choice (Psacharopoulos, 1988, 1992, 
Dougherty, 2005). As women have much more limited access to both education and labour 
market, investing in one additional year of schooling for women would allow them to earn 
much more than those with less education. However, the returns to education are higher for 
men in agricultural and manufacturing sectors. This contradicts the results of the base model 
and the one-level analysis.  
 The contradicting results in agricultural and manufacturing sectors are not obvious. The 
female and male rates of return in manufacturing sector are substantially close to each other 
since the difference between estimated returns of women and men are fairly marginal 
(0.0687-0.0675 = 0.0012). This implies that there is a trend towards gender equality in the 
manufacturing sector in which women and men face similar opportunity costs to receive 
education and enter labour market. However, there is no obvious reason that explains the 
higher male returns to schooling in agricultural sector.  
7.2.2. Region 
7.2.2.1 Region-Area of Residence 
Table 7-27 shows the two-level disaggregated analysis of OLS and IV returns to 
schooling by region and area of residence. The overall estimates of returns to schooling and 
the bias gaps of disaggregated analysis are consistent with those of the standard estimates and 
the estimates from one-level disaggregated analysis. First, the OLS estimates are higher than 
those of the IV estimation. This confirms that the upward ability bias still persists in the 
estimates from the two-level analysis. Second, regardless of region, the urban rates of return 
to schooling are greater than those of the rural sample. This is because urban labour market 
provides more sophisticated jobs that need skilled workers than does rural market. Thus, 
urban individuals have more chance to utilise their skills than do those living in rural areas 
(Warunsiri and McNown, 2010). Moreover, regardless of area of residence, the OLS and IV 
estimated results show that the returns to schooling for the North region are the highest 
among all regions, while the estimates from other regions preserve the ranking of the rates of 
returns illustrated in the main estimated result and the results from the one-level aggregated 
analysis by region, except for the estimates from rural north eastern region. The higher returns 
to schooling in North and Northeast regions can be explained by a regional migration and a 
movement of demand for and supply of educated labour. The interregional migration flows 




educated labour and, in turn, a reduction of rents or education premium used to be enjoyed by 
a smaller group of educated workers in the regions that absorb educated migrants. Thus, a 
decline of returns to schooling can be seen in those regions, including Bangkok, the Central 
region and the South region. In contrast, outmigration reduces the supply of educated labour 
in the Northeast and the North regions. Hence, an increase in returns to schooling can be 
observed in both regions. In addition, the estimated result also suggests that there is an 
inequality of job opportunities and access to schooling across regions. 
 Taking into account of area of residence, the estimated returns to schooling of urban 
areas are consistent with the main finding which indicates that the returns to schooling for the 
North and the Northeast regions are the highest among all regions. However, this pattern does 
not hold true in the case of rural Northeast region where the returns to schooling decreases to 
the lowest level among all regions. The highest level of returns to schooling of the urban 
North and Northeast can possibly be explained by the fact that residents from both the North 
and Northeast may benefit relative more from urbanisation. Compared to other regions, the 
North and Northeast are relatively less developed. Urbanisation helps residents in those 
regions expand their job opportunities, both in terms of access to labour market and 
occupational choice. As residents from these two regions have much more limited access to 
both education and sophisticated labour market, investing in one additional year of schooling 
for those residents would allow them to earn much more than those with less education. In 
contrast, it is quite common among residents from relatively more developed regions, e.g. 
Bangkok and metropolitan, to attain more education and to have better job opportunities; 
therefore, investing just one additional year of schooling would marginally increase their 
returns to schooling. Furthermore, urbanisation helps expanding the occupational choices for 
those from less developed regions. Thus, they may move away from traditional lower-paid 
jobs to higher-paid ones. This also contributes to the higher returns to schooling for urban 
north and northeast residents. On the other hand, jobs in rural areas require less skill; 
therefore, rural skilled workers cannot exploit their skills honed through higher education 
(Jamison and Lau, 1982). Hence, residents from the rural areas have lower returns to 
education. The result shows that the returns to schooling from the rural northeast region are 
the lowest among other rural regions. As the rural northeast region is the least developed area 
and jobs in this area requires less skills, residents find it difficult to apply their knowledge 
gained from education to their jobs. Thus, the rate of returns to education is the lowest among 
other rural regions. Nonetheless, the reason that the North region still has the highest returns 
is not obvious. The result suggests that residents in the rural North region benefit from 




7.2.2.2 Region-Economic Sector 
The two-level disaggregated analysis by region and economic sector (Table 7-28) 
indicates that the overall estimates of returns to schooling and the bias gaps follow those of 
the standard estimates and estimates from the one-level disaggregated analysis. First, the 
upward ability bias can still be observed in the estimates from two-level analysis as the rates 
of return to schooling from OLS estimation exceed those of IV estimation. Second, regardless 
of region, the rates of return to schooling from the agricultural sector is the lowest among all 
economic sectors, whereas that from the service sector is the highest. The higher returns to 
schooling in the manufacture and service sectors can be explained by the fact that better job 
opportunities mostly concentrate in the service sector, whereas the agriculture sector provides 
the least job opportunities in terms of returns to schooling and opportunity to exploit skills 
learnt from higher level of education. Furthermore, regardless of economic sector, the OLS 
and IV estimated results show that most of the returns to schooling from different regions 
preserve the ranking of the rates of return estimated from the one-level aggregated analysis, 
except for the estimates from the Northeast region. Nevertheless, the rates of return to 
schooling from the North and Northeast regions are still the largest in the service sector. A 
regional migration and a movement of demand for and supply of educated labour possibly 
explain the higher returns to schooling in the North and Northeast regions. As the 
interregional migration flows from the Northeast and North regions to others reduce the 
supply of educated labour in the home regions, an increase in rents or education premium 
enjoyed by a smaller group of educated workers can be observed. On the other hand, Bangkok, 
the Central region and South region absorb immigrants into their labour market. Thus, a 
decline of returns to schooling can be seen in those regions due to a reduction in education 
premium induced by the higher supply of educated workers.  
Taking into account of economic sector, the estimated returns to schooling of agricultural 
and manufacturing sectors portray contradicting results towards the main finding which 
indicates that the returns to schooling for the North and Northeast regions are the highest 
among all regions. In the two-level analysis, the rates of return of the Northeast regions are 
the lowest in agricultural and manufacturing sectors. The fact that residents from both the 
North and the Northeast may benefit relative more from the service sector may explain the 
situation in which the returns to schooling for the North and the Northeast regions in the 
service sector are higher than those of other regions. In general, the North and Northeast are 
less developed and poor regions where agriculture is the main source of income. While the 
supply of educated workers keep expanding, technology advancement in the agricultural 
sector cannot keep pace with the growth of educated labour supply. Thai agricultural sector 
still exploits traditional cultivating technique. However, Schultz (1964) argues that education 
does not matter in the traditional agriculture in which there is no new agricultural technology 




regions expand their job opportunities, both in terms of access to labour market and 
occupational choice because better job opportunities are available in the service and 
manufacturing sectors in which modern education matters in developing workers’ skills 
related to those jobs. Investing just one additional year of schooling would substantially 
increase their returns to schooling. On the contrary, service sector is more prevalent in more 
developed regions, e.g. Bangkok and metropolitan; therefore, investing one additional year of 
schooling would marginally increase their returns to schooling.  
7.2.2.3 Conclusion 
The overall result from the two-level disaggregated analysis supports the results from 
the base model and the one-level disaggregated analysis. The result indicates that the upward 
ability bias persists in all analyses. Moreover, with disaggregated analyses by a combination 
of different demographic characteristics, it generally observes higher returns to schooling for 
women, older cohort, urban area, the North and Northeast regions, and service sector. In 
addition, higher ability bias (bias gap) is dominant in subsamples of women, older cohort, 
rural area, the North and the Northeast regions, and agricultural sector. This implies that there 
is educational inequality in access to schooling in those demographic characteristics. 
Individuals with those characteristics have difficulties to attain education due to less 
educational opportunity and poverty. It is usually the case that decision regarding child’s 
schooling mainly made by his/her parents. Parents made their decision based on current 
demographic characteristics of their children and their households. Hence, households with 
poverty and poor educational opportunity tend to select one or few children with higher 
ability to study at school as they cannot afford to send all children to school. This is consistent 
with the ability bias hypothesis which argues that more-able individuals tend to have higher 
schooling. Lastly, it is worth noting that the more detailed the disaggregated analysis is, the 





Table 7-27 Two-Level Disaggregated Analysis of OLS and IV Returns to Schooling by Region and Area of Residence 
Dependent Variables OLS IV Bias gap Observations 
Base model     
Log monthly wages,  0.112*** 0.0856*** 0.0264 1,307,016 
all workers (0.00425) (0.00354)   
Region     
Log monthly wages,  0.112*** 0.0856*** 0.0264 1,307,016 
all workers (0.00425) (0.00354)   
Log monthly wages,  0.0956*** 0.0751*** 0.0205 162,399 
BKK (0.00204) (0.00116)   
Log monthly wages,  0.124*** 0.0990*** 0.025 256,236 
North (0.00439) (0.00436)   
Log monthly wages,  0.140*** 0.0977*** 0.0423 298,137 
Northeast (0.0038) (0.00683)   
Log monthly wages,  0.0928*** 0.0733*** 0.0195 222,181 
South (0.00473) (0.00343)   
Log monthly wages,  0.0973*** 0.0766*** 0.0207 369,035 
Centre (0.00459) (0.00225)   
Area of Residence     
Log monthly wages,  0.108*** 0.0849*** 0.0231 856,617 
urban (0.00369) (0.00169)   
Log monthly wages,  0.105*** 0.0709*** 0.0341 450,399 
rural (0.0053) (0.00622)   
Region and Area     
Log monthly wages, urban  0.0962*** 0.0758*** 0.0204 143,357 
Bangkok and Metropolitan (0.00198) (0.00143) 
  
Log monthly wages, urban  0.121*** 0.0997*** 0.0213 162,960 
Northern area (0.00394) (0.00235) 
  
Log monthly wages, urban  0.129*** 0.0965*** 0.0325 192,139 
North eastern area (0.00331) (0.00336) 
  
Log monthly wages, urban  0.0912*** 0.0726*** 0.0186 133,456 
Southern area (0.00392) (0.00245) 
  
Log monthly wages, urban  0.0957*** 0.0773*** 0.0184 225,565 
Central area (0.00419) (0.00103) 
  
Log monthly wages, rural  0.0876*** 0.0680*** 0.0196 19,042 
Bangkok and Metropolitan (0.00291) (0.00237) 
  
Log monthly wages, rural  0.115*** 0.0818*** 0.0332 93,276 
Northern area (0.00509) (0.00766) 
  
Log monthly wages, rural  0.142*** 0.0645*** 0.0775 105,998 
North eastern area (0.00563) (0.0143) 
  
Log monthly wages, rural  0.0838*** 0.0660*** 0.0178 88,725 
Southern area (0.00554) (0.00481) 
  
Log monthly wages, rural  0.0938*** 0.0695*** 0.0243 143,470 
Central area (0.00509) (0.00435) 
  
Notes: The dependent variables are log monthly wages. Each regression includes controls for a birth cohort dummies (except for the models 
with explicit cohort variables), regional dummies (except for the models with explicit region variables), and an indicator whether a cohort faced 
a new compulsory education law (6 years of compulsory education). Moreover, each model also includes age controls: a quadratic polynomial. 
Each regression includes the sample of 15 to 60 years old from the 1986 through 2012 Labour Force Surveys. Data are first aggregated into cell 
means and weighted by cell size. Regressions are clustered by birth cohort. ***, **, and * indicate p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.1, respectively. 
Bias gap refers to the difference between OLS estimate and the IV estimate. 




Table 7-28 Two-Level Disaggregated Analysis of OLS and IV Returns to Schooling by Region and Economic Sector 
Dependent Variables OLS IV Bias gap Observations 
Base model     
Log monthly wages,  0.112*** 0.0856*** 0.0264 1,307,016 
all workers (0.00425) (0.00354)   
Region     
Log monthly wages,  0.112*** 0.0856*** 0.0264 1,307,016 
all workers (0.00425) (0.00354)   
Log monthly wages,  0.0956*** 0.0751*** 0.0205 162,399 
BKK (0.00204) (0.00116)   
Log monthly wages,  0.124*** 0.0990*** 0.025 256,236 
North (0.00439) (0.00436)   
Log monthly wages,  0.140*** 0.0977*** 0.0423 298,137 
Northeast (0.0038) (0.00683)   
Log monthly wages,  0.0928*** 0.0733*** 0.0195 222,181 
South (0.00473) (0.00343)   
Log monthly wages,  0.0973*** 0.0766*** 0.0207 369,035 
Centre (0.00459) (0.00225)   
Economic Sector     
Log monthly wages,   0.101*** 0.0590*** 0.042 428,699 
Agricultural sector (0.00479) (0.0044)   
Log monthly wages,  0.0936*** 0.0706*** 0.023 238,274 
Manufacturing sector  (0.00468) (0.00285)   
Log monthly wages,  0.102*** 0.0825*** 0.0195 637,105 
Service sector (0.00325) (0.00078)   
Region and Economic Sector     
Log monthly wages, Bangkok and Metropolitan  0.0916*** 0.0590*** 0.0326 18,206 
agricultural and elementary workers (0.00198) (0.00341)   
Log monthly wages, Northern area  0.108*** 0.0693*** 0.0387 99,008 
agricultural and elementary workers (0.00486) (0.00587)   
Log monthly wages, North eastern area  0.136*** 0.0407*** 0.0953 122,801 




Log monthly wages, Southern area  0.0729*** 0.0573*** 0.0156 80,575 
agricultural and elementary workers (0.00485) (0.00449)   
Log monthly wages, Central area  0.0884*** 0.0628*** 0.0256 108,148 
agricultural and elementary workers (0.00490) (0.00412)   
Log monthly wages, Bangkok and Metropolitan  0.101*** 0.0731*** 0.0279 50,096 
non-agricultural manual workers (0.00372) (0.00241)   
Log monthly wages, Northern area  0.0960*** 0.0760*** 0.02 34,490 
non-agricultural manual workers (0.00548) (0.00330)   
Log monthly wages, North eastern area  0.0971*** 0.0598*** 0.0373 32,626 
non-agricultural manual workers (0.00499) (0.00657)   
Log monthly wages, Southern area  0.0837*** 0.0644*** 0.0193 26,171 
non-agricultural manual workers (0.00520) (0.00937)   
Log monthly wages, Central area  0.0889*** 0.0693*** 0.0196 95,064 
non-agricultural manual workers (0.00498) (0.00417)   
Log monthly wages, Bangkok and Metropolitan  0.0931*** 0.0791*** 0.014 91,729 
desk, service, and intellectual workers (0.00174) (0.00241)   
Log monthly wages, Northern area  0.114*** 0.0944*** 0.0196 122,639 
desk, service, and intellectual workers (0.00344) (0.00278)   
Log monthly wages, North eastern area  0.113*** 0.0929*** 0.0201 142,589 
desk, service, and intellectual workers (0.00303) (0.00255)   
Log monthly wages, Southern area  0.0899*** 0.0702*** 0.0197 115,376 
desk, service, and intellectual workers (0.00368) (0.00183)   
Log monthly wages, Central area  0.0949*** 0.0774*** 0.0175 165,532 
desk, service, and intellectual workers (0.00375) (0.00188)   
Notes: The dependent variables are log monthly wages. Each regression includes controls for a birth cohort dummies (except for the models with explicit cohort variables), 
regional dummies (except for the models with explicit region variables), and an indicator whether a cohort faced a new compulsory education law (6 years of compulsory 
education). Moreover, each model also includes age controls: a quadratic polynomial. Each regression includes the sample of 15 to 60 years old from the 1986 through 2012 
Labour Force Surveys. Data are first aggregated into cell means and weighted by cell size. Regressions are clustered by birth cohort. ***, **, and * indicate p < 0.01, p < 0.05, 
and p < 0.1, respectively. Bias gap refers to the difference between OLS estimate and the IV estimate. 






CHAPTER 8. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Section 1. SUMMARY BY CHAPTER 
 Chapter 2 provides readers with a comprehensive overview of Thai economic and 
educational development during 1960-1990. Thai economy can be divided into four main 
periods, namely pre-boom (1951-1986), boom (1987-1996), crisis (1997-1998), and 
post-crisis (1999 onwards). During 1951-1986, the Government put efforts in building basic 
physical infrastructure, e.g. road, electricity, to name a few, to help facilitating trading and the 
growth of the economy. The real GDP growth rate jumped to 9.2 per cent during the boom 
period, 1987-1996. This is considered as an economic miracle growth in Thailand. However, 
Thailand experienced a financial crisis in 1997 and faced a negative GDP growth at 6.1 per 
cent, which is the lowest in the Thai economic history. In the post-crisis period, Thailand 
managed to bounce back and achieved the real GDP growth rate of 4 per cent. The overall 
average real GDP growth and real GDP growth per capita were around 6.2 per cent and 4.2 
per cent, respectively, during 1951-2003. 
The high GDP growth is claimed to be the result of structural transformation during the 
pre-boom period, 1951-1986. Thailand went through a structural transformation from a 
primitive agriculture-based economy to newly industrialised economy, which the agricultural 
sector played a crucial role in reallocating resources to the other economic sectors. Similar to 
most of industrialisation process in other countries, the industrial sector was developed at the 
expense of the agricultural sector. In addition, Thailand also went through another structural 
transformation in terms of export and import pattern. Thailand changed from agriculture 
produce exporter, e.g. rice, to manufactured goods exporter, especially garments and parts and 
components. 
Overall, the situation of the development in Thailand is consistent with the characteristics 
of developing countries proposed by Behrman and Srinivasan (1995). They suggest that 
developing countries possess different degrees of market completeness and institutions from 
developed countries. The followings are the proposed characteristics of developing economies 
in comparison with developed economies. First, a majority of population still depends heavily 
on agricultural sector and rural labour activities. Second, in agricultural sector, it is common 
for family members to help working without formal pay; therefore, non-wage labour accounts 
for a large proportion of the total labour force in developing economies. Third, there has been 
a rapid growth of labour force in developing countries. Fourth, high labour participation rates 
among 15-64 year olds can be observed due to low human capital investments among young 
cohorts. Fifth, there are low school enrolment rates and the education gap is in favour of 




countries. Lastly, a majority of Thai population still lives below the poverty line even in the 
midst of high economic growth during 1970-1980. 
In terms of educational development, there had been a rapid expansion of the education 
system in the primary education for past 20 years (1960-1980), both in terms of student 
enrolment and number of teachers. In contrast, the demand and supply for secondary and 
tertiary education grew at a much slower pace. The Government raised both supplies of 
primary schools and teaching staffs to respond to the increasing demand for primary 
education while tried to increase the quality of the education. Hence, an improvement of 
overall education quality could also be observed as the student-teacher ratios kept declining 
over time across different levels of education. The boost in both demand and supply of 
education was a part of a national development plan to prepare Thai labour force to be ready 
for the next stage of social and economic development.  
In terms of migration, the rural-urban and interregional migration help facilitating the 
development process of Thai economy by reallocating human resources between regions and 
economic sectors. The phenomenon of “human capital drain from rural to urban areas” seems 
to occur in Thailand. Even though the majority of the migration streams concentrated in rural 
migrants, there was a growing trend of human capital drain from rural to urban areas during 
the period of 1965 – 1990. The flow of rural-urban migrants is dominated by the group of 
more educated individuals. In other words, more educated individuals have higher mobility. 
This pattern can also be observed from every type of migration stream. Regarding regional 
mobility, net migration losses were highest in the Northeast and the North regions during 
1970-1990, while the Central area, and Bangkok and metropolitan areas had the highest net 
migration gains among all regions.  
In conclusion, Thailand experiences rapid economic development and structural 
transformation during 1960-1990. Obtaining the rates of return to education in this period 
helps us better understand the process of Thai economic development as well as the interplay 
between the rates of return to schooling and economic development in Thailand during 1980s 
to 1990s. In addition, the overall social and economic conditions of the development in 
Thailand are consistent with the general characteristics of other developing countries. Hence, 
by implication, estimating the rates of return to schooling in Thailand also provides better 
understandings on the role of human capital in the process of development in other 
developing countries. As developing countries possess different degrees of market 
completeness and institutions which are radically different from those of developed countries, 
this warrants value for investigation of the rate of returns to schooling in the context of 
developing countries. This further investigation possibly gives a different economic pattern 
and implications of estimated results. 
Chapter 3 revisits the Mincer model to show that the Mincer function is alive and well 




methodological issues in estimating the rates of return to schooling. The third section surveys 
previous studies of the rates of return to schooling with a particular focus on studies utilising 
compulsory education law change as an instrumental variable. Fourth, previous studies on the 
sample selection are briefly discussed. Finally, the chapter is closed by emphasising the 
contributions of this research. 
The rates of return to schooling is one of the most important topics that economists 
have been investigating, especially by utilising the Mincerian equation. Despite the fact that 
the Mincer model is still alive and well in fitting the actual age-wage data, there has been a 
long debate that the OLS estimate from Mincer equation is possibly biased due to the 
endogeneity problem. Hundreds of studies with different methods of estimation attempt to 
deal with the endogeneity bias but they fail to establish a causal effect of schoolings on 
earnings in the absence of randomised experiment. Even though a randomised controlled trial 
(RCT) is the ideal estimation method, it is not feasible to conduct the RCT in most of the 
studies of returns to education. The second-best candidate, which is close to the RCT, is the 
estimation with quasi-experiment, e.g. regression discontinuity design (RDD), 
differences-in-differences, to name a few. However, the studies utilising those methods of 
estimation are rare, especially in developing countries where the issue of data scarcity is 
prevalent. 
 This study mainly focuses on the IV estimation using compulsory schooling as IV. 
There are two main debates in the literature from developed countries. The first debate is that 
the LATE is far from the ATE as the interventions do not affect a majority of the population. 
Thus, the IV estimates tend to be higher than those of OLS since the estimated results indicate 
the estimated returns to schooling of a socially disadvantaged group that usually has higher 
returns to schooling. The second debate raised by Stephen Jr. and Yang (2014) is the concern 
of potential bias from the omitted variables, including school quality and family background. 
They argue that without the interaction between region control and year of birth, changes 
across regions over time of school quality cannot be captured in the estimation. The effects of 
differences in school quality may cause estimates to be biased since the source of upward bias 
is not limited to innate ability, but also includes family background and quality of schooling 
(Schultz, 1988, Behrman, 1990, Strauss and Thomas, 1995). Even though there is no specific 
debate to the literature from developing countries, the overall results show that the estimates 
between developed and developing countries are different. The results from developing 
countries show that the OLS estimates are higher than those of IV estimation, while the 
estimates from developed countries tend to produce OLS estimates that are lower than those 
of IV. It implies that the ability bias is dominant in the OLS estimation of developing 
countries. 
 This study make three main contributions to the existing debates in the literature in terms 




developing countries in general. First, the previous literature reveals that there is a different 
pattern of the relative magnitudes between OLS and IV estimates using compulsory schooling 
as IV between developed and developing countries. Investigating this contrast can contribute 
to a better understanding of (a) how and when the conventional “ability bias” matters in 
estimating returns to schooling and of (b) the impact of compulsory schooling in different 
settings. Second, as Thailand experiences rapid economic development and structural 
transformation during 1960-1990, obtaining the rate of returns to education in this period 
helps us better understand the process of Thai economic development as well as the interplay 
between the rate of returns to schooling and the economic development process during 1980 
to 1990. This also helps understand the role of human capital in the process of development in 
other developing countries. Finally, the third contribution is on the construction of the 
database and discussion of the descriptive analysis for the discrepancies among different 
demographic characteristics, including gender, cohort, area of residence, region of residence, 
and economic sector. In addition to the overall estimates of returns to schooling, another 
important issue is an issue of heterogeneity in educational returns across individuals. 
Heterogeneity in individuals’ demographic characteristics tends to distort the returns to 
education; for example, the female rates of return to education is likely to be higher than those 
of male. Hence, it is worth examining heterogeneous returns to schooling from different 
demographic characteristics. 
Chapter 4 briefly presents a general theoretical framework of the analysis of returns to 
education. It mainly focuses on the Mincer’s (1974) human capital earnings function. Even 
though Mincer model seems unrealistic and some assumptions can be challenged, the 
estimation based on Mincer model still shows a positive effect of schooling on earnings 
(Harmon, et al., 2003) and well fit the actual age-wages profiles (Card, 1999). Chapter 3 
Section 1 shows that Mincer model with the OLS estimation can fit the actual recent data 
fairly well in both developed and developing countries. On the other hand, Heckman, et al. 
(2006) argues that Mincer model can only be used as a good starting point to develop a more 
complicated analytical framework. They criticise Mincer model on three main bases. First, 
there has been no decisive estimated rate of returns to schooling. Second, the estimated 
coefficient of years of schooling is ambiguous and difficult to make a meaningful economic 
interpretation. Finally, even a theoretically credible method of estimation such as IV 
estimation with RDD may possibly produce biased estimates as its instruments are generally 
found to be weak in many cases. A more comprehensive theoretical and empirical discussion 
can be found in the work of Heckman, Lochner and Todd (2003). Lastly, this study shall 
explicitly limit the definition of estimated coefficient of education attainment to a wage 
premium from education, but still follows the convention by using the term “the rates of 
return to schooling” to refer to growth of market earnings in terms of schooling. 




identification strategy employed in this study. In general, this study exploits an opportunity of 
quasi-experiment in Thailand which occurs from a change in compulsory education law to 
estimate the rates of return to schooling. The main estimation method is the IV estimation and 
the only source of data used in the estimation is the pooled cross-sectional Labour Force 
Survey (LFS) data from 1986 to 2012. 
Chapter 6 presents the empirical results from IV estimation by using Thai Labour 
Force Survey data. The results include the estimates from the first stage least square 
regression, the reduced form, the OLS regression (years of schooling on log wage), and the IV 
regression. First, the first stage estimation shows that the coefficients of compulsory 
education are statistically significant and robust across different specifications. The 
compulsory education law change leads to six additional years of schooling which is roughly 
corresponding to the first year of the upper secondary school (grade 10). Even though the new 
compulsory education law increases the minimum year of schooling from four years to six 
years, it seems that the impact of the law is beyond its expected initial impact. Second, the 
reduced form finds that the coefficients of compulsory education are statistically significant 
and robust across different specifications. The change in compulsory education level has a 
very large effect on the monthly wages. It yields approximately 36 per cent to 50 per cent 
increase in the monthly wages. The large estimated effect of compulsory education in 
Thailand can be explained by the fact that there is a wide income gap between individuals 
with different levels of education attainment. Third, the OLS point estimates of the 
coefficients of the years of schooling are statistically significant and robust across different 
specifications. The rates of return to schooling from the OLS estimation is approximately 11 
per cent and consistent with that of the previous study from Thailand (Warunsiri and McNown, 
2010). Finally, the IV estimation indicates that the coefficients of years of schooling are 
statistically significant and robust across different specifications. One additional year of 
schooling leads to approximately 8 per cent increase in monthly wages. Comparing the OLS 
estimates with those of IV, the result shows that the OLS estimates are greater than those of 
the IV around 3 per cent. This indicates the upward bias (overestimation) in the OLS 
regression, which is consistent with the argument of ability bias in returns to schooling.  
 This main finding of this study is consistent with the theoretical discussion showing 
that IV estimates should be smaller than those of OLS estimation (Heckman, et al., 2006). 
Furthermore, the finding also supports Behrman’s (1999) arguments regarding the ability bias. 
Behrman (1990, 1999) argues that there is a substantial large ability bias, especially in the 
case of developing countries. A number of studies controlling for unobserved ability, family 
background, and school quality find that the OLS estimates suffer from the ability bias which 
the impact of years of schooling is overestimated 40-100 per cent. 
 There are three main concluding remarks from the discussion of the results in terms 




effect of different sources of bias leads to the overestimated rates of return to schooling in the 
context of Thailand (OLS estimates > IV estimates). This implies that the ability bias 
outweighs other sources of bias, including the discount rate bias and the measurement error 
bias. Second, the finding rules out certain issues that may occur in the case of estimates with 
downward bias (IV estimates > OLS estimates), including further unobserved heterogeneity 
biases, the classical measurement error bias, and the argument that LATE estimated from IV 
method is far from ATE. Finally, there still a remaining puzzle as the IV estimates from this 
study and the estimates from panel with fixed effects (Warunsiri and McNown, 2010) are 
different not only in terms of magnitude of returns to schooling, but also the direction of the 
bias, even though these two studies use similar data set with similar statistical quality.  
 The last section concludes that the dominance of ability bias is mainly explained by 
the inequality of income and educational opportunity during the early period of social and 
economic development and there are two sources of ability bias in case of Thailand that 
includes the ability bias from a selection of more-able child within poor households and the 
ability bias due to higher financial endowment of rich families. However, the argument of the 
ability bias due to a selection of more-able child within poor households is more relevant and 
specific to the case of Thailand and, perhaps, other developing countries. In other words, this 
type of ability bias is less relevant in developed countries where poverty and inequality of 
educational opportunity, especially for the basic education, are less pronounced. Even though 
there is a tendency that individuals with higher ability are more likely to attain more years of 
schooling, the ability bias seems to be less dominant in developed countries, at least for the 
basic level of education. This is possibly the main reason that the upward ability bias is 
observed in case of Thailand and other developing countries, while the OLS estimation from 
developed countries suffers from downward bias (IV estimates > OLS estimates). Hence, the 
other sources of bias seem to dominate the effect of the upward ability bias in case of 
developed countries. Furthermore, explaining the upward ability bias in terms of the 
inequality of income and educational opportunity during the early period of Thai social and 
economic development may also possibly be generalised to the case of other developing 
countries, which share similar social and economic context with Thailand. 
In Chapter 7, with disaggregation by different demographic characteristics, the OLS 
estimates are greater than those of IV; therefore, the upward ability bias still persists even 
after estimating the rate of returns to schooling with different subsamples. This is consistent 
with the result from the standard estimation presented in Chapter 6.  
First, in terms of gender, the rate of returns to schooling is marginally higher for 
women than for men. This implies a movement towards gender equality in access to education 
and also labour market in Thailand. Second, regarding the cohort disaggregation, the rate of 
returns is also marginally greater in the older than the younger generations. This is explained 




stages of development, a rapid economic expansion creates rents or surplus earnings for a 
small proportion of educated population to enjoy (Psacharopoulos, 2011). Educated workers 
can enjoy new rents created by the new demand. As a consequence, the expansion of 
education produces a supply of educated workers to meet a demand for educated workers. 
Therefore, the rents are eliminated. As the process of economic development deepens, it is 
also possible that the rate of returns remains constant if the demand keeps pace with the 
increasing supply. Third, the urban rate of returns exceeds that of rural areas due to 
availability of more sophisticated jobs that need skilled workers in the urban labour market 
and higher quality of schools in urban areas. Urban individuals have more chance to utilise 
their skills acquired from better quality schools than do those living in rural areas (Behrman 
and Birdsall, 1983; Warunsiri and McNown, 2010). Fourth, in terms of regional 
disaggregation, the higher returns to schooling in least developed regions, the Northeast and 
the North regions, can be explained by a regional migration and a movement of demand for 
and supply of educated labour. The dominant effect of the interregional migration flows from 
the Northeast and the North regions to Bangkok, the Central, and South regions leads to an 
increase in the supply of educated labour and a reduction of returns to schooling in those 
labour-absorbing regions. In contrast, outmigration reduces the supply of educated labour in 
the Northeast and the North regions; therefore, returns to schooling increase in those regions. 
Finally, an excess demand for high skilled labour in the early stage of economic development 
creates rents or education premium in the manufacturing and the service sector to a small 
group of more educated labour to enjoy. Hence, the rate of returns to schooling is higher in the 
service and the manufacturing sectors, while the lowest returns to schooling would be 
expected to observe in the agricultural sector. Moreover, the higher returns to schooling in 
manufacturing and service sectors can be explained by the relevancy of modern education to 
job description in those sectors. Workers have more chance to exploit their skills learnt from 
modern school in more developed sector, while there is less chance to apply the modern 
knowledge in a sector such as agriculture in which technology is still traditional and 
backward.  
In terms of the bias gap from the one-level disaggregated analysis, even though the 
magnitude of the difference between male and female bias gap is small, it seems that the 
ability bias is more dominant for women. In the early stage of social and economic 
development, market distortions such as gender discrimination prevent women to attend 
schools. Hence, only women with higher ability and better family background are given an 
opportunity to attend schools. This is consistent with the ability bias hypothesis which states 
that more-able individuals are more likely to attain more years of schooling. However, the 
estimated result also implies that there is a trend towards equal educational opportunity 
between women and men as the differences of the estimated returns to schooling and the bias 




dominant in the OLS estimates of the older generation. At the early stage of development, 
poverty and low standard of living influence household’s decision making in sending their 
children to schools. It is likely that most of households may have to select only the most-able 
children to study at school due to the high direct and indirect costs of schooling and demand 
for household labour. Third, in terms of area of residence, the estimated result indicates that 
the ability bias is more dominant in rural areas. Similar results can be observed in 
disaggregated analysis by region and economic sector. The estimated results show that the 
ability bias is more dominant in the North East and the North regions, the least developed 
regions in Thailand, and in the agricultural sector, least developed economic sector both in 
terms of output growth and technology. The common characteristic is the stage of 
development of each unit, namely area, region, and economic sector. Less social and 
economic development implies higher bias gap or higher ability bias in the OLS estimates. A 
similar line of reasoning explained the ability bias in cohort disaggregated analysis can be 
applied to disaggregated analyses by area of residence, region, and economic sector. With less 
educational opportunity and high poverty, households tend to choose only the most-able 
children to send to school as they cannot bear costs of education for all children in the 
household. This is consistent with the ability bias hypothesis arguing that more-able 
individuals tend to have higher education.   
In conclusion, with the disaggregated analyses by different demographic characteristics, 
it is generally observed higher returns to schooling for women, older cohort, urban area, the 
North and the Northeast regions, and service sector. These results can be explained in the 
context of Thai development process. In addition, higher bias gap is prevalent in subsamples 
of women, older cohort, rural area, the North and the Northeast regions, and agricultural 
sector. Again, income and educational opportunity inequality during the early period of social 
and economic development help explain the higher bias gap in those socially disadvantaged 
groups. With less educational opportunity and high poverty, socially disadvantaged 
households tend to choose only most-able children to send to school since they cannot bear 
costs of education for all children in the household. This is consistent with the general ability 
bias hypothesis which argues that more-able individuals tend to have higher schooling. 
Moreover, the overall result from the two-level disaggregated analysis supports the 
results from the base model and the one-level disaggregated analysis. The result indicates that 
the upward ability bias persists in all analyses. Moreover, with disaggregated analyses by a 
combination of different demographic characteristics, it generally observes higher returns to 
schooling for women, older cohort, urban area, the North and the Northeast regions, and 
service sector. In addition, higher ability bias (bias gap) is dominant in subsamples of women, 
older cohort, rural area, the North and the Northeast regions, and agricultural sector. This 
implies that there is educational inequality in access to schooling in those demographic 




to less educational opportunity and poverty. It is usually the case that decision regarding 
child’s schooling mainly made by his/her parents. Parents made their decision based on 
current demographic characteristics of their children and their households. Hence, households 
with poverty and poor educational opportunity tend to select one or few children with higher 
ability to study at school as they cannot afford to send all children to school. This is consistent 
with the ability bias hypothesis which argues that more-able individuals tend to have higher 
schooling. Lastly, it is worth noting that the more detailed the disaggregated analysis is, the 
higher the risk of sample selection bias. The estimated results should be interpreted with 
caution.   
Section 2. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
First, according to the results from the first stage regression, the impact of the 
compulsory education law can go beyond its expected initial impact due to the timing that the 
compulsory education law was issued. For example, Thai 1978 compulsory education law 
was issued in the period before the fast-growing economic development, while there was no 
universal education at that time. The majority of school-age children were still out of school 
and the compulsory education law forced them to stay in schools. Thus, a large increase in 
completed years of schooling and also a sharp drop of sample with education at most four 
years can be observed. Hence, the Government should consider this unexpected effect of the 
compulsory education. To meet the demand for further schooling, the Government should 
provide sufficient educational supplies, including teaching staffs, classrooms, and educational 
budget for the grades specified by the law and grades beyond. 
Second, according to the reduced form regression, the results show that the change in 
compulsory education level has a very large effect on the monthly wages. It implies that 
education has a positive effect on earnings and empowers individuals to have a better standard 
of living. Moreover, the compulsory education at the primary level helps reducing income gap. 
For individuals who have less than six years of education (compulsory education level), an 
average monthly wage is approximately 5,900 baht, while an average monthly wage of those 
with secondary education is about 10,000 baht (Labour Force Survey, 1986-2012). The wage 
of secondary education graduates is at least 40 per cent higher than that of individuals with 
less than primary education. However, the Government should also pay attention to the 
marginalised groups that do not have access to the compulsory education. Otherwise, the 
compulsory education possibly widens the income gap. The ideal situation would be that the 
Government provides free compulsory education. In addition, it might be the case that 
proving free and compulsory education in higher levels of education, e.g. secondary education 
and tertiary education, may further reduce the income gap between the rich and poor.    




subsamples stratified by gender, area of residence, and economic sector. Third, in terms of 
gender, the rate of returns to schooling is marginally higher for women than for men. This 
implies a movement towards gender equality in access to education and also labour market in 
Thailand. Fourth, the urban rate of returns exceeds that of rural areas due to availability of 
more sophisticated jobs that need skilled workers in the urban labour market and higher 
quality of schools in urban areas. Urban individuals have more chance to utilise their skills 
acquired from better quality schools than do those living in rural areas (Behrman and Birdsall, 
1983; Warunsiri and McNown, 2010). Thus, providing better quality schools and more job 
opportunities, especially those required more skills, in rural areas possibly increase the returns 
to schooling in those areas. Fifth, in terms of economic sector, the higher returns to schooling 
in manufacturing and service sectors can be partly explained by the relevancy of modern 
education to job description in those sectors. Workers have more chance to exploit their skills 
learnt from modern school in more developed sector, while there is less chance to apply the 
modern knowledge in a sector such as agriculture in which technology is still traditional and 
backward. Thus, integrating agricultural education into the curriculum or providing a concrete 
linkage between the modern knowledge, e.g. science and technology, and agriculture may 
help students from agricultural households learn how to apply those modern knowledges into 
their agricultural production and change their household’s farming practice. Moreover, 
informal education could play an important role in further educating farmers after graduating 
from the compulsory education. As technologies keep developing and moving forward, 
farmers also need to keep learning and catching up with those new technologies to stay 
competitive in the market. Sixth, higher bias gap in subsamples of women, older cohort, rural 
area, the North and the Northeast regions, and agricultural sector implies that there is income 
and educational opportunity inequality. During the early period of social and economic 
development, the Government needs to carefully balance between the economic growth and 
income distribution.  
Finally, the overall social and economic conditions of the development in Thailand are 
consistent with the general characteristics of other developing countries. Hence, estimating 
the rates of return to schooling in Thailand, by implication, also provides better 
understandings on the role of human capital in the process of development in other 
developing countries. Due to the fact that developing countries possess radically different 
degrees of market completeness and different quality of institution from those of developed 
countries, this warrants value for investigation of the returns to schooling in the context of 
developing countries. This further investigation possibly gives a different economic pattern 




Section 3. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
8.3.1. Limitations 
First, the main analysis may encounter the problem of sample selection due to the data 
limitation. The LFS provides the information only on wages; therefore, non-wage labours are 
not included in the analysis. Schultz (1988) argues that a bias may occur when sample 
selection is related to the schooling-wage relationship. Sample selection criteria leading to a 
bias includes the choice of occupation, labour force participation, or migration, to name a few. 
Moreover, gender and area of residence may relate to occupation choices and labour 
participation. Hence, this may further bias our main results.  
Second, the contradiction between the IV estimates from this study and the estimates from 
panel with fixed effects (Warunsiri and McNown, 2010) is puzzling. In general, these two 
studies use similar data set with similar statistical quality as the OLS estimates from both 
studies indicate similar magnitude of the estimated coefficients and the level of significance. 
However, after correcting for the endogeneity bias with different estimation methods, the 
results are different not only in terms of magnitude of returns to schooling, but also the 
direction of the bias. As discussed in Chapter 3, the panel regression with fixed effect may 
suffer from further upward bias since running panel regression with fixed effects excludes 
time-invariant independent variables from the regression, such as region controls and 
schooling quality. Stephen Jr. and Yang (2014) find that adding region and school quality 
control leads the effect of compulsory education on earnings towards zero or even 
wrong-signed. They argue that without the interaction between region control and year of 
birth, changes across regions over time of school quality cannot be captured in the estimation. 
The effects of differences in school quality may cause estimates to be biased since the source 
of upward bias is not limited to only an individual’s ability, but also includes family 
background and quality of schooling (Schultz, 1988; Behrman, 1990; Strauss and Thomas, 
1995). 
Finally, the main puzzle is that returns to schooling are higher in the 
agriculture-dominated North and Northeast than in the regions where non-agricultural 
opportunities are more widely available
33
. This contradicts that of urban-rural disaggregation. 
The regional rates of return show that less developed regions provide higher returns, while the 
rates of return from urban-rural disaggregation indicate that there are higher returns in more 
developed areas (urban areas). The previous section argues that as there are more 
sophisticated jobs that need skilled workers in the urban labour market (more developed area), 
                                                        
33 In fact, the higher average monthly wages are observed in relatively more developed regions, e.g. 
Bangkok and the Central region, rather than those from less developed regions, e.g., the Northeast and North 
regions. It should be noted that the concept of rate of returns is rather relative and the rate of returns refer to the 




urban individuals have more chance to utilise their skills than do those living in rural areas 
(Warunsiri and McNown, 2010). Moreover, the higher quality of schools in urban areas also 
contributes to the higher returns to schooling (Behrman and Birdsall, 1983). However, the 
above lines of logic may not apply to the estimates from the regional disaggregation. It is 
possible that a migration may explain the contradicting patterns between regional returns and 
area of residence’s returns. The migration stream is not simply limited to a rural-urban 
migration but also includes regional migration. The interaction between these two dimensions 
of area and region of residence possibly complicates the estimation. The plausible explanation 
is that the argument used in urban-rural disaggregation is weaker in the case of regional 
disaggregation due to the coexistence of urban and rural areas within each region. Even 
though the Northeast and North regions are the least developed regions in Thailand, their 
urban areas help absorb some of educated labour by providing opportunities for more 
educated workers to work in more sophisticated jobs. 
8.3.2. Future Research 
The first priority of the future research should be dealing with those existing 
limitations, including the problem of sample selection and remaining puzzles. The problem of 
sample selection can be solved by the data with better quality. On the other hand, the 
remaining puzzle might be solved by resorting a different analytic model or framework. 
Introducing interaction terms of different demographic characteristics in the main model may 
help solving the remaining puzzles in this study.  
  Second, due to the fact that developing countries possess radically different degrees of 
market completeness and different quality of institution from those of developed countries, 
this warrants value for investigation of the returns to schooling in the context of developing 
countries. Different economic patterns and implications of the returns to schooling may be 
observed. However, this is an empirical question and it is worth further investigation. The 
emergence of large-scale microeconomic datasets from developing countries in last decades 
provides a chance for researchers to examine this issue in other developing countries or in 
other social and economic settings so that the findings from this study can be compared and 
contrasted with.  
Lastly, there is another interesting phenomenon indicating that there seems to be a lack 
of increase in average wages as well as returns to education across cohorts for a long period of 
time, even in the midst of economic development and structural transformation. Suggested 
further examination would be to conduct wages decomposition by separating age, cohort, and 
year effects on the wages. This may provide us a better understanding of the mechanism of 




Section 4. CONCLUSION 
 To estimate the rates of return to schooling, this study exploits an opportunity of 
quasi-experiment in Thailand which occurs from a change in compulsory education law in 
1978. The law change affects almost half of the population; therefore, the estimated LATE is 
possibly closer to the ATE than those of previous literature. The main estimation method is 
the IV estimation using the pooled cross-sectional Labour Force Survey data from 1986 to 
2012.  
 This study makes three main contributions in terms of methodology and also substantive 
aspect in the context of Thailand and, by implication, developing countries in general. First, 
the previous literature reveals that there is a different pattern of the relative magnitudes 
between OLS and IV estimates using compulsory schooling as IV between developed and 
developing countries. Investigating this contrast can contribute to a better understanding of (a) 
how and when the conventional “ability bias” matters in estimating returns to schooling and 
of (b) the impact of compulsory schooling in different settings. Second, as Thailand 
experiences rapid economic development and structural transformation during 1960-1990, 
obtaining the rate of returns to education in this period helps us better understand the process 
of Thai economic development as well as the interplay between the rate of returns to 
schooling and the economic development process during 1980 to 1990. This also helps 
understand the role of human capital in the process of development in other developing 
countries. Finally, the third contribution is on the construction of the database and discussion 
of the descriptive analysis for the discrepancies among different demographic characteristics, 
including gender, cohort, area of residence, region of residence, and economic sector. In 
addition to the overall estimates of returns to schooling, another important issue is an issue of 
heterogeneity in educational returns across individuals. Heterogeneity in individuals’ 
demographic characteristics tends to distort the returns to education; for example, the female 
rates of return to education is likely to be higher than those of male. Hence, it is worth 
examining heterogeneous returns to schooling from different demographic characteristics.  
 This study finds that the IV estimation with RDD indicates that the coefficients of years 
of schooling are statistically significant and robust across different specifications. This 
confirms a causal relationship between education attainment and earnings. One additional 
year of schooling leads to approximately 8 per cent increase in monthly wages. Second, the 
result shows that the OLS estimates are greater than those of IV around 3 per cent. This 
indicates that the net effect of different sources of endogeneity bias leads to the overestimated 
rate of returns to schooling in the OLS regression. In the context of Thailand, the ability bias 
outweighs other endogeneity biases, including the discount rate bias and the measurement 
error bias. Third, the dominance of ability bias is mainly explained by the inequality of 




development. There are two sources of ability bias, including the ability bias from a selection 
of more-able child within poor households and the ability bias due to higher financial and 
better genetic endowment in rich families. This finding may possibly be generalised to the 
case of other developing countries, which share similar social and economic context with 
Thailand. Lastly, with the disaggregated analyses by different demographic characteristics, it 
is generally observed higher returns to schooling for women, older cohort, urban area, the 
North and the Northeast regions, and service sector. These results can be explained in the 
context of Thai development process. In addition, higher bias gap is prevalent in subsamples 
of women, older cohort, rural area, the North and the Northeast regions, and agricultural 
sector. Again, income and educational opportunity inequality during the early period of social 
and economic development help explain the higher bias gap in those socially disadvantaged 
groups. With less educational opportunity and high poverty, socially disadvantaged 
households tend to choose only most-able children to send to school since they cannot bear 
costs of education for all children in the household. This is consistent with the general ability 
bias hypothesis which argues that more-able individuals tend to have higher schooling. 
 In conclusion, the interplay between the rates of return to schooling and economic 
development helps us better understand both the role of different stages of economic 
development in explaining the magnitude and the direction of bias of the estimated returns; 
and the role of the estimated returns in explaining the development process. This may also 
help understanding the role of human capital in the process of development in other 
developing countries. However, this is an empirical question and it is worth further 
investigation. The emergence of large-scale microeconomic datasets from developing 
countries in last decades provides a chance for researchers to examine this issue in other 
developing countries or in other social and economic settings so that the findings from this 
study can be compared and contrasted with. Furthermore, there is a puzzle indicating that 
there seems to be a lack of increase in average wages as well as returns to education across 
cohorts for a long period of time, even in the midst of economic development and structural 
transformation. Suggested further examination would be to conduct wages decomposition by 
separating age, cohort, and year effects on the wages. This may provide us a better 
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APPENDIX I A COMPREHENSIVE SUMMARY OF LITERATURE: IV ESTIMATION AND RETURNS TO 
SCHOOLING 
# Author Country Sample  Method of Estimation and Instrument  Schooling 
Coefficients 
OLS IV/DD 





1970 and 1980 Census 
Data, Men. 
 
Instruments are quarter of birth interacted 
with year of birth.  
Controls include quadratic in age and 
indicators for race, marital status, and 
urban residence 
1920-1929 
cohort in 1970 
1930-1939 
cohort in 1980 
1940-1949 






















Dependent variable is log earnings. 
Instruments are a dummy variable for the 
raising of the school-leaving age from 14 
to 15 in 1947, and a dummy variable for 
the raising of the school-leaving age from 
15 to 16 in 1973. 
Controls are a quadratic in age, area 
dummies, and year dummies. 
(*): s.e. 









1952 and 1983 data of 
the Brabant Survey, 
Men. 
1994 data of the OSA 
panel Survey 
Dependent variable is log of net hourly 
wages. 
Instruments are quarter of birth interacted 
with year of birth and change in the 
minimum school leaving age (MSLA) 
Controls include IQ, quadratic experience, 
quadratic age, and marital status. Season 




























identification test. MSLA is not 
statistically significant in Hausman’s t-test 
on exogeneity. (*): s.e. 
(0.027) 
4.  Callan and 
Harmon 
(1999) 
Ireland 1987 Survey of Income 
Distribution, Poverty 
and Usage of State 
Services, Men aged 
18-64. 
Dependent variable is log hourly wages. 
Instruments are a dummy variable for the 
raising of the school-leaving age from 14 
to 15 in 1972, and a dummy variable for 
the introduction of free secondary 
education in the mid-1960s  
Controls include quadratic age, geographic 
dummies, marital status, and the 
occupation-specific unemployment rate. 
(*): s.e. 
No report on statistical significance. 
The instruments are not valid 
See Bound et al. (1995) 
Problems with instrumental variables 
estimation when the correlation between 
the instruments and the endogenous 
explanatory variable is weak 
 
na na na 
5.  Brunello and 
Miniaci 
(1999) 
Italy 1993 and 1995 data of 
the Bank of Italy (BI) 
survey on the income 
and wealth of Italian 
households, Male 
household heads 
Dependent variable is log real hourly 
wages. 
Instrument is a dummy indicating whether 
individuals born since 1951 which is 
expected to pick up the effects of the 1969 
expansion of the higher education 
enrolment opportunity. 
Controls include age, areas, town sizes and 
year.  









6.  Vieira 
(1999) 
Portugal 1986 and 1992 data of 
Quados de Pessoal , 
Male workers. 
Dependent variable is log hourly wages 
Instruments are changes in the compulsory 
level of education in 1956 and 1964. 





















1950-1990 Census data, 
White men. 
Instruments are a) dummies interacting 
quarter of birth and year of birth (QOB); b) 
dummies indicating state- and 
year-specific child labour laws (SOB-CL); 
and c) dummies indicating state- and 
year-specific compulsory attendance laws 
(SOC-CA). 
Controls include state-of-residence effects, 
year effects, year-of-birth effects, and 
state-of-birth effects. 
The results are only from specification 
with dummies indicating state- and 
year-specific compulsory attendance laws 
(SOC-CA). 



















































8.  Denny and 
Harmon 
(2000) 
Ireland 1987 data of the 
household survey by 
the Economic and 
Social Research 
Institute , Men. 
Natural experiment 
Dependent variable is log gross hourly wages. 
Instrument is a dummy variable for the 
introduction of free secondary education in the 
mid-1960s  
Controls include quadratic age, trend in 
secondary participation, urban, marital status, 









No report on statistical significance. 




Spain 1991 data of the Survey 
of Structure, 
Conscience and 
Biography of Class 
(ECBC) and 1994 data 
of the Household Panel 
of the European Union 
(PHOGUE), Male 
workers. 
Dependent variable is log of the net hourly 
wages. Instruments are season of birth and 
change in the minimum school leaving age 
(MSLA) in 1970. Controls include 
quadratic age, tenure, and dummies of 













10.  Meghir and 
Palme 
(2005) 
Sweden 1961 and 1966 data of 
the Individual Statistics 
(IS) project of the 
Institute for Education 
at the University of 
Gothenburg, Men and 
women. 
Differences-in-differences 
Dependent variable is average annual 
log-pre-tax earnings 
Instruments are cohort and municipality 
assigned to the reformed system.  
Controls include cohort, a set of dummy 
variables indicating the municipality, time 
dummies, and observable characteristics of 
individual students. 
(*): s.e. 










1971, 1981, 1986, 
1991, 1996, and 2001 
data of the Censuses, 
Men and women. 
Regression Discontinuity 
Dependent variables are log annual income 
and earnings. Instruments are dummy 
variables for the raising of the 
school-leaving age. Controls are birth 
cohort, province, census year, and 



















1983 - 1998 data of the 
UK General Household 
Regression Discontinuity 















Surveys (GHS); 1985 - 




data of US Censuses; 
and 1971-2001 data of 
Canada Censuses, Men 
and women. 
weekly earnings for the United States. 
Instruments are dummy variables for the 
raising of the school-leaving age from 14 to 15 
in 1947 (UK) and in 1957 (Northern Ireland). 
Controls are birth year, region, survey year, 
sex, and a quartic in age. The US and Canada 
results also include a dummy variable for race, 








































1983 - 1998 data of the 
UK General Household 
Surveys (GHS); 1985 - 




data of US Censuses; 
and 1971-2001 data of 
Canada Censuses, Men 
and women. 
Regression Discontinuity 
Dependent variable is log annual earnings. 
Log weekly earnings for the United States. 
Instruments are dummy variables for the 
raising of the school-leaving age from 14 
to 15 in 1947 (UK) and in 1957 (Northern 
Ireland). 
Controls are birth year, region, survey 
year, sex, and a quartic in age. The US and 
Canada results also include a dummy 
variable for race, and state/provincial 
controls. 









































variable is log hourly wages. Instrument is 
a change in the minimum school leaving 
age (MSLA) in 1975. Controls are 
quadratic age. 
1953-1963 na -0.004 
(0.04) 
15.  Pischeke and 
Wachter 
(2008)  
Germany 1979, 1985-86, 
1991-92, and 1998-99 
data of the 
Differences-in-differences 
Dependent variable is log hourly wages. 














Career Survey (QaC) 
and 1989, 1991, 1993, 
and 1995-2004 data of 
the Micro Census, Men 
and Women 
grade since 1949. 
Controls are gender, a quartic in age, year, 
state of residence, and year of birth. 
















1979 - 1998 data of the 
General Household 
Survey (GHS) and 1975 
- 2001 data of the New 
Earnings Survey Panel 
Dataset (NESPD), Men 
and Women. 
Regression Discontinuity 
Dependent variable is log weekly earnings. 
Instrument is a raising of the minimum 
school leaving age in 1947. 
Controls are age, gender, and year-of-birth. 
























1997 - 2009 data of the 
Quarterly Labour Force 
Survey (QLFS), Men 
and women.  
Regression Discontinuity (closely 
related) Dependent variables are log 
hourly wages and log weekly earnings. 
Instrument is a dummy variable for the 
education expansion during 1989 and 
1994. Controls are a quartic in 
year-of-birth, a quartic in age, white, the 
quarterly unemployment rate, and cohort 









































1940 data of the 
Census, Men. 
Following Acemoglu and Angrist 
(2000),. 
Dependent variable is log weekly wages. 
Instruments are a compulsory attendance 
laws. 
Controls are a quadratic state time trend, 
race, nativity, and native English speaker. 









19.  Fang et al. 
(2012) 
China 1997, 2000, 2004, and 
2006 data of the China 
Health and Nutrition 
Survey (CHNS), Men 
and Women. 
CHNS contains data 
from 9 of China's 
provinces. These 9 
provinces account for 
44% of China's 
total population. 
Natural experiment 
Dependent variable is log annual earnings. 
Earnings include annual wage, income 
from businesses, faring, gardening, 
fishing, livestock, and retirement benefits. 
Instrument is a compulsory education law 
1986. 
Controls are a quadratic age, gender, ethnic 
status, marital status, urban residency, 
province, self-reported health status, and 
survey wave. 
(*): s.e. 









1990 - 2002 data of the 
French Enquête Emploi 
(EE) survey (France) 
and 1993 - 2006 data of 
the Quarterly Labour 
Force Survey (QLFS) 
(UK), Men and women. 
Regression Discontinuity 
Dependent variable is log hourly wages. 
Instruments are a dummy variable for the 
raising of the school-leaving age from 14 
to 16 in 1967 (France), and a dummy 
variable for the raising of the 
school-leaving age from 14 to 15 in 1972 
(UK). Controls are a quartic in age, a full 
set of survey year dummies, and a 
fourth-order polynomial in school cohort 




































1991-2005 data of the 
British Household 
Panel Survey, Men. 
Regression Discontinuity 
Dependent variable is log hourly wages. 
Instrument is a raising of the minimum 
school leaving age (RoSLA) in 1972. 
Controls are quadratic age, quadratic 







year-of-birth, region dummies, ethnicity 
dummies, survey period dummies, dummy 
for lived with both natural parents from 
birth to age 16, each parents’ occupational 
class dummies. (*): robust s.e. 
22.  Aydemir and 
Murat 
(2013) 
Turkey 2000 - 2010 data of the 




Dependent variable is log hourly wages. 
Instrument is the variation in the years of 
compulsory schooling across different 
birth 
Cohorts. 
Controls are year of birth cohort trend, age, 
year, relation to household head, marital 
status, type of employment, occupation, 
and sector of employment.  
(*): robust s.e. 
Linear time 




time trend for 














23.  Parinduri 
(2014) 
Indonesia 2007 data of the 
Indonesia Family Life 
Survey (IFLS), Men 
and Women. 
Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity 
Dependent variable is log hourly and 
monthly wages.. 
Instrument is an arbitrary rule that 
assigned students to a longer school year in 
1978-1979. 
Controls are gender, and age. 




















1960-1980 data of the 
US Censuses of 
Population, native-born 
Whites of 1905 – 1954 
birth cohorts. 
Dependent variable is log weekly wages. 
Instruments are schooling laws. 
Controls are quartic age, year of birth, state 
of birth, region, gender, census year and 
quality of schooling. 
The second coefficients result from the 


























[*] is the confidence intervals based on 























































25.  La and 
College 
(2014) 
China 1997, 2000, 2004, and 
2006 data of the China 
Health and Nutrition 
Survey (CHNS), Men 
and Women. 
CHNS contains data 
from 9 of China's 
provinces. These 9 
provinces account for 
44% of China's 
total population. 
Natural experiment 
Dependent variable is log annual earnings. 
Earnings include annual wage, income 
from businesses, faring, gardening, 
fishing, livestock, and retirement benefits. 
Instrument is a compulsory education law 
1986. 
Controls are a quadratic age, gender, ethnic 
status, marital status, urban residency, 
province, and self-reported health status. 






26.  Aydemir and 
Murat 
Turkey 2002 - 2013 data of the 
Turkish Household 
Regression Discontinuity 










(2015) Labour Force Surveys 
(HLFS), Men and 
Women. 
Instrument is the extension of compulsory 
schooling from 5 to 8 years in 1997. 
Controls are year of birth, age, and urban 









Notes: na – not available 




APPENDIX II SAMPLE DESIGN (TAKEN FROM LABOUR FORCE 
SURVEY OFFICIAL REPORT 2012) 
A Stratified Two - Stage Sampling was adopted for the survey. Provinces were constituted 
strata. The primary and secondary sampling units were enumeration areas (EAs) for municipal 
areas and non - municipal areas and private households / persons in the collective households 
respectively. 
Stratification: Provinces were constituted strata. There were altogether 77 strata. Each 
stratum was divided into two parts according to the type of local administration, namely 
municipal areas and non - municipal areas. 
Selection of primary sampling unit: The sample selection of enumeration areas was 
performed separately and independently in each part by using probability proportional to size 
- total number of households. The total sample enumeration areas were 5,970 from 127,460 
EAs. The total number of sample enumeration areas selected for enumeration by region and 
type of local administration was as follows: 
Selection of primary sampling unit (2012) 

























Total 5,970 3,060 2,910 
 
Selection of secondary sampling unit: Private households were our ultimate sampling units. 
A new listing of private households was made for every sample enumeration areas to serve as 
the sampling frame. In each sample EAs, a systematic sample of private households were 
selected with the following sample size: Municipal areas: 16 sample households per EAs; 
Non - municipal areas: 12 sample households per EAs. 
Before selecting sample private households in each sample EAs, the list of private 
households was rearranged by household’ s size - member of the households. All collective 




collective household were systematically selected for the interviewing. 
The total number of sample private households selected for enumeration by region and 
type of local administration was as follows: 
Selection of secondary sampling unit (2012) 






























APPENDIX III THE IDENTIFICATION FOR FUZZY REGRESSION 
DISCONTINUITY 
The identification for fuzzy regression discontinuity is as following: 
In the case of fuzzy regression discontinuity, treatment status or (actual) treatment 
indicator, 𝐷𝑖, is not a deterministic and discontinuous function of a covariate 𝑥𝑖. Instead, it 
utilizes discontinuities in the probability of treatment conditional on a covariate. In other 
words, treatment depends on whether 𝑥𝑖 ≥ 𝑥0 or 𝑥𝑖 < 𝑥0 and endogenous factors:  
𝑃[𝐷𝑖 = 1|𝑥𝑖] = {
𝑔1(𝑥𝑖), 𝑥𝑖  ≥ 𝑥0
𝑔0(𝑥𝑖), 𝑥𝑖 < 𝑥0
, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒  𝑔1(𝑥𝑖) ≠ 𝑔0(𝑥𝑖). 34 
E[𝐷𝑖|𝑥𝑖] =  𝑃[𝐷𝑖 = 1|𝑥𝑖] = 𝑔0(𝑥𝑖) + [𝑔1(𝑥𝑖) − 𝑔0(𝑥𝑖)]𝑇𝑖, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑇𝑖 = 1(𝑥𝑖  ≥ 𝑥0)   
To elaborate: 
If 𝑥𝑖  ≥ 𝑥0 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑇𝑖 = 1 then 𝑃[𝐷𝑖 = 1|𝑥𝑖] =  𝑔1(𝑋𝑖) 
If 𝑥𝑖  < 𝑥0 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑇𝑖 = 0 then 𝑃[𝐷𝑖 = 1|𝑥𝑖] =  𝑔0(𝑋𝑖) 
The dummy variable, 𝑇𝑖, indicates the point where there is a discontinuity in E[𝐷𝑖|𝑥𝑖]. Under 
the assumption of that 𝑔0(𝑥𝑖) and 𝑔1(𝑥𝑖) are pth-order polynomial functions, the fuzzy 
regression discontinuity can be mathematically illustrated as a simple Two-Stage least squares 
estimation (2SLS): 
E[𝐷𝑖|𝑥𝑖] =  𝛾00 + 𝛾01𝑥𝑖 + 𝛾02𝑥
2
𝑖 + ⋯ + 𝛾0𝑝𝑋𝑖
𝑝
+ [𝜋 + 𝛾1
∗𝑋𝑖 + 𝛾2
∗𝑋𝑖





𝐷𝑖  = 1 if observation i receives treatment and,  
0 if observation i does not receive treatment. 
𝑥0  = the cut-off point. 
With IV estimation, the first stage is as following: 
E[𝐷𝑖|𝑋𝑖] =  𝛾00 + 𝛾01𝑋𝑖 +  𝛾02𝑋𝑖
2 + ⋯ + 𝛾0𝑝𝑋𝑖
𝑝
+ 𝜋𝑇𝑖 + 𝛾1
∗𝑋𝑖𝑇𝑖 + 𝛾2
∗𝑋𝑖




                                                        
34 Most of mathematic expressions and equations are directly quoted from the book named, “Mostly Harmless 




𝐷𝑖 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐼(𝑥𝑖 > 𝑥0) + 𝜂𝑖 
The second stage is as following: 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1?̂?𝑖 + 𝛿(𝑥𝑖) + 𝑖 
According to Hahn, Todd, and van der Klaauw (2011), fuzzy regression discontinuity 
estimates local average treatment effect (LATE), or the average treatment effect of the 




























APPENDIX IV FULL EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
First Stage: Estimated Effect of Compulsory Education Law on Education Attainment, 
Thailand, Ages 15-60, 1986-2012 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  (First Stage) 





















(0.713) (0.0868) (0.0884) (0.105) (0.106) (0.105) (0.105) (0.0837) (0.0834) 
Fixed 
Effects: 
                




Quartic Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region  
x Year of 
Birth 
(Cohort) 
No No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Additional 
Controls 


















            Gender Gender Gender Gender 
        Urban Urban 




















R-squared 0.091 0.123 0.125 0.137 0.139 0.138 0.140 0.192 0.194 
Note: The dependent variables are number of years of schooling. Each regression includes controls for a birth 
cohort quartic polynomial or birth cohort dummies, regional dummies (except for the models with explicit region 
variables), and an indicator whether a cohort faced a new compulsory education law (six years of compulsory 
education). Column (4) to (9) also include age controls: a quadratic polynomial and fixed effects where indicated. 
Each regression includes the sample of 15 to 60 years old from the 1986 through 2012 Labour Force Surveys. 
Data are first aggregated into cell means and weighted by cell size. Regressions are clustered by birth cohort. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.1, respectively.  












Reduced Form: Estimated Effect of Compulsory Education Law on Log Annual 
Earnings, Thailand, Ages 15-60, 1986-2012 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  (Reduced Form) 





















(0.0705) (0.0326) (0.0325) (0.0291) (0.0285) (0.0298) (0.0292) (0.0255) (0.0247) 
Fixed 
Effects: 
                




Quartic Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region  
x Year of 
Birth 
(Cohort) 
No No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Additional 
Controls 


















            Gender Gender Gender Gender 
        Urban Urban 




















R-squared 0.017 0.088 0.090 0.125 0.127 0.133 0.135 0.199 0.201 
Note: The dependent variables are log monthly wages. Each regression includes controls for a birth cohort 
quartic polynomial or birth cohort dummies, regional dummies (except for the models with explicit region 
variables), and an indicator whether a cohort faced a new compulsory education law (six years of compulsory 
education). Column (4) to (9) also include age controls: a quadratic polynomial and fixed effects where indicated. 
Each regression includes the sample of 15 to 60 years old from the 1986 through 2012 Labour Force Surveys. 
Data are first aggregated into cell means and weighted by cell size. Regressions are clustered by birth cohort. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.1, respectively.  

















OLS Returns to Schooling Estimates for Log Monthly Wages, 15-60 Years Old, 
1986-2012 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  (OLS) 




0.113*** 0.111*** 0.111*** 0.112*** 0.112*** 0.112*** 0.112*** 0.109*** 0.109*** 
(0.00366) (0.00378) (0.00378) (0.00425) (0.00426) (0.00412) (0.00412) (0.00389) (0.00390) 
Fixed Effects:                 
Region No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year of Birth 
(Cohort) 
Quartic Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region  
x Year of 
Birth (Cohort) 
No No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Additional 
Controls 












            Gender Gender Gender Gender 
        Urban Urban 
          Observations 1,307,988 1,307,016 1,307,016 1,307,016 1,307,016 1,307,016 1,307,016 1,307,016 1,307,016 
R-squared 0.528 0.567 0.569 0.602 0.603 0.614 0.614 0.621 0.622 
Note: The dependent variables are log monthly wages. Each regression includes controls for a birth cohort 
quartic polynomial or birth cohort dummies, regional dummies (except for the models with explicit region 
variables), and an indicator whether a cohort faced a new compulsory education law (six years of compulsory 
education). Column (4) to (9) also include age controls: a quadratic polynomial and fixed effects where indicated. 
Each regression includes the sample of 15 to 60 years old from the 1986 through 2012 Labour Force Surveys. 
Data are first aggregated into cell means and weighted by cell size. Regressions are clustered by birth cohort. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.1, respectively.  




















IV Returns to Schooling Estimates for Log Monthly Wages, 15-60 Years Old, 1986-2012 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  (IV) 





















(0.00548) (0.00424) (0.00420) (0.00354) (0.00345) (0.00363) (0.00355) (0.00352) (0.00342) 
Fixed 
Effects: 
                
Region No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year of Birth 
(Cohort) 
Quartic Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region  
x Year of 
Birth 
(Cohort) 
No No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Additional 
Controls 












            Gender Gender Gender Gender 
        Urban Urban 
          Observation
s 
1,307,988 1,307,016 1,307,016 1,307,016 1,307,016 1,307,016 1,307,016 1,307,016 1,307,016 
R-squared 0.486 0.533 0.535 0.575 0.576 0.581 0.582 0.588 0.589 
Note: The dependent variables are log monthly wages. Each regression includes controls for a birth cohort 
quartic polynomial or birth cohort dummies, regional dummies (except for the models with explicit region 
variables), and an indicator whether a cohort faced a new compulsory education law (six years of compulsory 
education). Column (4) to (9) also include age controls: a quadratic polynomial and fixed effects where indicated. 
Each regression includes the sample of 15 to 60 years old from the 1986 through 2012 Labour Force Surveys. 
Data are first aggregated into cell means and weighted by cell size. Regressions are clustered by birth cohort. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.1, respectively.  







APPENDIX V FULL ESTIMATES FROM TWO-LEVEL DISAGGREGATED ANALYSIS 
1. Gender  
Dependent Variables OLS IV Bias gap Observations 
Base model     
Log monthly wages,  0.112*** 0.0856*** 0.0264 1,307,016 
all workers (0.00425) (0.00354)   
Log monthly wages,  0.108*** 0.0808*** 0.0272 662,753 
male (0.00439) (0.00374)   
Log monthly wages,  0.116*** 0.0856*** 0.0304 644,263 
female (0.00391) (0.00367)   
Gender and Cohort     
Log monthly wages, male  0.122*** 0.0827*** 0.0393 413,455 
cohort 1955-1970 (0.00340) (0.00337)   
Log monthly wages, male  0.0965*** 0.0807*** 0.0158 512,457 
cohort 1961-1985 (0.00410) (0.00376)   
Log monthly wages, female  0.128*** 0.0870*** 0.041 399,067 
cohort 1955-1970 (0.00359) (0.00386)   
Log monthly wages, female  0.106*** 0.0856*** 0.0204 504,292 
cohort 1961-1985 (0.00323) (0.00367)   
Gender and Area     
Log monthly wages, urban male  0.102*** 0.0776*** 0.0244 424,146 
 (0.00354) (0.00192)   
Log monthly wages, rural male  0.101*** 0.0687*** 0.0323 238,607 
 (0.00581) (0.00657)   
Log monthly wages, urban female  0.113*** 0.0871*** 0.0259 432,471 
 (0.00360) (0.00210)   
Log monthly wages, rural female  0.106*** 0.0668*** 0.0392 211,792 
 (0.00440) (0.00613)   
Gender and Region     
Log monthly wages, male  0.0945*** 0.0656*** 0.0289 82,071 
Bangkok and Metropolitan (0.00214) (0.00261)   
Log monthly wages, male  0.121*** 0.101*** 0.02 126,355 




Log monthly wages, male  0.131*** 0.0871*** 0.0439 151,593 
North eastern area (0.00401) (0.00425)   
Log monthly wages, male  0.0862*** 0.0659*** 0.0203 116,980 
Southern area (0.00503) (0.00500)   
Log monthly wages, male  0.0959*** 0.0750*** 0.0209 186,181 
Central area (0.00462) (0.00324)   
Log monthly wages, female  0.0968*** 0.0796*** 0.0172 80,328 
Bangkok and Metropolitan (0.00195) (0.00118)   
Log monthly wages, female  0.125*** 0.0938*** 0.0312 129,881 
Northern area (0.00414) (0.00459)   
Log monthly wages, female  0.148*** 0.101*** 0.047 146,544 
North eastern area (0.00366) (0.0101)   
Log monthly wages, female  0.0998*** 0.0774*** 0.0224 105,201 
Southern area (0.00422) (0.00273)   
Log monthly wages, female  0.0981*** 0.0738*** 0.0243 182,854 
Central area (0.00435) (0.00232)   
Gender and Economic Sector     
Log monthly wages, male  0.0944*** 0.0596*** 0.0348 230,334 
agricultural and elementary workers (0.00488) (0.00381)   
Log monthly wages, male 0.0990*** 0.0687*** 0.0303 138,554 
non-agricultural manual workers (0.00522) (0.00284)   
Log monthly wages, male 0.0903*** 0.0709*** 0.0194 293,022 
desk, service, and intellectual workers (0.00290) (0.00126)   
Log monthly wages, female  0.104*** 0.0476*** 0.0564 198,365 
agricultural and elementary workers (0.00437) (0.00514)   
Log monthly wages, female 0.0831*** 0.0675*** 0.0156 99,720 
non-agricultural manual workers (0.00335) (0.00286)   
Log monthly wages, female 0.109*** 0.0850*** 0.024 344,083 
desk, service, and intellectual workers (0.00329) (0.00286)   
Notes: The dependent variables are log monthly wages. Each regression includes controls for a birth cohort dummies (except for the models with explicit cohort variables), 
regional dummies (except for the models with explicit region variables), and an indicator whether a cohort faced a new compulsory education law (6 years of compulsory 
education). Moreover, each model also includes age controls: a quadratic polynomial. Each regression includes the sample of 15 to 60 years old from the 1986 through 2012 
Labour Force Surveys. Data are first aggregated into cell means and weighted by cell size. Regressions are clustered by birth cohort. ***, **, and * indicate p < 0.01, p < 0.05, 
and p < 0.1, respectively. Bias gap refers to the difference between OLS estimate and the IV estimate. 




2. Area of Residence 
Dependent Variables OLS IV Bias gap Observations 
Base model     
Log monthly wages,  0.112*** 0.0856*** 0.0264 1,307,016 
all workers (0.00425) (0.00354) 
  
Log monthly wages,  0.108*** 0.0849*** 0.0231 856,617 
urban (0.00369) (0.00169) 
  
Log monthly wages,  0.105*** 0.0709*** 0.0341 450,399 
rural (0.0053) (0.00622) 
  
Area and Gender      
Log monthly wages, urban male  0.102*** 0.0776*** 0.0244 424,146 
 (0.00354) (0.00192)   
Log monthly wages, rural male  0.101*** 0.0687*** 0.0323 238,607 
 (0.00581) (0.00657)   
Log monthly wages, urban female  0.113*** 0.0871*** 0.0259 432,471 
 (0.00360) (0.00210)   
Log monthly wages, rural female  0.106*** 0.0668*** 0.0392 211,792 
 (0.00440) (0.00613)   
Area and Cohort     
Log monthly wages, urban  0.120*** 0.0858*** 0.0342 537,768 
cohort 1955-1970 (0.00292) (0.00170)   
Log monthly wages, urban  0.0984*** 0.0848*** 0.0136 663,259 
cohort 1961-1985 (0.00333) (0.00175)   
Log monthly wages, rural  0.123*** 0.0718*** 0.0512 274,754 
cohort 1955-1970 (0.00506)*** (0.00640)   
Log monthly wages, rural  0.0927*** 0.0712*** 0.0215 353,490 
cohort 1961-1985 (0.00448) (0.00609)   
Area and Region   
 
 
Log monthly wages, urban  0.0962*** 0.0758*** 0.0204 143,357 
Bangkok and Metropolitan (0.00198) (0.00143)   








Log monthly wages, urban  0.129*** 0.0965*** 0.0325 192,139 
North eastern area (0.00331) (0.00336)   
Log monthly wages, urban  0.0912*** 0.0726*** 0.0186 133,456 
Southern area (0.00392) (0.00245)   
Log monthly wages, urban  0.0957*** 0.0773*** 0.0184 225,565 
Central area (0.00419) (0.00103)   
Log monthly wages, rural  0.0876*** 0.0680*** 0.0196 19,042 
Bangkok and Metropolitan (0.00291) (0.00237)   
Log monthly wages, rural  0.115*** 0.0818*** 0.0332 93,276 
Northern area (0.00509) (0.00766)   
Log monthly wages, rural  0.142*** 0.0645*** 0.0775 105,998 
North eastern area (0.00563) (0.0143)   
Log monthly wages, rural  0.0838*** 0.0660*** 0.0178 88,725 
Southern area (0.00554) (0.00481)   
Log monthly wages, rural  0.0938*** 0.0695*** 0.0243 143,470 
Central area (0.00509) (0.00435)   
Area and Industry     
Log monthly wages, urban  0.109*** 0.0708*** 0.0382 171,004 
agricultural and elementary workers (0.00482) (0.00346)   
Log monthly wages, urban 0.0971*** 0.0750*** 0.0221 158,304 
non-agricultural manual workers (0.00441) (0.00139)   
Log monthly wages, urban 0.103*** 0.0834*** 0.0196 524,584 
desk, service, and intellectual workers (0.00305) (0.000594)   
Log monthly wages, rural  0.0776*** 0.0435*** 0.0341 257,695 
agricultural and elementary workers (0.00418) (0.00545)   
Log monthly wages, rural  0.0797*** 0.0590*** 0.0207 79,970 
non-agricultural manual workers (0.00451) (0.00618)   
Log monthly wages, rural  0.0969*** 0.0751*** 0.0218 112,521 
desk, service, and intellectual workers (0.00414) (0.00306)   
Notes: The dependent variables are log monthly wages. Each regression includes controls for a birth cohort dummies (except for the models with explicit cohort variables), 
regional dummies (except for the models with explicit region variables), and an indicator whether a cohort faced a new compulsory education law (6 years of compulsory 
education). Moreover, each model also includes age controls: a quadratic polynomial. Each regression includes the sample of 15 to 60 years old from the 1986 through 2012 
Labour Force Surveys. Data are first aggregated into cell means and weighted by cell size. Regressions are clustered by birth cohort. ***, **, and * indicate p < 0.01, p < 0.05, 
and p < 0.1, respectively. Bias gap refers to the difference between OLS estimate and the IV estimate. 





Dependent Variables OLS IV Bias gap Observations 
Base model     
Log monthly wages,  0.112*** 0.0856*** 0.0264 1,307,016 
all workers (0.00425) (0.00354) 
  
Log monthly wages, 0.126*** 0.0872*** 0.0388 812,522 
cohort 1955-1970 (0.00354) (0.00347) 
  
Log monthly wages, 0.101*** 0.0856*** 0.0154 1,016,749 
cohort 1961-1985 (0.00377) (0.00354) 
  
Cohort and Gender     
Log monthly wages, male  0.122*** 0.0827*** 0.0393 413,455 
cohort 1955-1970 (0.00340) (0.00337)   
Log monthly wages, male  0.0965*** 0.0807*** 0.0158 512,457 
cohort 1961-1985 (0.00410) (0.00376)   
Log monthly wages, female  0.128*** 0.0870*** 0.041 399,067 
cohort 1955-1970 (0.00359) (0.00386)   
Log monthly wages, female  0.106*** 0.0856*** 0.0204 504,292 
cohort 1961-1985 (0.00323) (0.00367)   
Cohort and Area     
Log monthly wages, urban  0.120*** 0.0858*** 0.0342 537,768 
cohort 1955-1970 (0.00292) (0.00170) 
  
Log monthly wages, urban  0.0984*** 0.0848*** 0.0136 663,259 
cohort 1961-1985 (0.00333) (0.00175) 
  
Log monthly wages, rural  0.123*** 0.0718*** 0.0512 274,754 
cohort 1955-1970 (0.00506)*** (0.00640) 
  
Log monthly wages, rural  0.0927*** 0.0712*** 0.0215 353,490 
cohort 1961-1985 (0.00448) (0.00609) 
 
 
Cohort and Region     
Log monthly wages, cohort 1955-1970 0.103*** 0.0741*** 0.0289 96,073 
Bangkok and Metropolitan (0.00154) (0.000922)   








Log monthly wages, cohort 1955-1970 0.150*** 0.0991*** 0.0509 191,927 
North eastern area (0.00349) (0.00656)   
Log monthly wages, cohort 1955-1970 0.109*** 0.0750*** 0.034 131,534 
Southern area (0.00428) (0.00312)   
Log monthly wages, cohort 1955-1970 0.113*** 0.0785*** 0.0345 220,198 
Central area (0.00373) (0.00199)   
Log monthly wages, cohort 1961-1985 0.0909*** 0.0748*** 0.0161 131,317 
Bangkok and Metropolitan (0.00201) (0.00109)   
Log monthly wages, cohort 1961-1985 0.112*** 0.0991*** 0.0129 188,780 
Northern area (0.00380) (0.00434)   
Log monthly wages, cohort 1961-1985 0.130*** 0.0979*** 0.0321 228,013 
North eastern area (0.00331) (0.00669)   
Log monthly wages, cohort 1961-1985 0.0812*** 0.0732*** 0.008 177,346 
Southern area (0.00400) (0.00349)   
Log monthly wages, cohort 1961-1985 0.0863*** 0.0763*** 0.01 291,794 
Central area (0.00406) (0.00231)   
Cohort and Industry     
Log monthly wages, cohort 1955-1970 0.118*** 0.0614*** 0.0566 267,602 
agricultural and elementary workers (0.00488) (0.00501)   
Log monthly wages, cohort 1955-1970 0.114*** 0.0727*** 0.0413 128,681 
non-agricultural manual workers (0.00390) (0.00306)   
Log monthly wages, cohort 1955-1970 0.111*** 0.0827*** 0.0283 415,123 
desk, service, and intellectual workers (0.00266) (0.000801)   
Log monthly wages, cohort 1961-1985 0.0902*** 0.0569*** 0.0333 330,622 
agricultural and elementary workers (0.00387) (0.00412)   
Log monthly wages, cohort 1961-1985 0.0850*** 0.0700*** 0.015 199,898 
non-agricultural manual workers (0.00444) (0.00298)   
Log monthly wages, cohort 1961-1985 0.0924*** 0.0825*** 0.0099 483,566 
desk, service, and intellectual workers (0.00288) (0.000884)   
Notes: The dependent variables are log monthly wages. Each regression includes controls for a birth cohort dummies (except for the models with explicit cohort variables), 
regional dummies (except for the models with explicit region variables), and an indicator whether a cohort faced a new compulsory education law (6 years of compulsory 
education). Moreover, each model also includes age controls: a quadratic polynomial. Each regression includes the sample of 15 to 60 years old from the 1986 through 2012 
Labour Force Surveys. Data are first aggregated into cell means and weighted by cell size. Regressions are clustered by birth cohort. ***, **, and * indicate p < 0.01, p < 0.05, 
and p < 0.1, respectively. Bias gap refers to the difference between OLS estimate and the IV estimate. 





Dependent Variables OLS IV Bias gap Observations 
Base model     
Log monthly wages,  0.112*** 0.0856*** 0.0264 1,307,016 
all workers (0.00425) (0.00354) 
  
Log monthly wages,  0.0956*** 0.0751*** 0.0205 162,399 
BKK (0.00204) (0.00116) 
  
Log monthly wages,  0.124*** 0.0990*** 0.025 256,236 
North (0.00439) (0.00436) 
  
Log monthly wages,  0.140*** 0.0977*** 0.0423 298,137 
Northeast (0.0038) (0.00683) 
  
Log monthly wages,  0.0928*** 0.0733*** 0.0195 222,181 
South (0.00473) (0.00343) 
  
Log monthly wages,  0.0973*** 0.0766*** 0.0207 369,035 
Centre (0.00459) (0.00225) 
  
Region and Gender      
Log monthly wages, male  0.0945*** 0.0656*** 0.0289 82,071 
Bangkok and Metropolitan (0.00214) (0.00261)   
Log monthly wages, male  0.121*** 0.101*** 0.02 126,355 
Northern area (0.00458) (0.00604)   
Log monthly wages, male  0.131*** 0.0871*** 0.0439 151,593 
North eastern area (0.00401) (0.00425)   
Log monthly wages, male  0.0862*** 0.0659*** 0.0203 116,980 
Southern area (0.00503) (0.00500)   
Log monthly wages, male  0.0959*** 0.0750*** 0.0209 186,181 
Central area (0.00462) (0.00324)   
Log monthly wages, female  0.0968*** 0.0796*** 0.0172 80,328 
Bangkok and Metropolitan (0.00195) (0.00118)   
Log monthly wages, female  0.125*** 0.0938*** 0.0312 129,881 
Northern area (0.00414) (0.00459)   
Log monthly wages, female  0.148*** 0.101*** 0.047 146,544 
North eastern area (0.00366) (0.0101)   
Log monthly wages, female  0.0998*** 0.0774*** 0.0224 105,201 
Southern area (0.00422) (0.00273)   
Log monthly wages, female  0.0981*** 0.0738*** 0.0243 182,854 
Central area (0.00435) (0.00232)   
Region and Cohort     
Log monthly wages, cohort 1955-1970 0.103*** 0.0741*** 0.0289 96,073 
Bangkok and Metropolitan (0.00154) (0.000922) 
  
Log monthly wages, cohort 1955-1970 0.136*** 0.100*** 0.036 173,735 
Northern area (0.00381) (0.00465) 
  
Log monthly wages, cohort 1955-1970 0.150*** 0.0991*** 0.0509 191,927 
North eastern area (0.00349) (0.00656) 
  
Log monthly wages, cohort 1955-1970 0.109*** 0.0750*** 0.034 131,534 
Southern area (0.00428) (0.00312) 
  
Log monthly wages, cohort 1955-1970 0.113*** 0.0785*** 0.0345 220,198 
Central area (0.00373) (0.00199) 
  
Log monthly wages, cohort 1961-1985 0.0909*** 0.0748*** 0.0161 131,317 
Bangkok and Metropolitan (0.00201) (0.00109) 
  
Log monthly wages, cohort 1961-1985 0.112*** 0.0991*** 0.0129 188,780 
Northern area (0.00380) (0.00434) 
  
Log monthly wages, cohort 1961-1985 0.130*** 0.0979*** 0.0321 228,013 
North eastern area (0.00331) (0.00669) 
  
Log monthly wages, cohort 1961-1985 0.0812*** 0.0732*** 0.008 177,346 
Southern area (0.00400) (0.00349) 
  
Log monthly wages, cohort 1961-1985 0.0863*** 0.0763*** 0.01 291,794 
Central area (0.00406) (0.00231) 
  
Region and Area     
Log monthly wages, urban  0.0962*** 0.0758*** 0.0204 143,357 
Bangkok and Metropolitan (0.00198) (0.00143) 
  
Log monthly wages, urban  0.121*** 0.0997*** 0.0213 162,960 





Log monthly wages, urban  0.129*** 0.0965*** 0.0325 192,139 
North eastern area (0.00331) (0.00336) 
  
Log monthly wages, urban  0.0912*** 0.0726*** 0.0186 133,456 
Southern area (0.00392) (0.00245) 
  
Log monthly wages, urban  0.0957*** 0.0773*** 0.0184 225,565 
Central area (0.00419) (0.00103) 
  
Log monthly wages, rural  0.0876*** 0.0680*** 0.0196 19,042 
Bangkok and Metropolitan (0.00291) (0.00237) 
  
Log monthly wages, rural  0.115*** 0.0818*** 0.0332 93,276 
Northern area (0.00509) (0.00766) 
  
Log monthly wages, rural  0.142*** 0.0645*** 0.0775 105,998 
North eastern area (0.00563) (0.0143) 
  
Log monthly wages, rural  0.0838*** 0.0660*** 0.0178 88,725 
Southern area (0.00554) (0.00481) 
  
Log monthly wages, rural  0.0938*** 0.0695*** 0.0243 143,470 
Central area (0.00509) (0.00435) 
  
Region and Industry     
Log monthly wages, Bangkok and Metropolitan  0.0916*** 0.0590*** 0.0326 18,206 
agricultural and elementary workers (0.00198) (0.00341)   
Log monthly wages, Northern area  0.108*** 0.0693*** 0.0387 99,008 
agricultural and elementary workers (0.00486) (0.00587)   
Log monthly wages, North eastern area  0.136*** 0.0407*** 0.0953 122,801 
agricultural and elementary workers (0.00528) (0.00903)   
Log monthly wages, Southern area  0.0729*** 0.0573*** 0.0156 80,575 
agricultural and elementary workers (0.00485) (0.00449)   
Log monthly wages, Central area  0.0884*** 0.0628*** 0.0256 108,148 
agricultural and elementary workers (0.00490) (0.00412)   
Log monthly wages, Bangkok and Metropolitan  0.101*** 0.0731*** 0.0279 50,096 
non-agricultural manual workers (0.00372) (0.00241)   
Log monthly wages, Northern area  0.0960*** 0.0760*** 0.02 34,490 
non-agricultural manual workers (0.00548) (0.00330)   
Log monthly wages, North eastern area  0.0971*** 0.0598*** 0.0373 32,626 
non-agricultural manual workers (0.00499) (0.00657)   
Log monthly wages, Southern area  0.0837*** 0.0644*** 0.0193 26,171 
non-agricultural manual workers (0.00520) (0.00937)   
Log monthly wages, Central area  0.0889*** 0.0693*** 0.0196 95,064 
non-agricultural manual workers (0.00498) (0.00417)   
Log monthly wages, Bangkok and Metropolitan  0.0931*** 0.0791*** 0.014 91,729 
desk, service, and intellectual workers (0.00174) (0.00241)   
Log monthly wages, Northern area  0.114*** 0.0944*** 0.0196 122,639 
desk, service, and intellectual workers (0.00344) (0.00278)   
Log monthly wages, North eastern area  0.113*** 0.0929*** 0.0201 142,589 
desk, service, and intellectual workers (0.00303) (0.00255)   
Log monthly wages, Southern area  0.0899*** 0.0702*** 0.0197 115,376 
desk, service, and intellectual workers (0.00368) (0.00183)   
Log monthly wages, Central area  0.0949*** 0.0774*** 0.0175 165,532 
desk, service, and intellectual workers (0.00375) (0.00188)   
Notes: The dependent variables are log monthly wages. Each regression includes controls for a birth cohort dummies (except 
for the models with explicit cohort variables), regional dummies (except for the models with explicit region variables), and an 
indicator whether a cohort faced a new compulsory education law (6 years of compulsory education). Moreover, each model 
also includes age controls: a quadratic polynomial. Each regression includes the sample of 15 to 60 years old from the 1986 
through 2012 Labour Force Surveys. Data are first aggregated into cell means and weighted by cell size. Regressions are 
clustered by birth cohort. ***, **, and * indicate p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.1, respectively. Bias gap refers to the difference 
between OLS estimate and the IV estimate. 
Source: Author’s compilation based on LFS 1986-2012. 
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5. Economic Sector 
Dependent Variables OLS IV Bias gap Observations 
Base model     
Log monthly wages,  0.112*** 0.0856*** 0.0264 1,307,016 
all workers (0.00425) (0.00354) 
  
Log monthly wages,   0.101*** 0.0590*** 0.042 428,699 
Agricultural sector (0.00479) (0.0044) 
  
Log monthly wages,  0.0936*** 0.0706*** 0.023 238,274 
Manufacturing sector  (0.00468) (0.00285) 
  
Log monthly wages,  0.102*** 0.0825*** 0.0195 637,105 
Service sector (0.00325) (0.00078) 
  
Industry and Gender     
Log monthly wages, male  0.0944*** 0.0596*** 0.0348 230,334 
agricultural and elementary workers (0.00488) (0.00381) 
 
 
Log monthly wages, male 0.0990*** 0.0687*** 0.0303 138,554 
non-agricultural manual workers (0.00522) (0.00284) 
 
 
Log monthly wages, male 0.0903*** 0.0709*** 0.0194 293,022 
desk, service, and intellectual workers (0.00290) (0.00126) 
 
 
Log monthly wages, female  0.104*** 0.0476*** 0.0564 198,365 
agricultural and elementary workers (0.00437) (0.00514) 
 
 
Log monthly wages, female 0.0831*** 0.0675*** 0.0156 99,720 
non-agricultural manual workers (0.00335) (0.00286) 
 
 
Log monthly wages, female 0.109*** 0.0850*** 0.024 344,083 
desk, service, and intellectual workers (0.00329) (0.00286) 
 
 
Industry and Cohort     
Log monthly wages, cohort 1955-1970 0.118*** 0.0614*** 0.0566 267,602 
agricultural and elementary workers (0.00488) (0.00501) 
  
Log monthly wages, cohort 1955-1970 0.114*** 0.0727*** 0.0413 128,681 
non-agricultural manual workers (0.00390) (0.00306) 
  
Log monthly wages, cohort 1955-1970 0.111*** 0.0827*** 0.0283 415,123 
desk, service, and intellectual workers (0.00266) (0.000801) 
  
Log monthly wages, cohort 1961-1985 0.0902*** 0.0569*** 0.0333 330,622 
agricultural and elementary workers (0.00387) (0.00412) 
  
Log monthly wages, cohort 1961-1985 0.0850*** 0.0700*** 0.015 199,898 
non-agricultural manual workers (0.00444) (0.00298) 
  
Log monthly wages, cohort 1961-1985 0.0924*** 0.0825*** 0.0099 483,566 
desk, service, and intellectual workers (0.00288) (0.000884) 
  
Industry and Area     
Log monthly wages, urban  0.109*** 0.0708*** 0.0382 171,004 
agricultural and elementary workers (0.00482) (0.00346) 
  
Log monthly wages, urban 0.0971*** 0.0750*** 0.0221 158,304 
non-agricultural manual workers (0.00441) (0.00139) 
  
Log monthly wages, urban 0.103*** 0.0834*** 0.0196 524,584 
desk, service, and intellectual workers (0.00305) (0.000594) 
  
Log monthly wages, rural  0.0776*** 0.0435*** 0.0341 257,695 




Log monthly wages, rural  0.0797*** 0.0590*** 0.0207 79,970 
non-agricultural manual workers (0.00451) (0.00618) 
  
Log monthly wages, rural  0.0969*** 0.0751*** 0.0218 112,521 
desk, service, and intellectual workers (0.00414) (0.00306) 
 
 
Industry and Region     





agricultural and elementary workers (0.00198) (0.00341) 
 
 
Log monthly wages, Northern area  0.108*** 0.0693*** 0.0387 99,008 
agricultural and elementary workers (0.00486) (0.00587) 
 
 
Log monthly wages, North eastern area  0.136*** 0.0407*** 0.0953 122,801 
agricultural and elementary workers (0.00528) (0.00903) 
 
 
Log monthly wages, Southern area  0.0729*** 0.0573*** 0.0156 80,575 
agricultural and elementary workers (0.00485) (0.00449) 
 
 
Log monthly wages, Central area  0.0884*** 0.0628*** 0.0256 108,148 
agricultural and elementary workers (0.00490) (0.00412) 
 
 





non-agricultural manual workers (0.00372) (0.00241) 
 
 
Log monthly wages, Northern area  0.0960*** 0.0760*** 0.02 34,490 
non-agricultural manual workers (0.00548) (0.00330) 
 
 
Log monthly wages, North eastern area  0.0971*** 0.0598*** 0.0373 32,626 
non-agricultural manual workers (0.00499) (0.00657) 
 
 
Log monthly wages, Southern area  0.0837*** 0.0644*** 0.0193 26,171 
non-agricultural manual workers (0.00520) (0.00937) 
 
 
Log monthly wages, Central area  0.0889*** 0.0693*** 0.0196 95,064 
non-agricultural manual workers (0.00498) (0.00417) 
 
 





desk, service, and intellectual workers (0.00174) (0.00241) 
 
 
Log monthly wages, Northern area  0.114*** 0.0944*** 0.0196 122,639 
desk, service, and intellectual workers (0.00344) (0.00278) 
 
 
Log monthly wages, North eastern area  0.113*** 0.0929*** 0.0201 142,589 
desk, service, and intellectual workers (0.00303) (0.00255) 
 
 
Log monthly wages, Southern area  0.0899*** 0.0702*** 0.0197 115,376 
desk, service, and intellectual workers (0.00368) (0.00183) 
 
 
Log monthly wages, Central area  0.0949*** 0.0774*** 0.0175 165,532 
desk, service, and intellectual workers (0.00375) (0.00188) 
 
 
Notes: The dependent variables are log monthly wages. Each regression includes controls for a birth cohort 
dummies (except for the models with explicit cohort variables), regional dummies (except for the models with 
explicit region variables), and an indicator whether a cohort faced a new compulsory education law (6 years of 
compulsory education). Moreover, each model also includes age controls: a quadratic polynomial. Each 
regression includes the sample of 15 to 60 years old from the 1986 through 2012 Labour Force Surveys. Data are 
first aggregated into cell means and weighted by cell size. Regressions are clustered by birth cohort. ***, **, and 
* indicate p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.1, respectively. Bias gap refers to the difference between OLS estimate 
and the IV estimate. 
Source: Author’s compilation based on LFS 1986-2012. 
